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TO FUTURE PROGRAMS
SUMMA RY
A total of I, 178 Saturn significant Unsatisfactory Condition Reports
(UCR's), (approximately 95 percent of which occurred during or
subsequent to Post-Manufacturing Checkout), and 86 other problems
that reached senior contractor/MSFC management attention, were
reviewed to formulate this document. Significant UCR's are those
reported conditions that could cause loss of life, loss of mission, or a
launch scrub. All duplications and unverified failures were eliminated.
Of the resulting 422 problem entries, 187 or 44 percent were electrical
problems, and 235 or 56 percent were mechanical problems. The
problems in each section were collated and indexed by type of hardware.
Connectors experienced the greatest number of problems in the
electrical section and accounted for 18 percent of the reported problems,
while relays and switches were next with 15 percent. In the :mechanical
section, valves and modules experienced the largest number of
problems and accounted for 34 percent of the reported problems.
The problems were indexed into five major categories of problem
orientation. Overall, 29 percent are Design oriented problems, 25
percent are Human Error, 4 percent are Maintenance, 21 percent are
Manufacturing, and 21 percent are Procedures problems. In the
electrical section, Design accounted for 26 percent of the problems,
Human Error 30 percent, Maintenance 2 percent, Manufacturing 24 percent,
and Procedures 18 percent. In the mechanical section, Design accounted
for 31 percent of the problems, Human Error 20 percent, Maintenance
6 percent, Manufacturing 19 percent, and Procedures Z4 percent.
The problems were also indexed according to the hardware physical
condition. In the electrical section, the physical condition of contaminated
or corroded accounted for 14 percent of the problems and shorted
accounted for 9 percent. Each of the other physical conditions in the
electrical problem section accounted for 7 percent or less. In the
mechanical section, bent, chipped, cracked, or broken accounted for 20
percent of the problems while contaminated, corroded, or eroded
accounted for 18 percent. Each of the other physical conditions were
I0 percent or less.
ix
Fifty-two new inspection techniques are identified that were either
developed or refined during the Saturn program. The techniques range
from individual component inspection to overall system and end item
inspections for both hardware and software.
X
INT RODUC TION
This document has been prepared to summarize the problems encountered and
new techniques developed on the Saturn program, and to summarize the
experiences and practical benefits obtained for dissemination and use on
future programs. A total of 1,264 Saturn significant Unsatisfactory
Condition Reports (UCR's)and other problem reports were reviewed to
formulate this document.
The document is divided into three major sections: an electrical problem
section, a mechanical problem section, and a new technique section. Each
problem section is prefaced by three indices :
1. Hardware Index - Classifies the problems by type of hardware
such as valves, switches, etc.
Problem Index - Lists the problems with the hardware by the
following types of problems:
Design
Human Error
Maintenance
- Problems resulting from inadequate
design.
- Problems resulting from human error,
workmanship, etc.
- Problems resulting from the lack of
maintenance/preventive maintenance and
inadequate proces sing controls subsequent
to manufacture.
Manufacturing
Procedures
- Problems resulting from the manufacturing
process, excluding procedural and human
error problems.
- Problems resulting from deficient
procedures.
.
Condition Index - Denotes the physical condition of the hardware
after problem occurrence.
Each individual entry in the electrical and mechanical problem summaries
as referenced by the indices contains the following information:
Item Number
Hardware Nora enclature
Reference Code
Problem Description
Problem Cause
Problem Effect
Remarks /
Suggestions
All duplication has been eliminated in the document in that items with
the same hardware nomenclature, problem, and cause appear only
once; however, where the problem and/or cause is not the same, the item
is again identified. The entries are collated into hardware families or
similar hardware families and it should be noted that the figures and
numbers reflected on the hardware, problem, and condition grapl_s relate
only to the contents of this document.
Contained in section three of this document are fifty-two new inspection
techniques that were developed or refined during the Saturn program.
The reference codes listed below are for assistance in obtaining more
detailed information on any problem or technique identified in this
document.
Code Office Symbol Mailing Address Telephone No.
A PM-MA-Q
B S&E-QUAL-E/
NR/SD
C S&E-QUAL-E/
MDAC
D S&E-QUAL-E /
RKDN
E S&E-QUAL-E/IBM
F S&E-QUAL-QT/
MSFG
G S&E-QUAL-AR/
MSFC
H S&E-QUAL-PC /
MSFC
P.O. Box 26078, New Orleans,
Louisiana 70126
12214 Lakewood Boulevard,
Downey, California 90241
5301 Bolsa Avenue, Huntington
Beach, California 92647
6633 Canoga Avenue, Canoga
Park, California 91303
150 Sparkman Drive, Building #2
Huntsville, Alabama 3 580 5
Marshall Space Flight Center,
Building #4708, Huntsville,
Alabama 3 5812
Marshall SpaCe Flight Center,
Building #4708, Huntsville,
Alabama 3 5812
Marshall Space Flight Center,
Building #4708, Huntsville,
Alabama 3 5812
504/255-3401
213/594-3781
213/896-1224
213/884-3306
205/895-1193
205/453 -3986
205/453- 1474
205/453-4740
C ONCLUSIONS AND REC OMMENDA TIONS
It is not the intent of this handbook to make conclusions and recommendations
concerning design changes, procedural changes, etc. ; however, it is
recommended that this data be used in future programs to minimize
occurrence of similar problems. This document can have broad application
in future space activities - from the designer making a part selection for
a specific application to the test engineer or technician in the identification
of a particular failure cause. The new techniques identified in the document
should prove invaluable for future programs requiring an end product as
complex as that delivered under the Saturn program, as the use of these
techniques will enhance product quality and reliability and decrease cost
and manpower requirements. Use of the document will also allow greater
management emphasis to be placed on potential problem areas.
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74 (7)
70 (6)
57 (6)
45 (18)
72 {13)
66 (22)
39 (I0)
41 (9)
73 (3)
34 (5)
25
CONDITION INDEX ELECTRICAL
CONDITION
BROKEN/DAMAGED WIRE
(Continued)
Range Safety Decoder
Relay
Relay
Static Power Inverter
C ON TAMINA T ED, C ORR OD ED
Cable
Cable Assembly
C erpaks
Chilldown Inverter
Connector
Connector
Control Signal Processor
Crosslinked, Polyalkene, Insulated, Electric Copper Wire
Electrical Ground Points
Electrical Wire
Explosion Proof Switch
Flight Control Computer
Nickel-Cadmium Battery
NPN Transistor
Potentiometer
Power Transfer Switch
Pressure Transducer
Propellant Utilization Cable Assembly
Range Safety Decoder
Relay
Relay
Sequence and Control Distributor
Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR)
Tim e r/P ropulsion Dis t ributo r
Transistor
Transistor Flatpack
Variable Air Trimmer Capacitor
26
Page/Item
Number
6z (3)
64 (I i)
65 (13,
17)
60 (11)
37 (i)
37 (z)
56 (i)
58 (3)
49 (17)
51 (z6)
73 (4)
37 (5)
73 (6)
38 (6)
63 (I)
42 (2)
35 (z)
68 (3)
40 (4)
63 (5)
71 (7)
38 (9)
62 (2)
65 (15, 16)
66 (18)
53 (3)
68 (6)
53 (4)
69 (8, i0)
57 (9)
41 (7)
_;...... .... • ,: _, .;" :
CONDITION INDEX ELECTRICAL
CONDITION
CRACKED/DEFECTIVE SOLDER CONNECTIONS
Connector
Electrical Brush Material
Electrical Control Assembly (ECA)
Flight Control Computer
Flight Control Computer
LOX Pressure Switch
Multiplexer
Pressure Transducer
Printed Circuit Board
Printed Circuit Board Assembly
Printed Circuit Card
Silver-Zinc Battery
Static Power Inverter
Static Power Inverter
DEFECTIVE BOND, FOAM GROWTH
Diode
Electrical Distributor
Launch Vehicle Digital Computer
Rectifier
Silver-Zinc Battery
DEFECTIVE WELD JOINTS
Fuel Mass Sensor
Potentiometer
Pressure Transducer
Propellant Utilization Computer
Propellant Utilization Computer
Relay
Silicon Zener Diode
Single Pole Double Throw (SPDT) Switch
Temperature Sensitive Resistor
Toggle Switch
Valve Feedback Potentiometer Filter Module
Vent and. Relief Valve
Page/Item
Number
46 (4)
73 (5)
s5 (4)
42 (6)
43 (7)
63 (3)
74 (8)
71 (8)
56 (3)
56 (5)
57 (7)
36 (7)
59 (9)
60 (10, 1Z)
68 (l)
53 {z)
43 (8)
68 (4)
36 (8)
70 (4}
40 (3)
71 (10)
44 (13)
45 {17)
65 (14)
69 {7)
66 {19)
40 (6)
66 (23)
75 (11)
67 (24)
Z7
CONDITION INDEX ELECTRICAL
CONDITION
i
Silve r'_Z inc Battery
EXPLODED
FAULT Y/DAMAGED INSULA TION
Cable Assembly
Electrical Wire
Harness Assembly
Propellant Utilization Computer
Tantalum Foil Electrolytic Capacitor
Thermal Time Delay Relay
2 Amp Relay Module
INTE RMIT TEN T/INCOMPLETE/E RR ONE OUS
OPERATION
Amplifier Pre-regulator Module
Electrical Control Assembly (ECA)
Flight Control Computer
Power Transfer Switch
Propellant Utilization Computer
RF Detector
Thrust OK Distributor
Variable Wirewound Resistor
50 Amp Relay Module
LEAD/PIN SEPARATION
Ceramic Capacitor
Coaxial Cable Connector
LOX Mass Probe
Page/Item
Number
35(5)
37 (4)
38 (7)
38 (8)
44 (15)
40 (5)
66 (2 l)
67 (25)
73 (1)
55 (3)
42 (3)
63 (4, 6)
44 (12)
71 (ll)
54 (6)
41 (8)
67 (28)
40 (1)
46 (1)
70 (5)
28
CONDITION INDEX ELECTRICAL
. CONDITION-
LEAKAGE
Electrical Control Assembly (ECA)
Range Safety Decoder
LOOSE, WEAK
Connector
DC Amplifier
Propellant Utilization Computer
RF Coaxial Cable Connector
MISMATCHED, MISALIGNED
Conne cto r
Right Angle Coaxial Connector
Safety and Arming Device (Inert)
MISSING PARTS
Minature Connector
Pres sure Switch
NOT TO DRAWING/SPECIFICATION/E. O.
Connector
Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR)
5 Volt Excitation Module
Z9
Page/Item
Number
48 (12, 13)
34 (4)
45 (16)
5Z (3Z)
46 (5)
5Z (33)
74 (9)
51 (z9)
64 (8)
//
49 (16)
68 (5)
61 (3)
. . ..... • , _ /" ..... /_ %!
CONDITION INDEX ELEC TRICAL
CONDITION
, ,,,, ,.,, ,,,
OPEN
Chilldown Inve rter
Integrated Circuit
Inverter Converter
Pressure Transducer
Printed Circuit Card
Propellant Utilization Computer
Transducer
Transistor
OVERHEATED, HEAT DAMAGE
Chilldown Inverter
Chilldown Inverter
Control Rate Gyro
Hydraulic Starter Switch
Propellant Utilization Computer
Relay
Silver-Zinc Battery
Thrust OK Distributor
2 Amp Relay Module
10 Amp Magnetic Latch Relay Module
RECESSED/DAMAGED C ONTACTS/SOCKETS
Connector
Connector
Connector
Connector
Quick Disconnect Connector
Replaceable Contact Connector (Crimp Type)
Page/Item
Number
58 (2)
56 (z)
59 (7)
71 (9)
57 (8)
44 (14)
72 (14)
69 (9)
58 (4)
59 (5)
73 (z)
63 (2)
43 (9)
64 (12)
36 (6)
53 (s)
67 (2G)
67 (27)
47 (8, 9, 10)
48 (11)
49 (18, 19)
50 (24)
5z (30)
5z (31)
30
CONDITION INDEX ELECTRICAL
CONDITION
RETENTION CLIP DAMAGE
Connector
Connector
Connector
Connector
SHORTED
Auxiliary Power Distributor
Cable Assembly
Chilldown Inverter
Diode
Electrical Assemblies
Electrical Control As sembly
Flight Control Computer
Fuel Mass Probe
Nickel-Cadmium Battery
Power Supply
Power Transfer Switch
Propellant Utilization Computer
Silver-Zinc Battery
Static Power Inverter
Switch Selector
Temperature Transducer
Voltage Regulator
Page/Item
Number
46 (3)
47 (7)
48 (15)
50 (ZZ,Z3)
53 (I)
37 (3)
59 (6)
68 (z)
55 (i)
55 {5)
4z (4)
70 (z,3)
35(i)
61 (I)
64 (i0)
43 (ii)
36 (9)
59 {8)
66 (ZO)
7Z (12)
7s (iz)
31
Z_
NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
g)
I I I I I
ADJUSTMENT/CALIBRATION IMPROPER
ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION IMPROPER
BROKEN/DAMAGED WIRE
BROKEN,, CRACKED, PUNCTURED, SPLIT
CONTAMINATED, CORRODED
CRACKED/DEFECTIVE SOLDER CONNECTIONS
DEFECTIVE BOND, FOAM GROWTH
DEFECTIVE WELD JOINTS
EXPLODED
FAULTY/DAMAGED INSULATION
INTERMITTENT/INCOMPLETE/ERRONEOUS •OPERATION
LEAD/PIN SEPARATION
LEAKAGE
LOOSE, WEAK
MISMATCHED, MISALIGNED
MISSING PARTS
NOT TO DRAWING/SPECIFICATION/EoOo
OPEN
OVERHEATED a HEAT DAMAGE
RECESSED/DAMAGED CONTACTS/SOCKETS
RETENTION CLIP DAMAGE
SHORTED
¢,o
u1
i
0
0
U
A
N
Cl
Cl
ELECTRICAL PROBLEM SUMMARY
33
Nc
I
Hardware
Ref
Cod_
DC Amplifier A
2 DC Amplifier A
3 DC Amplifier
%0
4! DC Amplifier F
AMP LIFIERS
5 DC Amplifier A
A s s embly
Problem
Calibration
point out-of-
tolerance in run
mode.
Hi-calibration
point out-of-
tolerance in
run mode.
A Erratic output.
Unable to
calibrate.
Inductor resis-
tance varies.
Cause
Change in contact
resistance of the
low calibration
relay contacts.
Damaged induc-
tor in relay
filter.
Resistance
changes in relay
contacts or call-
bration resistors.
Loose mounting
nut on the ampli-
fier power
supply
transformer.
Damage to wire
during winding
of the inductor.
Effect
Unstable operation
and erroneous
data.
Unstable operation
and erroneous
data.
Erroneous readings
Loss of correlation
of data to a cali-
bration value.
Actual readout
values lower than
predicted values.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute use of HI-REL components.
Incorporate closer testing controls
after assembly and after
ins tallation.
Institute use of HI-REL componenta
Incorporate closer testing controls
after assembly and after
ins tallation.
Institute use of HI-REL components
Implement acceptance tests that
will identify defective units.
Caution personnel to use more care
during fabrication. Initiate inspec-
tion point during amplifier power
transformer mounting.
Implement additional vendor tests
for production amplifiers to
ascertain proper operation prior
to shipment.
_For reference code identification, refer t_ Introduction, pg. 2,
NO Hardware
1 Nickel-Cad-
mium Battery
2 Nickel-Cad-
mium Battery
3 Silver -Zinc
Battery
4 Silver-Zinc
%n
Battery
5 Silver -Zinc
Battery
Ref
Gode
B
Proble m
Voltage drop dur-
ing heater actua-
tion sequence.
A High resistance
short.
F Thermostat cut
off lower than
specified.
A Cell would not
accept electro-
lyte during acti-
vation and ex-
pelled large
amounts during
load tests.
C Heater failure.
BATTERIES
Cause
Heater circuit
wire lodged be-
tween battery post
i and strap.
Small particle of
wire in battery.
Thermostat in
wrong location.
Ins ufficient plate
clearance due to
improper manu-
facture.
Sustained exces-
sive heater circuit
current.
Effect
;Reduced voltage;
!short.
Loss of output
voltage.
Loss of 28 VDC
power.
Battery damage or
loss.
Battery explosion.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure suppliers acceptance tests
and contractors process specifica-
tions are adequate to ensure verifi-
cation of the absence of shorts be-
tween terminals. Establish inspec-
tion requirements and acceptance
tests that will identify defective
units.
Institute tighter inspection controls
during battery assembly.
Revise drawings and manufacturing
inspection procedures to ensure
proper assembly and operation.
Institute 100% vendor inspection re-
quirements to monitor plate group
thickness tolerances. Revise acti-
vation procedure s to reduce possi-
bility of electrolyte expulsion.
Institute use of improved battery
heater control circuitry, including
a thermostat in series with the heat
er blanket, to protect against over-
heating and ensure a fail-safe opera-
tion. Increase gap between cell ter-
minals to preclude shorting cells.
Eliminate excessive wiring in the
batteryand provide adequate insula
tion on battery connectors and ter-
minals for protection from covers
,and encasements.
Nc
6
8
Lm
O _
Hardware
Silver -Zinc
Battery
Silver-Zinc
Battery
Silver-Zinc
Battery
Silver -Zinc
Battery
Ref
Code
B
C
C
C
Problem
Excessive heat
following
battery
connection.
Heater circuit
fails to energize
at low tempera-
ture.
Threaded metal
insert becomes
loose and drops
on plates.
Application of
two and one half
times the rated
VRMS during
battery
resistance
testing.
BATTERIES
Cause
Cellophane
separator mis sing
from one of the
positive plates.
Continued)
Effect
Short; loss of
Remarks/Sugge stions
Establish mandatory inspection
Defective solder
joint between
sensor lead and
temperature
controller.
Inad equate
bonding of insert
to cell.
Procedural
inadequacy.
voltage.
Loss of battery
Ioutput in a
i
cryogenic
environment.
iShort circuit.
Short ed winding s.
points during fabrication and
as s embly operations to ensure
proper installation of cellophane
s eparato r s.
Redesign controller circuit elimi-
nating all possible solder joints
and instigate more stringent
inspection during manufacturing.
Institute a bonding check, for
batteries of this type, to verify
that adequate bonding of ins err
to cell exists.
Ensure specifications and proce-
dures are correct and within the
tolerance range of the components
being tested.
Nc
%0
-.a
3
4
Hardware
Cable
Cable
Assembly
Cable
As sembly
Cable
A s s embly
Cross Hnked,
Polyalkene
Insulated,
Electric
Copper Wire
Ref
Code
E
A
A
B
F
Problem
Intermittent
open.
Intermittent
connector
contact.
Shorted
connector.
Frayed outer
jacket; crushed
insulation.
Base metal
deposit on
conductor.
CABLES, HARNESSES, AND WIRE
Cause
P o lyur ethane
mate rial on
connector pins.
Contamination
from adhesive
us ed during
fabrication, and
deterioration of
a connector seal.
Improper assem-
bly during manu-
facture.
Personnel
traffic.
Inclusion of
foreign material
between the wire
strands during
fabrication.
Effect
boss of continuity.
Intermittent signals
and los s of data.
Erroneous output
signals.
Electric arc to
stage structure;
opens and shorts.
Poor solderability.
Remarks/Sug_e stions
Initiate adequate vendor connector
process controls by developing
black light ins pection techniques
to screen for polyurethane
contamination. Develop cleaning
procedure for pins.
Establish requirements for
scheduled connector change out.
Revise manufacturing specifications
and procedures to preclude
contamination problems. Institute
100% inspection during fabrication.
Caution assembly personnel to use
proper cable fabrication methods.
Ensure personnel are properly
trained and certified. Institute
tighter inspection requirements and
functional checks after fabrication.
Route cables to preclude personnel
traffic damage. Institute use of
special ladders for workmen and
provide protective coverings
where possible.
Implement adequate manufacturing
process and inspection controls to
eliminate deficiency.
CABLES, HARNESSES, AND WIRE (Continued)
Oo
CO
Ref
Hardware Code
Electrical Wire F
7 Electrical Wire B
8 Harness
As s embly
9 Propellant
Utilization
Cable
A ssembly
B
Proble m
Teflon and FEP
jacket
contamination.
Insulation
indentations, and
fibrous
materials
embedded in
fiberglass and
adhering to
jacket.
Outer insula-
tion damaged
and shield
expos ed.
C Corrosion.
,Cause
Inadequate ve ndo r
process controls.
Inadequate quality
requirements for
procureme_ of
wires.
Unsatisfactory
standard repair
procedure.
Poor workman-
ship resulting in
loss of seal and
entrapment of
moisture.
Effect
Change in
insulation resis-
tance.
Insulation break-
down; short.
Erroneous pro-
pellant utilization
system mass
indications.
Fails resistance
tests.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Perform a 100% wet dielectric and/
or spark test•at receiving
inspection. Perform visual
ins pection for foreign m ate rial
and/or surface irregularities.
Establish requirements for
laboratory inspection and test for
all bulk-type procurement in
addition to normal inspection.
Rework ana repair of harness
assemblies should be dispositioned
by a Material Review Board
rather than standard repair proce-
dures.
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work in cable and
wire harness fabrication and
assembly. Institute 100% inspection
during fabrication, assembly, and
installation of cable and wire
harness assemblies.
CABLES, HARNESSES, AND WIRE (Continued)
%0
\
Nc Hardware
l0 Wire Harness
Ref
Code
C
Problem
Numerous de-
fects such as
Cause
Poor workman-
ship and inspec-
Effect
Failure to function
properly.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work in cable and wire
split sealing
grommets,
improperly
crimped sockets,
and broken in-
sulation cups.
tion in production. harness fabrication and as s embly.
Institute 100% inspection during
fabrication, assembly, and
installation of cable and wire
harness assemblies.
Nc Hardware
Ceramic
Capacitor
O
4
2 Fixed Carbon
Resistor
3 Potentiometer
Pot entiom ete r
Tantalum Foil
Electrolytic
Capacitor
Temperature
Sensitive
Resistor
Ref
Code
F
F
C
F
F
J
F
CAPACITORS, RESISTORS, AND POTENTIOMETERS
Problem Cause Effect Remarks/Surge stions
Lead separated Inadequate lead Inoperative capaci-:
from body of bonding, for.
capa cito r.
Parameter
deviations.
Fails resistance
tests.
Sho r ted.
Excessive DC
leakage between
insulated
terminals and
case.
Inte rmitte nt
opens during
temperature
cycling.
Improper manu-
facturing capping
process.
Defective tap
welds resulting
in open windings.
Internal metallic
chip contamina-
tion.
Improperly cured
insulating
material.
Poor lead welds,
cracked transfer
tabs, and cracked
silicon resistive
element.
Out -of-tolerance
values.
Improper output.
Erratic control of
external circuits.
Inoperative
capacitor.
Failure of part.
Implement tighter manufacturing
controls and improve lead bonding
process to eliminate deficiencies.
Change manufacturing process to
include proper capping procedures.
Initiate inspection controls both
during manufacturing and
receiving.
Institute thermal shock screening
tests for detection of defective
welds and provide redundant nickel
silver tap welds.
Implement closer inspecting during
manufacturing and receiving.
Change drawings to specify a
preferred capacitor style
employing tantalum -to - glass
hermetic seals.
Implement tighter manufacturing
inspection and revise process con-
trois during lubrication. Institute
screening procedure to include
aging at rated power and
tempe rature.
CAPACITORS, RESISTORS, AND POTENTIOMETERS (Continued)
N¢ Hardware
7 Variable Air
Trimmer
Capacitor
8 Variable Wire-
wound Resistor
9 Wir ewound
Resistor
Ref
Code Problem
F Short circuits.
F Improper rota-
tion of shaft.
F Large fallout
of precoat
material.
Cause
Metal particles
internal to the
capacitor.
Design deficiency.
Insufficient lead
support by
external molding.
Effect
Inoperative capaci-
tor.
Loss of wiping
]actio n.
Part cracking;
open circuit.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Caution vendor personnel of clean-
liness procedures during fabrica-
tion. During receiving inspection,
select random samples for X-ray
testing.
Ensure through proper testing that
item design is satisfactory.
Change drawings to provide for
proper lead support. Provide 100%
receiving inspection to screen out
any defective items.
COMPUTERS
DO
Nc Hardware
I Flight Control
Computer
2 Flight Control
Computer
3 Flight Control
Computer
4 Flight Control
Computer
5 Flight Control
Computer
6 Flight Control
Computer
Ref
Code
E
Problem
Premature mode
excitation
during power-
off and issuance
of first motion
command.
E Defective relay.
E Defective relay
driver.
E
E
E
Printed circuit
board in con-
tact with filter
casting.
Noise on the
power bus.
Defective mag-
netic amplifier.
EffectCause
Design error.
Internal contami-
nation.
Intermittent open
in transistor,
Improper design.
Other equipment
on the same
power bus.
Inadequate re-
Premature
initiation of stage
function.
Inhibition of relay
operation.
Erratic computer
input,
Short in the space-
craft control mode
select circuit.
Noise on the servo-
amplifier outputs.
Delayed outputs.
Remarks/Suggestions
Implement a drawing change to
install a blocking diode in the
computer circuitry.
Initiate vendor manufacturing and
testing improvements during and
subsequent to relay assembly.
Institute tighter transistor screen-
ing tests during receiving
inspection,
Redesign the affected P. C. boards
for proper mechanical location.
Ensure compatibility of equipment
sharing the same power source,
Caution personnel to ensure that
work operations
resulting in an
unsoldered
connection.
all connections in reworked areas
have been made. Initiate inspec-
tion checks during assembly,
COMPUTERS (Continued)
U0
Nc Hardware
7 Flight Control
Computer
Launch Vehicle
Digital
Computer
9 Propellant
Utilizatio n
Computer
10 Propellant
Utilization
Computer
11 Propellant
Utilization
Computer
Ref
iCode
E
E
C
B
B
Problem
Capacitor open
in the phi-dot
yaw filter.
Defective
memory
module.
Transistor
failure.
Degraded in-
verter voltage.
Low feedback
voltage on P. U.
valve position
potentiometer.
Cause
Defective solder
connection (lot
oriented) at the
capacitive ele-
ment to lead
connection.
Faulty thermal
compression bond
in a transistor
flatpack.
Inadequate heat
sinking.
A reversed capa-
citor in the AC
voltage regulator.
Shorted capacitor
in the valve
modulator.
Effect
Improper
frequency
response.
Power-on
sequencing can not
be accomplished.
Improper output.
Loss of P.U.
valve control.
Erroneous output
from the P. U.
computer.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Implement 100% visual inspection
after capacitor soldering. Use
stress relief soldering methods
and subject lot samples to pull test
Institute tighter screening
techniques on stocked and subse-
quently manufactured items.
Implement higher torquing values
to provide more efficient heat
transfer from transistors to heat
sinks.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for P.U. computer
manufacture. Institute additional
inspection points as required.
Subject assembled voltage regula-
tors to a 2 i/2 hour "burn-in"
time to detect reversed installation
of components.
Institute use of HI-REL components
Require a 150 hour "burn-in" time
to be logged on all computers prior
to acceptance testing and an addi-
tional 50 hour "burn-in" time after
replacement of any computer
module.
N¢ Hardware
12 Propellant
Utilization
Computer
13 Propellant
Utilization
Computer
14 Propellant
Uti lizatio n
Computer
15 Propellant
Utilization
Computer
Ref
Code
B
B
B
B
Problem
Low voltage
output from the
fixed phase in-
verter.
No P.U. valve
amplifier
output.
Open circuit.
Defective LH 2
summing
potentiometer.
COMPUTERS (Continued)
Cause
Marginal circuit
design; failure of
power transistors
due to a combina-
tion of worst case
tolerances and
circuit parameter
conditions.
Transistor output
below requirement
due to a high
resistance weld
on the transistor
lead.
A faulty shield
connection at
coaxial connector.
Welding pres sure_,
breaking down the
winding ins ulation
to the mandrel.
Effect
Loss of P.U. valve
control.
Loss of mass
measurement
signals.
Coarse mass LOX
indicator remains
at full position.
Short circuit.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure that component tolerances
and circuit parameters are com-
patible. Devise screening tests to
detect and eliminate marginal
conditions.
Institute 100% weld inspection with
the aid of magnification. Ensure
personnel are trained and certified
for work on welded• electronic
module as s emblies.
Ensure that process specifications
impose a torque requirement for
coaxial cable connections.
Incorporate redundant tap leads,
improved tap material, improved
manufacturing procedures, and
additional inspection points during
manufacturing operation. Subject
completed potentiometers to
thermal cycling prior to installa-
tion to ensure that defective units
will not be installed as flight
worthy hardware,
on
Nc
16
17
18
Hardware
Propellant
Utilization
Computer
Propellant
Uti liz atio n
Compute r
Propellant
Utilization
Computer
Ref
Code
C
C
C
COMPUTERS _Continued)
Problem
Loose trim pot
allowing 360 °
rotation.
Defective valve
modulator.
Compensating
resistor out-of-
tolerance.
,Cause
Improper torque
applied.
Discrepant capa-
citor and broken
weld at a diode
lead.
Puncture of Mylar
tape during
assembly of aP. U.
oven cemponent,
allowing a tuning
wire to contact
the thermal insu-
lation at the point
of puncture.
Effect
Erroneous output
readings.
Erratic operation
of valve positioner.
Low output at null
setting.
Remarks/Surge stions
Ensure procedures clearly define
torquing requirements. Ensure
adequate tools are available and
personnel should be trained in
torquing technique s.
Institute use of HI-REL components
and the latest welding and soldering
technique s.
Perform tighter inspection to pre-
clude tape punctures during assem-
bly. Select proper Mylar tape
thickness to reduce the suscepti-
bility of assembly damage.
o-,
Nc Hardware
1 Coaxial Cable
Conne cto r
2 Coaxial
Connector
3 Connector
4 Connector
5 Connector
Ref
Code
A
B
E
C
.C
Problem
Connector
s eparated from
cable.
Inner Conductor
extends past
connector
surface.
Defective female
socket.
Wires separa-
ted from back
of solder cups.
Mislocated
wires; crossed
and mismatched
connectors.
C ONNE C TORS
,Cause
Insufficient
Effect
Loss of continuity.
Remarks/Suggestions
Implement vendor procedures for
assembly
methods.
Flexing of cables
after cables were
taped together.
Top half of spring
clip mis sing.
Poor enforcement
of soldering
requirements.
Failure in the
direct wire RF
check.
Intermittent pin
contact.
Discontinuities.
proper mating of connector to
cable and monitor through 100%
ins pection.
Maintain proper coaxial cable
length and ensure cables are not
taped °rb°nded together in any
way prior to or during installation.
Revise inspection procedures to
include 100% visual inspection
during as s embly.
Implement better enforcement of
solder requirements and inspec-
tion of all solder cups prior to
installation of wires.
Inadequate
controls for
mating and de-
mating electrical
connectors.
Critical commands
being sent to wrong
components.
Conduct a continuity check of wire
bundles by personnel other than
those attaching individual wires to
the various connector pins.
Institute extensive use of reference
designators, clocked connectors,
tamper proof seals, and wire
bundle clamping. Avoid use of
identical connectors in close
proximity.
"-3
N¢ Hardware
6 Connector
7 Connector
8 Connector
9 Connector
I0 Connector
Ref
Code
F
F
B
B
B
Problem
Bent rear con-
tact leaves ;
cracks in area
of pin retention
leaf crimp.
Damaged cavity
retention
device.
Recessed
socket contacts.
Recessed
contacts.
Recessed and
damaged
contacts.
CONNECTORS (Continued)
,Cause Effect
Insufficient crimp Inoperative connec-
Remarks/Su_e stions
Implement 100% ins pection controls
operation and
improper rear-
to-front leaf
offset.
Insertion bullet
shank lengths not
for.
Improper socket
retention in the
during and subsequent to manufac-
ture. Ensure that personnel are
trained and certified for work on
connectors.
Ensure manufacturing controls
specify correct insertion tool.
to specification.
Mi salignrnent
caused by connec-
tor backshell
grommet twisting
and skewing the
contacts.
Incorrect
positioning of
contacts during
initial installa-
tion.
Workmanship;
handling error.
connector; loss of
continuity.
Loss of continuity.
Loss of continuity.
Los s of continuity.
Initiate vendor personnel training
on proper assembly methods.
Color code insertion bullets.
Institute use of a dry powder lubri-
cant during as s embly and provide
grommet torsional relief by
backing off the connector
backshell.
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work on connectors.
Institute X-ray inspection after
connector as sembly.
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work on connectors.
Institute X-ray inspection after
connecto r as sembly.
co 13
Nc Hardware
I 1 Connector
12 Connector
Connector
14 Connector
:15 Connector
Ref
Code
B
B
B
B
B
Problem
Recessed
sockets.
Coupling springs
weak.
No spring load
on coupling nut.
Snapring dis
placed from
locking groove.
Insufficient
strength in
retention cavity
to hold contacts
in place.
CONNECTORS (Continued)
iCause
Insufficient lead
slack in harness
bends at connec-
tors resulting in
exces sive axial
loads on the con-
nector contacts.
Lack of heat
treatment on
coupling springs.
Excessive mating
and unmating
cycles.
Technician error
which resulted in
marginal snap-
ring engagement.
Technician error
during assembly
or rework
operations.
Effect
Loss of continuity.
Unsatisfactory
locking action;
loss of
continuity.
Loss of continuity.
\
Grommet move-
ment; mating
problems.
Loss of continuity.
Remarks/Suggestions
Band all large gauge connector
leads (size 0 and 4) at their point
of entry into connector to provide
an external visual inspection for
contact r ece s sion.
Ensure that supplier routing pro-
cedures require that heat treat-
ment be performed immediately
prior to plating process.
Establish time and cycle replace-
ment requirements for connectors
prone to numerous mate and
demate activities.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for work on connec-
tors. Snapring should be designed
such to preclude marginal
engagement.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for work on
connectors.
,,o
Nc Hardware
16 Connector
17 Connector
18 Connector
19 Connector
Ref
Code
B
B
B
C ONNE CT ORS Continued)
Problem Cause Effect
Retention clip
will not hold pin
contact.
Defective bond-
ing between
retaining disc
and grommet.
Recessed pins.
Clip tine bend
dimensions less
than drawing
requirements.
Contamination
introduced during
the manufacturing
Bent and
recessed pins.
Loss of continuity.
Low insulation
resistance;
grommet
proces s. extrusion.
External force
exerted on the
connector cable
(sharp bend• radius
near the connec-
tor mounting)
plus the normal
force imposed
during the mating
operation.
Misalignment due
to grommet
twi sting.
Open circuit.
Loss of continuity.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Institute 100% inspection on re-
taining clip tines prior to insulator
bonding.
Develop a holding fixture to
minimize connector handling durin_
priming and bonding operations.
Instruct personnel, to wear Nylon
gloves for connector handling
during manufacturing and rework
operations.
Institute use of connectors that will
not be degraded under forces sus-
tained during normal mating
operations. Ensure that cable
routing is such that external forces
and sharp bends near the connector
do not exist. Implement X-ray
inspections after connector
installation or rework has been
accomplished.
Institute use of a dry powder
lubricant during assembly
operations and provide grommet
torsional relief by backing off
the connector baekshell.
kn
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Nc Hardware
20 Connector
21 Connector
22 Connector
231 Connector
24 Connector
Ref
Code
B
B
B
B
B
CONNECTORS (Continued)
Problem Cause
Recessed pins.
Cracked silicone
rubber ins errs.
Damaged re=
tention clips,
Broken reten-
tion clip.
Socket cavity
damaged during
rework opera-
tion.
Retention disc
installed back-
ward into the
connector.
Thermal shock
encountered dur-
ing cryogenic
donditio ns.
Lack of detailed
instructions and
r ewo rk
procedures.
Workmanship.
Insertion bullets
incorrectly
dimensioned by
s upplie r.
Effect
Loss of continuity.
Insulation break-
down; short
circuit.
Loss of continuity;
electrical short.
Loss of continuity.
Loss of continuity.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute 100% inspection on all
connectors and ensure that tooling
is such that it will not allow the
retention disc to be installed
backwards.
Replace all cryogenic connectors
having silicone rubber inserts with
connectors that contain Teflon
ins ert s,
Issue directives requiring that
detailed rework instructions and
caution notes be included in
modification instructions for
rework operations. Implement
additional inspection points as
required.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for work on
connectors.
Ensure that supplier engineering
drawings correctly define dimen-
sions of insertion bullets. Color
code insertion bullets for positive
id entifi curio n.
rNc Hardware
25 Connector
26 Connector
un 27 Connector
Z8 Cryogenic
Connector
29 Miniature
Connector
Ref
Code
B
B
B
C
B
CONNECTORS (Continued)
Problem
Ins err rotation
in connector
shell.
Corrosion on
,Cause
Ins err debonding
from shell due to
application of ex-
cessive torque.
Moisture under
Effect
Los s of continuity,
Loss of structural
outer surface and
between coupling
ring and connec-
tor barrel.
connector
insulation,
integrity; possible
short.
Continuous drift-
ing of the pro-
pe llant utiliza-
tion system
indications.
Glass insert
cracks at cryo-
genic tempera-
tures.
Missing leaf
spring and low
pin retention
forces.
Welding in pro-
cess on the stage
which introduced
noise into the
P.U. system,
State -of-the-art
problem; also in-
adequate test and
inspection,
Inadequate ins pec-
tion by suppliers.
Erroneous LOX
level readings.
Possible leakage.
Electrical opens or
intermittents resul-
ting in loss of crit-
ical circuit
functions.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work on connectors.
Ensure that manufacturing and as-
sembly procedures clearly specify
torque requirements for connectors
Moisture penetration can be pre-
vented by establishing new methods
to provide an internal barrier to
moisture laden air (anti-wicking
plug) and an external barrier (tape
wrapping) to prevent insulation foam
intrusion into cable conductors and
connector coupling hardware:
Ensure that no welding operations
are in process during checkout
operations.
Tighten inspection criteria. Con-
duct leak check, electrical insula-
tion test, and visual magnification
ins pection.
:Impose more stringent inspection
requirements and criteria on
suppliers of critical electrical
connectors,
o-1
0o
No Hardware
30 Quick
Dis connect
Connector
31 Replaceable
Contact
Connector
(Crimp Type)
3Z RF Coaxial
Cable Connec-
tor
33 Right Angle
Coaxial
C onne cto r
Ref
Code
F
C ONNE C T ORS
Problem Cause
Electrical
discontinuity andi
high millivo it
drop.
C Pin recession.
B Torque relaxa-
tion of jam nut.
F Punctured Teflor
dielectric.
Marginal pin
retention and
connector mating
incompatibility.
Inadequate inspec-
tion after
assembly.
"Set" occurring
after initial
torquing.
Misalignment of
wire to
connector.°
Continued)
Effect
Connector
dis continuities.
Low pin retention
force. Opens or
intermittent s re-
sulting in loss of
critical circuit
functions.
Intermittent shield
connection. Com-
plete separation of
cable from
connector.
High signal loss
or open circuit of
cable/connector.
Remar ks/Sugge stions
Provide 100% inspection on
connectors for conformance to
specification requirements with
emphasis on pin size, retention
and continuity, and resistance
checks.
Provide 100% verification of con-
tact retention force after assembly
of every replaceable pin connector.
After initial torque, retorque after
a minimum of Z4 hours. Apply
torque paint after final torque.
Institute use of straight connectors.
Incorporate X-ray testing during
receiving inspection to verify
proper alignment.
Nc
2
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Hardware
Auxiliary
Power
Distributor
Electrical
Distributor
Sequence and
Gontrol
Distributor
Timer /
Propulsion
Dis tribut o r
Thrust OK
Distributor
Ref
Code
E
A
A
A
A
Problem
Shorted distri-
butor diode.
Foam growth
increasing in
physical
dim e ns ion.
Corroded distri-
butor relay tie
bar, nicked
relay base,
missing cover
gasket, and
nicked wire
bundle.
Solder contam-
ination from
magnet brackets
found in relays.
Burned-out
resistors.
DIST RIBUT ORS
Cause
Inductive spikes
due to a design
change in the GN 2
solenoid valve.
Incorrect curing
process.
Improper fabri-
cation and rework
techniques ; con-
tarnination intro-
duced during pre-
ventive main-
tenance checks.
Relay overheating I
during base
mount brazing
processes,
causing magnet
bracket solder to
flow.
Defective break-
out box in the
special test setup
for electromag-
netic compatibil-
ity testing.
Effect
Reset water
coolant valve
control relay.
Loss of electrical
function due to
stress.
Potential compo-
nent malfunctions.
Intermittent relay
operation.
Loss of capability
to detect an
Tfengine or%t".
Remarks/Suggestions
Implement test subsequent to
rework to check out feasibility
of design change prior to in-
service use.
Ensure that temperatures and
length of time for adequate curing
are maintained.
Caution personnel on the effects of
contamination and ensure environ-
ment is suitable for fabrication and
assembly operations. Institute
tighter inspection requirements and
controls.
Ensure that manufacturing proce-
dures clearly specify that relays
be moved through brazing unit
rapidly to prevent prolonged heat
exposure. Institute 100% inspec-
tion on all completed assemblies.
Ensure testing procedures and
equipment are compatible with
distributo r circuitry.
Ln
N¢ Hardware
6 Thrust OK
Distributor
7 Thrust OK
Distributor
Ref
Code
A
A
DISTRIBUTORS
Probterr%,
Inconsistent
time delays.
No voltage
output.
Cause
Voltage transients
caused by relay
bounce.
Wiring error in
distributor.
Continued)
Effect
Premature SCR
firing.
Loss of thrust OK
signals; premature
engine cutoff.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Revise circuitry to compensate for
relay spiking. Institute an
effective testing program.
Add additional check points to
distributor checkout program to
catch wiring discrepancies.
Institute 100% vendor inspection
during as sembly.
Ln
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N¢ Hardware
1 Electrical
As s emblies
2 Electrical
Control
A ssembly
(ECA)
3 Electrical
Control
As s embly
(ECA)
4 Electrical
Control
A s s embly
(ECA)
5 Electronic
Control
Package
Ref
Code
D
D
D
D
D
ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLIES
Problem Cause Effect
Short.Defective
safety wiring.
Leaky spark
exciter connec -
for seal.
Damaged
transistor.
Weak solder
joint.
Shorted
transistor.
Inadequate tools
and facilities.
Inadequate
connector seal
design.
Inadequate test
procedure.
Inadequate
inspection of
"blind" solder
joint s.
Improper sealing
during manufac-
turing; off-the-
shelf component.
Improper spark
rate; failure to
deenergize no. 1
spark plug on
command.
False ignition
detect signal.
False engine cutoff
command.
Spark deene rgiz ed
timer ceases to
operate.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Establish a special area for
installing safety wire, and ensure
the use of proper tools designed
specifically for safety wiring.
Incorporate a design change to
hermetically seal connector to
spark exciter canister.
Ensure that test procedures are
sufficient to properly check out
assemblies to preclude damaging
components.
Initiate directive to eliminate all
"blind" solder joints from assem-
blies. Provide 100% inspection
for solder joints.
Specify use of HI-REL components
to Preclude obtaining off-the-shelf
items.
Nc
3
4
Hardware
Cerpaks
Integrated
Circuit
Printed
Circuit Board
Printed
Circuit Board
Printed
Circuit Board
A s s embly
Ref
Cod_
m
F
E
A
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND PRINTED CIRCUITS
Problem
Lead
contamination.
Degraded
operation.
Voids in solder
attaching the
top hat welds.
Timer count-
down distributor
stays in "reset"
po s itio n.
F Solder cracking.
,Cause
Handling and
as s embly
processing.
Open metailiza-
tion at the oxide
step caused by
inadequate
deposition of
aluminum over the
corner of the step.
Improper
clearance; incor-
rect welding tip
used to weld top
hat to component
lead prior to
soldering.
Reversed
installation of
polarized
capacitor.
Unsatisfactory
assembly and
soldering
techniques.
Effect
Possible failure.
Improper amplifier
I output.
Integrity of joint
damaged.
Improper output.
P.C. board
failure.
Remarks/Suggestions
Caution personnel on the proper
handling of items. Initiate 100%
assembly inspection points.
Screen devices by thermal cycling
tests. Studymant_facturing process
to determine the conditions leading
to metallization problem. Institute
tighter vendor inspection controls.
Ensure that top hat to circuit land
clearance is within specification.
Also, ensure use of the proper
type welding tip.
Specify closer vendor quality
inspection during assembly.
Ensure board assembly is accom-
plished by personnel trained in
proper soldering techniques.
Inspect I00_0 during fabrication.
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND PRINTED CIRCUITS (Continued)
N( Hardware
Printed
Circuit
Card
Printed Circuit
Card
Printed Circuit
Card
Transistor
Flatpack
Ref
Code Problem ,Cause Effect
Open circuit in
resistor.
Open solder
joints.
Open circuit
in gate
transformer.
Foreign parti-
cles :and hanging
leads.
Broken glass sub-
strate.
Improper solder-
ing techniques.
Imperfections in
wire used to wind
transformer.
Insufficient
controls by vendor
during manufac-
ture.
Improper voltage
output from
circuit.
Constant output
signal with no
input.
Out -of-tolerance
condition in multi-
plexer for related
cha nne i/fram e.
Inte rmittent
failures.
Remarks/Suggestions
Redesign resistor to include a
larger glass substrate. Identify
redesigned items by a white ring
around the body.
Institute 100% quality inspection
during manufacturing. Ensure
personnel are properly trained
and certified for soldering work.
Institute 100% vendor inspection
during fabrication and assembly of
transformer, Establish acceptance
requirements for wire purchase.
Institute operator certification
and specify 100% inspection.
Tighten manufacturing process
controls and screening tests.
INVERTERS
%n
0o
3
4
Hardware
Chilldown
Inverter
Chilldown
Inverter
Chilldown
Inverter
Chilldown
Inverter
Ref
Code
C
C
C
C
Problem
Excessive
current surge.
Open circuit in
three driver
modules.
Shorted driver
transistors.
Z ener diode
failure in heat
sink assembly.
,Cause
Three -phase
os ciUator trans-
former output
windings retaining
charges causing
out of sync
windings.
Arcing current
from a partially
mated connector.
Metallic contam-
ination introduced
during fabrication
of the heat sink/
transistor assem-
bly.
Overheating
during
manufacturing.
Effect
No output.
No output.
Burned out driver
transformer and
module driver.
Failure of
associated compo-
nents ; improper
output
Remarks/Su_e stions
Provide a DC current reset for
cores in three-phase oscillators
for assurance that the windings
will always be in sync when
inverter is turned on, and to
eliminate voltage spikes.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for connector handlin@
and assembly. Institute 100%
inspection on all connectors after
final assembly to ensure proper
ins tallation.
Caution personnel on the effects of
contamination and ensure environ-
ment is suitable for fabrication and
assembly operations. Institute a
resistance check between driver
transistor and case on completed
assemblies. Add protective
coatings to critical components
and institute tighter inspection
requirements and controls.
Institute use of HI-REL diodes and
conduct tests on the diodes, prior
to assembly, that will ensure
proper operation after assembly.
t.n
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No
5
7
8
Hardware
Chilldown
Inverter
Chilldown
Inverter
Inverter
Converter
Static Power
Inverter
Static Power
Inverter
Ref
Code
C
C
C
B
B
INVERTE RS (Continued)
Problem
Burned out
transistors.
Cause
Shorting bar
inadvertently left
on test equipment.
Shorted tantalum
electrolytic
capacitors on
input side of
inverter.
Open transistor
in voltage
regulator.
Inverter output
voltage erratic.
Inverter output
e r ratic.
Reve r s e
resistance
testing.
Excessive
voltage input.
Short circuit
between inverter
case cover and
the collector ter-
minal of the vol-
tage regulator
transistor.
Inverter transis-
tor failure caused
by voids in solder
bond between chip
and case.
Effect
No output.
Damage to filter
module; degraded
inverter
performance.
Loss of DC output
voltage.
Erratic recircula-
lion pump opera-
tion; low recircula-
lion pressure.
Erratic r ecircula-
tion pump opera-
tion; low recircula
tion pressure.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for use of complex test
equipment. Insert "warning notes"
in procedures to ensure that
shorting bar is removed at the
proper time.
Ensure that test procedures
clearly define that resistance
testing will be conducted in the
"forward" direction only.
Ensure test procedures specify
voltage limits and applications.
Caution personnel on hazards of
over voltage inputs.
Institute use of HI-REL stud-
mounted transisto rs.
Institute use of HI-REL stud-
mounted transistors.
O_
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Nc
10
11
12
Hardware
Static Power
Inverter
Static Power
Inverter
Static Power
Inverter
Ref
Cod_
B
B
B
Problem
Broken solder
connection.
Low output
voltage.
Zero inverter
output.
INVERTERS (Continued)
Cause
Faulty test
equipment at
the supplier.
Broken wires due
to repeated
disturbance of
Effect
multistrand wire
during inve rte r
rework.
Poor solder
connection
between terminal
and transistor in
the overcurrent
protection
circuit.
Degraded inverter
out put.
Loss of recircula-
tion capability.
Loss of excitation
voltage and power
to the recirculation
pure p.
Remarks/,Suggestions
Ensure test equipment is
adequately designed to preclude
inducing failures in assemblies.
Institute vibration screening tests
to identify broken solder
co nne crions.
Ensure that rework/modification
procedure sequence is such that
wire disturbances are kept at a
minimum. Institute additional
inspection points during rework/
modification operations to preclude
defective inverters from being ac-
cepted as flight-worthy hardware.
Establish 100% inspection of all
solder joints by vendor, contractor,
and government personnel.
Consider use of welded joints
rather than soldered joints.
O',
Nc Hardware
i
1 Power Supply
2 56 Volt Power
Supply
3 5 Volt
Excitation
Module
Ref
Code Problem
E Shorted capaci-
tor.
E High output.
C Improperly
wired connector
cable.
P OWER SUPPLIES
Cause
Improper compo-
nent positioning
during assembly.
Marginal design
problem occurring
after design
change.
Cable connector
incorrectly
labeled.
Effect
Current output
with no load.
Pos sible voltage
breakdown/erratic
operation of
external circuitry.
Los s of output
voltage.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Initiate x-ray testing on completed
capacitor assembly modules to
verify proper positioning of
components. Add caution notes to
drawings to avoid future errors.
Ensure design changes are compa-
tible with existing equipment para-
meters. Test design prior to
in-service use.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and certified for the manufacturing
and labeling of connectors.
Institute 100% inspection in areas
of connector labeling and
manufacturing.
O'-
Nc Hardware
1 Range Safety
Decoder
2 Range Safety
Decoder
3 Range Safety
Decoder
Ref
Code
C
C
B
Problem
Negative tran-
sistor voltage
leakage.
Power
transistor
leakage.
Broken wire in
potted connec-
tor
RANGE SAFET Y DEC ODERS
Cause ,
Silicon control
rectifier
leakage.
Contamination
Effect
Improper output.
Unstable voltage
Remarks/Sugge stions
Institute use of HI-REL components
and ensure that pretest operations
will adequately identify defective
components.
Ensure that manufacturers'
introduced during
manufacturing
process.
output. contamination control requirements
are adequate to preclude problem.
Institute special tests (screening)
prior to installation of piece parts.
Mishandling by
personnel.
Loss of continu_y
between connector
and decoder
ground.
Ins titute additional inspection
points and add caution notes to
procedures. Ensure personnel
are trained and certified for
work on connectors and their
installation into Range Safety
Decoders.
RELAYS AND SWITCHES
O"
N¢ Hardware
I Explosion
Proof Switch
Z Hydraulic
Starter Switch
3 LOX Pressure
Switch
4 Power Transfel
Switch
5 Power Transfe:
Switch
6 Power Transfe]
Switch
Ref
Code
F
C
A
E
A
A
Problem
Heavy internal
corrosion.
Failure to
actuate.
Switch actuation
out -of-tolerance.
Inability to
transfer power.
Erratic output.
Out -of-role rance
cam angle.
Cause
Chemical
Interaction of
switch materials.
Exce s sive •thrust
bearing friction
in the motor
control circuit.
Inadequate ly
sealed solder
joints.
Low voltage due
to excessive drop
along the check-
out cables.
Contamination
introduced during
rework.
Tolerance for cam
angle not estab-
lished prior to
manufacture of
parts.
Effect
Internal open or
short circuiting.
Open circuit.
Leakage of her-
metic seal and
reduction in tank
ullage pressure.
Loss of external
system power.
Loss of power.
Cam could not be
driven into the cam
dwell region at
minimum voltage.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Verify chemical compatibility of
materials prior to production of
item.
Institute use of nonrotational thrust
bearings in the motor control cir-
cuit. Establish and institute time
and cycle requirements for
starter switch.
Ensure personnel are trained for
solder work. Institute 100%
inspection during fabrication.
Ensure that cable lengths are con-
sidered in initial checkout station
designs for voltage supply
adequacy.
Caution personnel on the effects
of contamination and ensure
environment is suitable for fabri-
cation and assembly operations.
Institute tighter inspection require-
ments and controls.
Ensure all design parameters are
considered to meet system require.
ments prior to production.
Institute testing program for check
out prior to production.
I
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Nc Hardware
7 Pressure
Switch
8 Pressure
Switch
9 Pressure
Switch
10 Power Transfel
Switch
1 1 Relay
12 Relay
Ref
Code
C
B
C
F
A
A
RELAYS AND SWITCHES
Problem ,Cause
External helium
leakage.
Fails to actuate
over full range.
Crossed line
connections.
Switch inte rna[
lead shorted to
ground.
Broken coil
wire.
Inoperative re-
lay contacts.
Darnage received
during previous
calibration checks
Mis sing and bent
locking screws ;
incorrect
procedures.
Improper identi-
fication of
umbilical housing.:
Improper lead
routing during
manufacturing.
Improper coil/
relay terminal
connection
techniques.
Melting of the
glass bead on ac-
tuator rod during
a previous dielec-
tric test of relay.
C ontinu ed)
Effect
Leakage; possible
depletion of
helium supply.
Inability to provide
accurate indication.
Leakage; over-
pressarization of
pressure switches,
and rupture of
switch bellows.
Inoperative switch.
Inoperative relay.
Los s of function.
Remarks/Suggestions
Institute post calibration test pro-
cedures to check for leakage. Plug
or cap calibration port after
leakage tests to prevent supply
depletion in the event of subsequent i
leakage.
Initiate directives to personnel to
use proper instruction manual and
adjustment tools.
Incorporate positive identification
procedures for handling and check-
out of pneumatic equipment and
line s.
Initiate vendor inspection points
when routing leads during
manufacturing.
Implement 100% vendor inspection
requirements. Ensure personnel
are properly trained and are
using the correct assembly
pro cedur es.
Ensure test environment is com-
patible with component being
tested.
RELAYS AND SWITCHES(Continued)
O"
On
Nc Hardware
13 Relay
14 Relay
1 5 Relay
16 Relay
17 Relay
Ref
Cod_
E
E
F
F
F
Problem
Intermittent open
wire in reset
coil.
Coil lead wire
separation from
relay post.
Internal
co ntamination.
Contaminated
contacts.
Broken coil
wire.
Cause
Inadequate proce-
dures for heat
shrink of tubing
during
manufacture.
Inconsistent
welding process.
Poor manufac-
turing quality
control during
fabrication.
Teflon particles
on relay contacts.
Poor vendor work-
Effect
Abnormal relay
transfer.
Failure to transfer.
Relay failure.
Relay failure.
!Inoperative relay.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Revise manufacturing procedures
for heat shrinking operations and
institute tighter inspection controls
at vendor during relay assembly.
Implement drawing change to call
out for use of HI-REL relays which
are screened to detect this type
problem. Ensure that welding
process is consistent and current
with the state-of-the-art.
Review manufacturers' fabrication
and inspection methods. Institute
training of personnel, including
proper cleanliness procedures.
Purchase relays without Teflon
spacers for particular AC/DC
applications. Specify usage limits
for procurement purposes.
Ensure that manufacturers' produc-
manship and
inadequate
soldering
techniques.
tion and quality requirements meet
acceptable standards. Ensure
personnel are certified for solder-
ing work. Institute inspection with
magnification for all soldering
operations.
RELAYS AND SWITCHES(Continued)
N¢ Hardware
18Relay
(3"
O"
19
Z0
21
22
Single Pole
Double Throw
(SPD T ) Switch
Switch
Selector
Thermal Time
Delay Relay
Thrust OK
Pressure
Switch
23 Toggle Switch
Ref
Code
F
F
C
F
F
F
Problem
Open circuit
condition.
Intermittent
open.
No telemetry
signal output.
Resistance
changes in
heater element.
Cracked U-
frame,
Internal contam-
ination, weld
defects, momen-
tary shorting,
cracks, and an
lannealed return
spring.
Cause
Internal moisture.
Loose contact
mounting point.
Connector shorted
to ground by a
scrap piece of
wire,
Poor coil wire
insulation.
Stress corrosion
of 17-TPH
switch material,
Inadequate manu-
facturing process
controls.
Effect
Failure to transfer.
Erratic operation.
Inability to
trams:air signal,
Erratic time
delays.
Actuation below
requirements.
Inoperative switch.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Tighten manufacturer controls and
procedures, Employa low tem-
perature screening test prior to
relay usage.
Implement adequate s cr eening
procedures to detect internal
deficiencies. Review manufac-
turers' process and inspection
controls for adequacy.
Institute rigid inspection during
assembly and installation of
connectors. Ensure personnel are
trained and certified for work on
connectors.
Requalify relay using improved
insulation method. Investigate
manufacturers' quality control
practices.
Institute switch redesign incor-
porating use of Inconel 7 18 switch
material.
Ensure screening and inspection
requirements will detect switch
problems. Implement 100% vendor
inspection for each deficiency
during switch fabrication.
O'-
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IN(
_24
25
26
27
28
Hardware
Vent and
Relief Valve
Switch
2 Amp Relay
Module
2 Amp Relay
Module
10 Amp Magne-
tic Latch Relay
Module
50 Amp Relay
Module
Ref
Code
F
C
C
C
C
RELAYS AND SWITCHES (Continued)
Problem Caus e Effect Remarks/Su_e stions
Excessive
current draw.
Melted wire
insulation next
to relay can.
Contacts fail
to close.
Failure to
reset.
Intermittent /
no nfunctional
motor driven
switch.
Defective weld
joint on internal
switch actuating
pin.
Application of
excessive current
from an unknown
source.
Contact acciden-
tally burned
during a previous
trouble shooting
operation.
Heat application
causing vinyl wire
covering to shrink
causing a short
circuit.
"Break before
make" type
contacts and
oxidation.
Failure of
associated
circuitry.
Warped relay;
open circuit.
Failure to function
Redesign switch to employ rivet
construction rather than
resistance welds.
Ensure checkout procedures are
adequate to prevent excessive
current applications. Thicker wire
insulation will reduce possibility
of complete breakdown in the event
of inadvertent application of
excessive current.
Ensure personnel are properly
properly; open
circuit.
Inability to com-
plete circuit.
Open circuit;
failure to transfer
power.
trained and instructed on proper
troubleshooting techniques.
Institute use of Teflon wire
coverings to prevent heat damage.
Institute use of "make before
break" type contacts and cycle
relays several times prior to
intended use to help prevent oxida-
tion.
,m,,,
Nc Hardware
1 Diode
2 Diode
O _
00
3 NPN
Transistor
4 Rectifier
Silicon Con-
trolled Recti-
fier (SCR)
Sillcon
Contro fled
Rectifier (SCR)
Ref
Code
F
F
F
F
F
F
Problem
Voids and
cracks in the
bonding
material.
Excessive
reverse
current.
Shorted
transistors.
Silicon pellet
broken loose
from header.
Devices do not
meet applicable
specifications.
Excessive
electrical
leakage.
SEMIC ONDU C T ORS
, Cause
Shrinkage of
silver paste
bonding material.
Shunt resistance
paths due to
aluminum whisker
over-hanging the
PN junction.
Internal nickel
particle
contamination.
Inadequacy of
silver paste
honding mat erial.
Mis repr es enta-
tion by SCR
dis tributor.
Contamination
introduced during
processing of
the Mesa chip or
the silicone rub-
ber coating.
Effect
Reduced quality
and reliability.
Short.
No output.
Reduced quality
and reliability.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Ensure vendor develops proper
design and material processes
to reduce or eliminate deficiency.
Initiate tight inspection controls
and utilize random X-ray inspec-
tion subs equent to manufacture.
Develop screening (particle
detection) techniques such as X-ray,
nondestructive testing, and
micro s cope . examination of ran-
dom samples.
Investigate use of other types of
bonding material. Tighten vendor
quality control during assembly
of rectifier and specify proper
test to evaluate adequacy of bond.
Questionable
quality and
r eliability.
SCR will trigger
with anode voltage
applied.
Institute quality assurance at user
facility to establish controls and to
preclude use of suspect items.
Redesign SCR and ensure proper
operation by testing its parameters
under adequate test circuit condi-
tions. Ensure that processing
requirements and controls are ade
quate to prevent SCR contarpination
O'-
,.O
Nc
7
Hardware
Silicon Z ene r
Diode
8 Transistor
9 Transistor
10 Transistor
Ref
Code
F
F
F
F
Problem
Breakage.
Current leakage.
l_ernal lead
Wire open.
Internal
contamination.
SEMICONDUCTORS (Continued)
Cause
Improper weld
and shelf storage
time.
Exce ssive
internal
moisture.
Design and
material
limitation.
Inadequate manu-
facturing controls
Effect
Open circuit.
Unstable transistor
output s.
Transistor failure.
Erratic operation.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Implement 100% gross and fine leak
testing, 100% thermal shock
testing, 100% burn-in testing, and
radiographic inspe ction.
Distribute information concerning
shelf storage times of this type
diode.
Discontinue Mesa type construction
of transistor and implement
screening requirements. Initiate
manufacture utilizing Planar type
construction of transistor chip.
Implement new screening specifi-
cations to detect defective items
prior to use. Tighten vendor
inspection controls during manu-
facturing proce ss.
Implement tighter vendor part
screening, and X-ray all units
during receiving inspection.
Review manufacturer welding
processes.
TRANSDUCERS
Nc
1
4
-,,l
O
Hardware
ASI Ignition
Detector
Fuel Mass
Probe
Fuel Mass
Probe
Fuel Mass
Semsor
5 LOX Mass
Probe
6 Mass Sensor
Ref
Code
D
C
C
Problem Cause
Probe leads
crossed.
Shorted probe.
Inner and outer
probe elements
shorted together.
B Open circuit.
C
B
Disengagement
of pin from the
probe.
Numerous de-
fects (damaged
wire, split
sleeves, out of
round hole s,
etc. ).
Probe tip rotation
after installation.
Unauthorized us e
of lubrication
during as s embly.
Locking pin not
fully ins erred into
inner element of
probe ; inadequate
procedures.
Defective spot
weld attaching a
tab to the inner
electrode.
Insufficient s lack
in the lead-in
wire to the point
level sensor.
Workmanship.
Effect
Fails to detect
engine ignition.
Erroneous output.
Erratic output.
Loss of sensor.
Improper output.
Incorrect loading
and measurement:
Remarks/Suggestions
X-ray probes prior to installation.
Add tamper proof devices to pro-
vide visual indication of tip rotation.
Institute stringent, limited access
requirements and controls for ac-
cess to and usage of lubricants.
Provide an assembly outline to en-
sure proper installation of the in-
sulator and lock pin. Institute in-
spection requirements and controls
to verify proper assembly,
Incorporate the use of a rivet in ad-
dition to the spot weld to preclude
separation of the tab from the
inner electrode,
Ensure proper probe lead wire
length is maintained during assem-
bly and ensure inspection controls
are adequate to preclude discrepant
probes from being installed,
Verify proper sensor operations
subsequent to assembly and installa.
tion at supplier and contractor.
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work on sensors and
probes and implement additional
inspection points to preclude
incorrect and faulty assembly.
TRANSDUCERS(Continued)
Nc Hardware
Pressure
Transducer
8 Pressure
Transducer
9 Pressure
Transducer
I0 Pressure
Transducer
11 RF Detector
Ref
Code
D
A
Problem
Corrosion and
pitting.
Leakage at
tubing connectior
and housing
plates.
F High output.
D Pin hole in
weld.
C Adjustment
range not
sufficient for
proper opera-
tion.
,Cause
P ota s slum
chloride from the
spark igniter
caused corrosion
of the transducer
sensing line.
Cracked solder
joint caused by
pressure cycling.
Open circuit due
to inadequate
swaging operation.
Poor al{gnment
during welding
process.
Poor design
resulting in
thermal sensiti-
vity; tested by
vendor at other
than operating
temperatures.
Effect
External leakage.
Failure to perform
pre s cribed
function.
Imp rope r oatpu,t.
Leakage.
]Inability to
accurately measure
RF power in
telemetry systems.
Remarks/Suggestions
i
Implement design change to relo-
cate the pressure sensing line and
provide redundant seals to prevent
leakage.
Add requirements for each compo-
nent to undergo vibration, proof,
and burst tests at the vendors.
Tighten manufacturers' inspection
controls. Review manufacturing
process for adequacy in the
swaging operation.
Revise drawings to add a split
Teflon seal to reinforce flange
weld. Also, advise vendor to
adhere to strict welding and align-
ment procedures.
Ensure that vendor test require-
ments and field usage requirements
are compatible to ensure proper
equipment operation.
Nc
12
13
14
--3
_0
Hardware
Temperature.
Transducer
The rmocouple
Gage
Transducer
Ref
Code
B
B
A
Problem
High resistance
short.
Bent pins and
chipped glass
seal.
Open circuit
in the resistive
element.
TRANSDUCERS (Continued)
Cause Effect
Dielectric break-
down during
thermal shock
and vibration.
Mishandling.
Improper wire
connection during
manufacture.
Loss of output;
erroneous output.
Leakage; loss of
vacuum in cryo-
genic lines.
Output signal too
high.
Remarks/.Su_e stions
Ensure that qualification testing is
conducted under environmental
conditions that simulate actual use
of component. Utilize HI-REL
cornponents for transducer
as s embly.
Ensure that personnel are trained
and •certified for thermocouple gage
installation on vacuum jacketed
lines.
Revise vendor ass emhly procedures
and institute additional inspection
points to determine proper connec-
tion prior to sealing.
i
Lm
N(
4
Hardware
Amplifier Pre-
regulator Mo-
dule
Control Rate
Gyro
Control Signal
Processer
Control Signal
Processer
Electrical
Brush
Material
Electrical
Ground Points
Ref
Code
C
E
E
E
F
C
Problem
Diode failure in
potentiOmet er.
Gyro wheel
turning
capability
impaired;
failure to start.
Transformer
secondary open.
Suspected solder
ball contamina-
tion of RFI
filters.
Poor mechanical
bond between
brush block
and holder.
Inadequate aldo-
lization of
grounding
surfaces.
MISCEL LA NEOU.S
Cause
Impurity between
tungsten whis ke r
and aluminum
chip.
Weld bura-through
during manufac-
turing re suiting in
Effect
Inability to adjust
potentiometer to a
null of plus or
minus one volt AC.
Inability of gyro to
come up to speed;
gyro failure.
Rema{ks/Suggestions
Institute use of HI-REL components
during module assembly. Institute
screening tests for added assurance
of HI-REL components.
Revise documentation to require a
gyro "run-down" test subsequent
to manufacturing and acceptance
spin bearing
lubricant
destruction.
Broken wire.
Inadequate
manufacturing
procedures.
Unsatisfactory
soldering
procedure.
Poor grounding
p_actices due to
inadequate
procedures.
No output from
transformer.
Capacitor failure
in the RFI filter.
Separation of the
brush block from
the brush holder.
Corrosion of
grounding joint s.
tests. This should be accomplishec
four months prior to a launch with
spares tested every six months.
Institute tighter inspection control
points during assembly and
manufacturing process es.
Initiate tighter transformer quali_y
controls at vendor during assembly
Improve manufacturing filter
assembly process and add X-ray
inspection r equir ements during
fabrication.
Initiate change to soldering
technique for this type brush
material.
Institute periodic inspections for
grounding joints and ensure proper
surface aldolization through strin-
gent inspection requirements and
controls.
I
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Nc
7
9
Hardware
Linear Shaped
Charge Assem-
bly (LSC)
8 Multiplexer
10
Safety and
Arming Device
(Inert)
Safety and
Arming Device
(Live)
Ref
Code
B
C
A
B
Problem
Striations in
LSC cover
material.
Multiplexer
output zero.
Device would not
move to armed
position.
Rotor shaft
overtravel.
MISCELLANEOUS
Cause
Inadequate control
of the Teflon
fo truing
processes.
Cracked solder
joint on the DC
to DC converter
board.
Possible rnisalign-
ment of clutch
a ssembly and
improper
grounding.
Marginal adjust-
ment during
original assembly.
Continued)
Effect
Incomplete detona-
tion of LSC.
Intermittent
operation; loss of
data.
System could not
be armed; loss of
propellant dis-
per sion capability.
Loss of propellant
dispersion capa-
bility.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Formulate specific quality
standards for acceptance and rejec.
lion of cover material. Ensure
that "forming" processes incor-
porate the latest state-of-the-art
techniques.
Institute use of welded joints where
possible. Ensure inspection
controls are adequate to detect
defective joints. Initiate screening
tests (thermal shock) for additional
assurance of adequate welds.
Institute tighter quality control
measures at vendor.
Develop a mechanical test set for
initial alignment and adjustment of
the rotor. Increase exposure time
to random vibration during P_oduc-
lion Acceptance Tests (PAT). In-
crease number of switchings durin 8
PAT to a minimum of 100, and
provide additio nal ins trum entation
to monitor rotor position during
switchings.
LOn
Nc Ha r_wa re
11 Valve Feedback
Pot entiom eter
Filter Module
12 Voltage
Regulator
Ref
Code
B
C
MISCELLANEOUS (Continued)
/
Problem
Voltage divider
does not main-
tain required
voltage.
Exce ssive
current draw.
Cause
An unwelded joint
in the module.
Short in the secon-
dary winding of
output
transformer.
Effect
Loss of propellant
utilization valve
control.
Short; no output.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute weld marking to ensure
that no welds are missed and pro-
vide 100% inspection for all welds.
Impose a "burn-in" time for all
P.U. computer modules prior to
installation and additional "burn-in'
time for computers after final
as sembly.
Implement additional inspection
points and tests to check trans-
former windings prior to encapsu-
lating the regulator.
Z0
0
[D
0
I--I
Z
0
-.D
HARDWARE INDEX MECHANICAL
, , ,,,., .,,
HARDWARE
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
Accumulator
Servoactuator
BELLOWS AND _L_NIFOLDS
ASI Manifold.
Hydraulic Manifold
Re circulation Return Manifold
Torsional Bellows
Vent Line Bellows
CARRIER PLATES AND ADAPTERS
Adapter Assembly
Plate s
C OVE RS
Protective and Shipping Material
Purge Cover
HOSES AND TUBES
ASI Fuel Injector Hose Assembly
Flex Hose Assembly
Fuel Return Line Hose
Hose Assembly
Tube As sembly
Page No.
109
109
III
iii
ii!
Iii
III
77
112
112
113
113
114
114
114
114
115
HARDWARE INDEX MECHANICAL
HARDWARE
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS
Foam Material
Tank Insulation
Teflon Coaring
LINES AND DUCTS
Auxiliary System Line
Duct As sembly
Feedlines
Fill and Drain Line
Recirculation Duct
Recirculation Line
Stainless Steel Ducting
Vent Line
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
Chemicals
Lubricating Agents
PUMPS
Hydraulic Pump
Recirculation Pump
Turbopump
QUICK DISCONNECTS
Fluid Quick Disconnect
Quick Disconnect
I
Page No.
I17
116
116
120
118
118
121
119
119
121
120
123
123
123
123
123
125
125
78
HARDWARE INDEX MECHANICAL
HARDWARE
REGULATORS
Bubbling Regulator
Flow Regulator
Pressure Regulator
Purge Regulator
SEALS
Conos eal
Cryogenic Seal
Naflex Seal
Piston Seal
Seal
SUPPORT HARDWARE
Bolts
Brackets
Clamps
Flared Tube Fittings
Ins errs
Nuts
Raw Stock
Screws
Welded Support Hardware (Ladders)
Weld Sleeve
TANKS
Bulkhead A ssembly
Cylinder As sembly
Expulsion Tank
Tank Quarter Panel
Tanks
Page No.
126
127
126
127
129
129
129
129
129
130
130
130
131
132
130
130
132
133
133
134
134
134
135
134
79
HARDWARE INDEX MECHANICAL
HA RD WA RE
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL
COMPONENTS
All Hardware
Contract End Items
Expos ed Hardware
Pneumatic Components
Qualification Test Hardware
Various Functional and Structural Components
Welded. Hardware and Structures
UMBILICALS
Re connect A ss embly
Stage Umhilicals
Umbilical Locking Mechanism
VALVES AND MODULES
Actuation Control Module
Ball Valve
Butterfly Valve
Check Valve
Continuous Vent Module
Discharge Valve
Dump Module
Fill and Drain Valve
Flow Control Valve
Fuel Valve
Hand Valve
Ignition Monitor Valve (IMV)
Oxidiz er Valve
Pneumatic Valve
Power Control Module
Pressurization Control Module
Prevalve
Propellant Control Module
Relief Valve
Shutdown Valve
Shutoff Valve
i
Page No.
136
136
137
137
137
138
137
139
139
139
148
140
141
140
143
152
141
144
142
147
142
143
142
142
148
141
141
149
145
144
141
8O
HARDWARE INDEX MECHANICAL
HARDWARE
Solenoid•Valve
Vent and Relief Valve
Vent Valve
VALVES AND MODULES
(Continued)
MISCELLANE OUS
Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS)
Burner Assembly
Duct Flange
Environmental Control System (ECS)
Filter
Impeller Fan
Inacces sible Areas
Latching Spring
Latch Shaft
LOX Dome
LOX Sump Baffles
Manufacturing Operations
Material Control
Pneumatic Checkout Rack
Supply Pressure
Retrorocket Motor
Vibration Isolator
Page No.
14Z
145
143
154
156
154
154
154
155
155
155
155
155
156
156
156
156
155
157
157
81
• /
58
NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
m
-4
m
Ill
o o o
I I I
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
CARRIER PLATES AND ADAPTERS
COVERS
HOSES AND TUBES
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS
LINES AND DUCTS
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
PUMPS
QUICK DISCONNECTS
SEALS
TANKS
REGULATORS
SUPPORT HARDWARE
0 0 0 0
I I I I
TEST HARDWARE,, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
UMBILICALS
VALVES AND MODULES
MISCELLANEOUS
I
o
o
0
M
U
N
Cl
0
0
1',-4
M
C/1
t_
o
o
v
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
DESIGN
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
H20/Methanol Accumulator
Hydraulic Accumulator Reservoir
Servoactuator
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
ASI Manifold
Recirculation Return Manifold.
CARRIER PLATES AND ADAPTORS
Anti-Friction Plate
COVERS
Purge Cover
HOSES AND TUBES
Augmented. Spark Igniter Fuel Injector Hose Assembly
Pressure Transducer Sensing Lines (Tube Assembly)
LINES AND DUCTS
Fuel Feed Duct
LH2 Recirculation Line
LOX Auxiliary Pressurization System Line Assembly
LOX Fill and Drain Line
Vacuum Jacketed Feedline
Page/It em
Num be r
109 (I)
109 (2)
1 io (6)
lll (1)
iII (3)
112 (1)
113(i)
114(1)
i15(7)
118(2)
119 (9)
120(14)
121(18)
_.z?.(27)
83
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
DESIGN
PUMP S
Auxiliary Hydraulic Pump
LH2 Recirculation Pump
LOX Turbopump
QUICK DISC ONNECTS
LOX Disconnect Assembly
REGULA T OR S
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Nitrogen Flow Regulator
Pressure Regulator
SEALS
Cryogenic Seal
Hydraulic Accumulator and Large Piston Seals
SUPPORT HARDWARE
Bracket
Flange Bolt
Flared Tube Fitting Sleeve
Flex[oc Nut
Mounting Inserts Anchored in Honeycomb Material
Titanium Metals Used in LOX Systems
Welded Support Hardware (Ladders)
Page/Item
Numb e r
i I ill
124 (])
124 (3)
124 (4)
125 (31
126 (1, 3, 5)
1.27 (9)
128 (]4, 15)
129 C2)
129 (3)
130 (3)
13o (6)
131 (7)
131 (10)
132 (131
133 ( 19}
133 (21)
84
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
D ESIGN
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL
COMPONENTS
All Hardware
Qualification Test Hardware
UMBILICALS
Carrier Retract Reconnect Assembly
Umbilical Carrier Reconnect Assembly
Umbilical Locking Mechanism
VALVES AND MODULE S
Check Valve
Chilldown Shutoff Valve
Cryogenic Butterfly Valve
Gas Generator Ball Valve
Helium Vent and Shutoff Valve
LH 2 Vent Valve
LH2 Vent and Relief Valve
LOX Fill and Drain Valve
LOX Prevalve
LOX Prevalve/Fuel Prevalve
LOX Shutdown Valve
LOX Shutdown Valve
LOX Tank Pressurization Control Module
LOX Tank Vent and Relief Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Pneumatic Actuation Control Module
Pneumatic Power Control Module
Relief Valve
Relief Valve
Shutdown Valve
Solenoid. Ball Valve
Solenoid. Valve
Page/Item
Number
136 (1)
137 (8)
139 (1)
139 (3)
139 (4)
140 (4)
141 (7)
141 (9)
142 (12)
143 (19)
143 (24)
143 (23)
144 (2 5)
144 i26)
144 (27)
144 (28)
145 (29)
145 (30)
145 (33)
146 (35, 36)
148 (47)
148 (48, 49)
14.9 (51, 55,
56)
15o (59)
150 (60)
15o (61)
150 (63)
85
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
D ESIGN
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued.)
Solenoid Valve
Start Tank Discharge Valve
Tank Pressurization Control Module
MISCELLANEOUS
Environmental Control System (ECS)
GN z Supply Pressure (Test Supply)
Impeller Fan
Latching Springs
LOX Sump Baffles
Pneumatic Checkout Rack
Page/Item
Number
151 (64)
ISZ (73)
153 (76)
154 (3)
155 (6)
155(7)
iss(10)
l_6(iz)
156(16)
86
P ROBL"EM INDEX MECHANICAL
HUMAN ERROR
,,. ,., , ,
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
Re circulation Return Manifold
COVERS
Shipping and Protective Materials
HOSES AND TUBES
Flex Hose Assembly
Hose Assembly
Tube Assembly
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS
LH 2 Tank Insulation
LH 2 Tank Sidewall Insulation
Spray Foam Insulation
LINES AND DUCTS
Duct Assembly
LH 2 Feedline
LH2 Feedline
LH 2 Recirculation Duct
LH 2 Recirculation Return Line
LOX Fill and Drain Line
LOX Vent Line Assembly
Page/Item
Number
ill (4:)
113 (3)
114 (2)
i14(5)
115 (9)
ll6(Z)
116(3)
I17(5)
i18(I)
118 (4)
i19(6)
i19(8)
izO(ii) ,
121(17)
121(19)
8?
PROBELM INDEX MECHANICAL
HUMAN ERROR
PUMPS
Turhopump
QUICK DISCONNECT
LH Z Disconnect
REGULATORS
LOX Dome Purge Regulator
Pressure Regulator
SEALS
C ono seal
Naflex Seal Installation
SUPPORT HARDWARE
Clamps (In-Tank)
Flared Tube Plugs
Self-Locking Nut
Socket Head Cap Screw
TANKS
APS Bladder Expulsion Tank
Bulkhead A ssembly
Page/Item
Number
|i
124 (6)
125(2)
127 (8)
127(11,
13)
129 (1)
129 (4)
130 (4)
131(9)
132(15)
132(16)
134(1)
1.34(2)
g 8
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
HUMAN ERROR
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND MECHANICAL
C OMP ONENTS
Contract End Items
Exposed Hardware
Various Components
UMBILICAL
Stage Umbilicals
VALVES AND MODULES
Check Valve
Fuel Pr evalve
Gas Generator Fuel Purge Check Valve
GH 2 Pneumatic Valve
Ignition Monitor Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Main Oxidizer Valve
Modulating Flow Control Valve
Relief Valve
Relief Valve
Solenoid. Valve
Solenoid. Valve
MISC ELLANEOUS
Environmental Control System (ECS)
O2/H 2 Burner Assembly
Page/Item
Number
136 (4)
137 (5)
138 (10)
139 (2)
140 (5)
141 (10)
142 (1:3)
142 (15,)
143 (20)
147 (39)
147 (4:3)
148 (4 5)
149 (52)
150 (57)
151 (65, 66,
67)
152 (71)
154 (2)
156 (15)
$9
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
MAINTENANC E
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
Se rvoactuator
HOSES AND TUBES
Fuel Return Line Hose
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
Reproduction Machine Toner
QUICK DISCONNECTS
Fluid Quick Disconnect
Quick Disconnect Assembly
REGULAT ORS
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Pressure Regulator
VALVES AND MODULES
Ball Valve
Hand Valve
Mainstage Control Solenoid. Valve
Relief Valve
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid Valve
Page/Item
Number
1o9 (5)
1 14 (4)
123 (5)
125 (i)
125 (5)
126 (2,4)
127 (12)
140 (2.)
142 (16)
148 (44)
149 (53, 54)
151 (70)
152 (7 2)
9O
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
MANUFAC TURING
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
Servoactuator
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
Vent Line Bellows
HOSES AND TUBES
Flex Hose Assemblies
Tube' As sembly
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS
FEP Teflon Wire Insulation
Stafoa:m: Foam Potting Material
Tank Insulation Tile and Simulators
LINES AND DUCTS
LH 2 Feedline
LOX Feedline
Turbopump Fuel Ducts
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
Electroplating Copper Additives
Epoxy/T richlo ro ethylene
Lubricant
Transparent Chemical Film (Alodine 1500)
Page/Item
Number
,11
i
109 (4)
ill (6)
114 (3)
ii5 (8)
ii6 (i)
117 (6)
i16 (4)
118 (5)
izo (15)
izz (zi)
1;!3 (i)
123 (2)
123(3)
123 (6)
91
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
MANUFACTURING
QUICK DISCONNECT
QuiCk Disconnect
REGULATORS
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
LOX Bubbllng Regulator
SUPPORT HARDWARE
Aluminum Alloy Coupling Nut
Aluminum Raw Stock
Coupling Nut
High Carbon Steel Bolts
Self-Locking Nut
Socket Head Screw
Support Bracket
TA NKS
Cylinder Assembly
Fuel Tank
Helium Storage Tanks
LH2 Tank
LH 2 Tank Quarter Panel
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL
C OMP ONENTS
Pneumatic Components
Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) Welded Hardware and Structures
Page/item
Number
1Z 5 (4)
lZ6 (6)
126 (7)
130 (1)
130 (Z)
130 (5)
131 (11)
13Z (14)
13Z (17)
133 (18)
134 (3)
134 (4)
134 (5)
135 (6)
135 (7)
137 (6)
137 (9)
92
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
MANUFACTURING
VALVES AND MODULES
Ball Valve
Cold Helium Dump Module
GasGenerator Oxidizer Valve
LOX' Tank Shutoff Valve
Main Fuel Valve
Override Solenoid Valve
Vent and.Relief Valve
MISCELLANEOUS
Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS)
Filter
Manufacturing Operations
Material Control
Retrorocket Mot.or
Vibration Isolato rs
'Page/I_em
Number
140 (I)
14 !(8)
142 (14)
145(32)
147 (4 l)
148 (46)
153(78,
79)
154(1)
154 (4)
156 (13)
156 (14)
157(17)
157(18)
93
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
PROCEDURES
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
Hydraulic Actuator
Servoactuator
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
Hydraulic Manifold As sembly
Torsional Bellows
CARRIER PLATES AND ADAPTORS
Carrier Plate Assembly
Orifice Adapter Assembly
COVERS
Purge Cover
HOSES AND TUBES
Hydraulic Line (Tube Assembly)
LINES AND DUCTS
Fuel Pressu're Duct
LH 2 Recirculation By-Pass Line
LH 2 Recirculation Line
LH 2 Recirculation Return Line
LH2 Vent Line
LOX Feedline
Stainless Steel Ducting •
94
Page/Item
Number
i
lO9 (3)
1 10 (7)
Iii (2)
111 (5)
1 12 (2)
I12 (3)
1 13 (2)
115 (6)
118(3)
119 (7)
119(10)
120(12)
120_13)
121(16)
. 12 1_ZO )
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
PROCEDURES
,,, ,,
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
Lubricating Agents
PUMPS
Auxiliary Hydraulic Pump
Turbopump
REGULATORS
Pressure Regulator
SEALS
Seal
SUPP ORT HARDWARE
Flared Tube Installation
MF Tube Fittings with Ratchet and Spring Locking Devices
Weld Sleeve
TANKS
Oxidizer Tank Assembly
95
Page/Item
Number
iz3 (4)
lz7 (lo)
_z9 (s)
131 (8)
131 (IZ)
133 (ZO)
135 (8i9)_
PROBLEM INDEX MECHANICAL
PROCEDURES
. ,m
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL
C OMP ONENTS
Contract End. Items
Qualification and Engineering Test Hardware
Various Functional and Structural Components
VALVES AND MODULES
Check Valve
Fuel Tank Pressurization Control Module Assembly
Helium Flow Control Valve
Ignition Monitor Valve (IMV)
LH 2 Continuous Vent Module
LOX Tank Relief Valve
LOX Vent and. Relief Valve
LOX Vent Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Main Oxidizer Valve
Propellant Control Module (APS)
Relief Valve
Solenoid Operated Valve (3-way)
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid Valve (3-way)
Start Tank Discharge Valve
Start Tank Fill Valve
Vent and Relief Valve
MISCELLANEOUS
Fuel High Pressure Duct Flange
Inaccessible Areas
Latch Shaft
LOX Dome
Page/Item
Number
136 (2, 3)
137 (7)
138 (II)
140 (3,6)
141 (ii)
142 (17)
143 (2i)
143 (22)
145.(3l)
145 (34)
146 (37,38)
147 (40)
147 (42)
149 (50)
1.5o (58)
150 (62)
151 (68, 69)
142 (18)
15Z (74)
152 (75)
153 (77)
154 (5)
155 (8)
155 (9)
155 (ll)
96
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CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
CONDITION
ASSEMBLY/ADJUSTMENT/INSTALLA TION IMP ROPE R
Auxiliary Hydraulic Pump
Check Valve
Gas Generator Fuel Purge Check Valve
Hose Assembly
Ignition Monitor Valve (IMV)
LHz Recirculation By-Pass Line
Modulating Flow Control Valve
Pneumatic Checkout Rack
Relief Valve
Servoactuator
Solenoid Valve
Various Components
BENT, CHIPPED, CRACKED, BROKEN
Aluminum Alloy Coupling Nut
Aluminum Raw Stock
Anti-Friction Plate
APS Bladder Expulsion Tank
Augmented Spark Igniter Fuel Injector
Auxiliary Hydraulic Pump
Check Valve
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Filter
Flange Bolt
Flared Tube Fitting Sleeve
Fuel Return Line Hose
Fuel Tank
GH2 Pneumatic Valve
High Carbon Steel Bolts
Impeller Fan
Latching Springs
Page/Item
Number
lZ4 (2)
14o (3)
14z (13)
114 (5)
143 (20)
119 (7)
148 (4 5)
156 (16)
150 (57)
110 (7)
151 (66, 67,
69)
138 (10)
13o (i)
13o (z)
112 (I)
134 (i)
114 (i)
124 (i)
140 (4)
126 (6)
154 (4)
130 (6)
13i (7)
114 (4)
134 (4)
142 (15)
131 (11)
155 (7)
155 (I0)
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CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
C ONDITION
BENT, CHIPPED, CRACKED, BROKEN (Continued)
LH 2 Feedline
LH2 Recirculation Return Line
LH2 Tank
LH 2 Tank Quarter Panel
LOX Bubbling Regulator
LOX Disconnect Assembly
LOX Dome Purge Regulator
LOX Fill and Drain Valve
LOX Shutdown Valve
LOX Sump Baffles
LOX Tank Pressurization Control Module
LOX Turbopump
LOX Vent and Relief Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Main Fuel Valve
MF Tube Fittings with Ratchet and Spring Locking Devices
Recirculation Return Manifold
Relief Valve
Relief Valve
Retrorocket Motor
Self-Locking Nut
Servoactuator
Shutdown Valve
Socket Head Cap Screw
Socket Head Screw
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid. Valve
Start Tank Discharge Valve
Tank Insulation Tile and Simulators
Tube Assembly
Turbopump
Umbilical Locking Mechanism
CALIBRATION/REWORK IMPROPER
Solenoid Valve
Page/I_em
Number
119 (6)
120 (ii)
135 (6)
135 (7)
Iz6 (7)
iz5 (3)
127 (8)
144 (2 5)
145 (29)
156 (lZ)
145 (30)
124 (4)
145 (34)
147 (39)
147 (41)
131 (Iz)
111 (4)
149 (55, 56)
150 (58)
157 (17)
132, (14)
109 (4)
150 (60)
132 (16)
132 (17)
151 (70)
152 (7 I)
152 (73)
116 (4)
115 •(8)
124 (5)
139 (4)
15I (65,68)
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CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
C OND ITI ON
i
CONTAMINATED, CORRODED, ERODED
Bracket
Carrier Plate Assembly
Check Valve
Cylinder Assembly
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
GN2 SupplyPressure (Test Supply)
Hand Valve
Helium Flow Control Valve
Helium Vent and Shutoff Valve
Hydraulic Manifold Assembly (4-way)
Inacces sible Areas
LH2 Recirculation Line
LH 2 Recirculation Return Line
LH 2 Vent Valve
LOX Dome
LOX Vent Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Lubricating Agents
Main Oxidizer Valve
Mainstage Control Solenoid Valve
Manufacturing Operations
Oxidizer Tank As sembly
Pneumatic Component s
Pneumatic Power Control Module
Pressure Regulator
Pressure Regulator
Propellant Control Module (APS)
Purge Cover
Relief Valve
Reproduction Machine Toner
Servoactuator
Solenoid. Operated Valve (3-way}
Solenoid. Valve
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid. Valve
Stainless Steel Ducting
Start Tank Discharge Valve
ii
Page/Item
Number
130 (3)
112 (2)
140 (6)
134 (3)
126 (2)
1_5 (6)
142 (16)
14z (17)
143 (19)
iii (2)
155 (8)
119 (9, 10)
:zo (:z)
143 (24)
155 (11)
146 (35, 37,
38)
147 (40)
123 (4)
147 (42, 43)
148 (44)
:56 (13)
13 5 (8)
137 (6)
148 (48)
127 (10)
:28 (14)
149 (50)
113 (2)
149 (53)
123 {5)
109 (5)
150 (62)
150 (63)
151 (64)
152 (72)
121 (20)
152 (74)
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CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
CONDIT ION
CONTAMINATED, CORRODED, ERODED
• (Continued)
Start Tank Fill Valve
Torsional Bellows
Turbopump
Various Functional and Structural Components
Vent and Relief Valve
Vent Line Bellows
Weld Sleeve
CRACKED/DEFECTIVE WELD
ASI Manifold
LH2 Feedline
LOX Feedline
LOX Fill and Drain Line
LOX Vent Line Assembly
Support Bracket
Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) Welded Hardware and Structures
Turbopump Fuel Duct
Welded Support Hardware (ladders)
DENTS, DINGS, SCRATCHES
Ball Valve
Bulkhead Ass embly
Conoseal
Page/Item
Number
152 (75)
ill (5)
1Z4 (6)
13s it i)
153 (77,78,
79)
Iii (6)
133 (20)
iii (I)
118 (4, 5)
lzo (15)
121 (17)
121 (19)
133 (18)
137 (9)
IZ2 (Zl)
133 (21)
140 (i)
134 (2)
129 (i)
101
CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
CONDITION
lJl
DENTS, DINGS, SCRATCHES
(Continued)
Contract End Items
Exposed Hardware
Flex Hose Assembly
Ignition Monitor Valve (IMV)
LOX Tank Shutoff Valve
Quick Dis connect
Seal
Spray Foam Insulation
Tube Assembly
EXPLODED
LOX Prevalve/Fuel Prevalve
Pressure Transducer Sensing Lines (Tube Assembly)
Titanium Metals Used in LOX Systems
FATIGUE C RACKS
Chilldown Shutoff Valve
Fuel Feed Duct
LOX Auxiliary Pressurization System Line Assembly
LOX Fill and Drain Line
HEAT DAMAGE
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
LH z Recirculation Pump
O2/H2 Burner Assembly
Page/Item
Number
136 (4)
137 (5)
114 (2)
143 (20)
14 5 (32)
125 (4)
129 (5)
i 17 (5)
115 (9)
144 (27)
115 (7)
133 (19)
141 (7)
118 (2)
120 (14)
121 (18)
126 (5)
124 (3)
156 (is)
I02
CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
C ONDITION
INTERMITTENT, FLUCTUATION
Cryogenic Butterfly Valve
LOX Vent Valve
Nitrogen Flow Regulator
Pressure Regulator
MISMA T CHED
Fluid Quick Disconnect
Helium Solenoid. Valve (3-way)
LH2 Disconnect
Stage Umbilicals
NOT TO DRAWING/SPECIFICATION/E. O.
All Hardware
Contract End. Items
Coupling Nut
Flex Hose Assemblies
Fuel Pressure Duct
Gas Generator Oxidizer Valve
Orifice Adapter Assembly
Qualification and Engineering Test Hardware
PRESSURE/VACUUM LEAK
Cryogenic Seal
Flared Tube Installation
'Page/Item
Number
,, , ,, ,
141 (9)
146 (36)
127 (9)
128 (15)
125 (i)
142 (18)
125 (2)
139 (2)
136 (i)
136 (Z)
130 (5)
114 (3)
llS (3)
142 (14)
I12 (3)
137 (7)
129 (2)
131 (8)
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CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
C ON D IT ION
PRESSURE/VACUUM LEAK
(Continued.)
LH 2 Recirculati0n Duct
LOX Fe edline
Naflex Seal Installation
Pneumatic Actuation Control Module
Pneumatic Power Control Module
Pres sure Regulator
Relief Valve
Se rvoactuato r
SLOW/INCOMPLETE OPERATION
Tank Pressurization Control Module
Umbilical Carrier Reconnect Assembly
STUCK, SEIZED, BINDING
Check Valve
Cold Helium Dump Module
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Latch Shaft
LH2 Continuous Vent Module
LOX Shutdown Valve
LOX Tank Vent and Relief Valve
Override Solenoid Valve
Pressure Regulator
Solenoid Ball Valve
104
Page/Item
Number
i19 (8)
121 (16)
129 (4)
148 (47)
148 (49)
127 (11)
149 (52)
1 i0 (6)
1
153 (76)
139 (3)
140 (3)
141 (8)
126 (1)
155 (9)
143 (22)
144 (28)
145 (33)
148 (46)
127 (13)
150 (61)
C ONDITION IND EX ME CHANICA L
C ONDITION
TORN, DEBONDED
Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS)
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Electroplating Copper Additives
Epoxy/T richoroethylene
LH2 Tank Insulation
LH 2 Tank Sidewall Insulation
Mounting Inserts Anchored in Honeycomb Material
Oxidizer Tank Assembly
Purge Cover
Vibration Isolators
WARPED, SHRUNK, GROWTH
FEP Teflon Wire Insulation
Hydraulic Actuator
Quick Disconnect Assembly
Stafoam: Foam Potting Material
Vacuum 3acketed Feedlines
WORN, WEAK, STRIPPED, LOOSE
Ball Valve
Carrier Retract Reconnect Assembly
Clamps (In-Tank)
Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator
Duct Assembly
Environmental Control System (ECS)
Flared Tube Plugs
Flexloc Nut
Fuel Prevalve
Fuel Tank Pressurization Control Module Assembly
Gas Generator Ball Valve
HzO/Methanol Accumulator
Hydraulic Accumulator Reservoir
Hydraulic Accumulators and Large Piston Seals
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Page/Item
Number
154 (i)
126 (3)
123 (1)
]z3 (z)
i16 (z)
116 (3)
13z (13)
13 5 (9)
113 (I)
157 (iS)
I16 (i)
109 (3)
125 (5)
117 (6)
122 (22)
140 (2)
139 (i)
130 (4)
126 (4)
118 (I)
154 (2)
131 (9)
131 (]Q)
141 (i0)
141 (I i)
142 (12)
109 (1)
109 (Z)
129 (3)
CONDITION INDEX MECHANICAL
CONDITION
WORN, WEAK, STRIPPED, LOOSE
(C ontinued)
Hydraulic Line (Tube Assembly)
LH 2 Vent and Relief Valve
LH 2 Vent Line
LOX Prevalve
LOX Tank Relief Valve
Lubricant
Pressure Regulator
Reeirculation Return Manifold
Relief Valve
Relief Valve
Self-Locking Nut
WRONG MATERIAL
Fuel High Pressure Duct Flange
Helium Storage Tanks
Material Control
Shipping and Protective Materials
Relief Valve
Page/I_em
Number
115 (6)
143 (2,3)
lZO (_3)
144 (2,6)
145 (3 1)
lZ3 (3).
1z7 (lz)
111 (3)
149 (54)
150 (59)
132 (15)
154 (5)
134 (5)
156 (14)
113 (3)
149 (51)
106
LO[
NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
"t"
Ill
0
Z
.-!
Z
o
I I I I I
ASSEMBLY/ADJUSTMENT/INSTALLATION IMPROPER
BENT, CHIPPED, CRACKED, BROKEN
CALIBRATION/REWORK IMPROPER
CONTAMINATED, CORRODED, ERODED
CRACKED/DEFECTIVE WELD
DENTS, DINGS, SCRATCHES
EXPLODED
FATIGUE CRACKS
HEAT DAMAGE
INTERMITTENT, FLUCTUATION
MISMATCHED
NOT TO DRAWlNG/SPECIFICATION/EoO°
PRESSURE/VACUUM LEAK
SLOW/INCOMPLETE OPERATION
STUCK, SEIZED, BINDING
DEBONDED
WARPED, SHRUNK, GROWTH
WORN, WEAK, STRIPPED, LOOSE
WRONG MATERIAL
0
t_
M
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U
0
r._
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MECHANICAL PROBLEM SUMMARY
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Z
,.O
No Hardware
1 H20/Methanol
Accumulator
2 Hydraulic
Accumulator
Reservoir
3 Hydraulic
Actuator
4 Servoactuator
5 Servoactuator
Ref
Code
E
C
C
A
Problem
Decreased
accumulator
bolt torque.
Gaseous nitro-
gen pressure
deday.
Excessive leak-
age of hydraulic
fluid.
Broken torsion
spring in the
actuator feed-
back mechanism
A Rust on piston
rod.
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS
Cause
Improper flange
sealing surface
design and
bladder relaxa-
tion.
Spiralling O-rings
on the piston.
O-ring taking a
slight set during
storage.
Intergranular
corrosion due to
improper
cleaning methods
prior to heat
treating.
Inadequate pro-
tection from
moisture.
Effect
H zO/Methanol
leakage.
Loss of positive
pressure in the
accumulator.
Possible depletion
of hydraulic fluid
supply.
Servoactuator fails
to return to the
Zero null position.
Seal damage and
[eakage.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Redesign the bladder and flange
sealing surface. Incorporate
changes into the drawings and
subsequently manufactured parts.
Institute use of quadrangular shaped
seals (QUAD-BON) instead of
conventional O-rings.
Cycle the actuator several times
prior to checkout to restore the
elasticity of the O-rings. Initiate
use of quadrangular shaped seals
(QUAD-BON) instead of convention-
al O-rings on subsequent hardware.
Institute 100% inspection immedia-
tely prior to and immediately
foilowing heat treating process to
ensure the absence of contamina-
tion prior to continuing the
manufacturing process.
Impose strict requirements to pre-
vent contamination and provide for
environmental protection of
actuators.
*For reference code identification, refer to Introduction, pg. 2.
ACCUMULATORS AND ACTUATORS (Continued)
o
Nc Hardware
6 Servoactuator
7 Servoactuator
Ref
C_ode
A
A
Problem
Insufficient
s ealing capa-
bility of O-ring
seal on pre-
filtration by-
pass valve.
Out-of-tolerance
stroke.
,Cause
Inadequate design
resulting in the
use of an under-
sized O-ring,
Improper adjust-
ment for specific
application.
Effect
Leakage through
valve; fire hazard.
/
Servoactuator
position output does
not correspond to
input signal.
Remarks/Suggestions
Incorporate the use of a larger
cross section O-ring and provide a
Teflon backup ring to prevent
leakage.
Implement step-by-step procedures
for adjustment, institute training
for personnel, and maintain an
entry log of actuator length adjust-
ment for its specific application.
Nc Hardware
1 ASI Manifold
2 Hydraulic
Manifold
Assembly
(4 -way)
3 Recirculation
Return
Manifold
4 Recir culation
Return
Ma nifo ld
5 Torsional
Bellows
6 Vent Line
Bellows
Ref
Code
D
D
Problem
Excessive vibra-
tion loading.
Metallic con-
tamination
lodged in 4-way
control valve.
B Loss of vacuum.
Bent pin in
thermocouple
gage.
B
B Corrosion.
B Contaminated
layer on surface
of bellows
material.
BELLOWS AND MANIFOLDS
Cau s e
Poor design re-
sulting in a large,
suspended mass.
Inad equate
Cleaning of hy-
draulic manifold
assembly.
Undersized
threads on
thermocouple due
to "off the shelf"
procurement.
Mi shandling.
Inadequate
cleaning, drying,
and lubrication
specifications.
Material annealed
in ovens in which
proper atmos-
pheric conditions
were not main-
tained.
Effect
Cracked welds.
Start solenoid on
4-way control
ivalve fails to
operate.
Excessive hollo ff.
Loss of vacuum.
Leakage.
Cracks in bellows;
scrapped material.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Redesign manifold, replacing
manifold block with tubing to
eliminate the large suspended
mas s.
Revise cleaning specifications to a
more stringent level. Ensure all
sharp edges and burrs are removed
after machining. Provide inspec-
tion during cleaning process.
Ensure that procurement of spare
thermocouple gages are from the
supplier of the manifold and not
"off the shelf" procurement.
Institute use of protective coverings
on thermocouple gages. Ensure
personnel are trained and certified
for work on vacuum jacketed lines.
Impose stringent cleaning and dryir@
processes. Utilize a corrosion
resistant lubricant as a coating for
torsional bellows (Ecolube 642).
Conduct micrographic examination
for contamination of bellows
material upon receipt.
CARRIER PLATES AND ADAPTERS
N¢ Hardware
1 Anti-Friction
Plate
2 Carrier Plate
A s s embly
3 Orifice Adapte_
As sembly
!Ref
Code Problem
A
B
C
Anti- friction
holddown arm
broken.
Copper seal
used on alumi-
num tube
a ssembly.
Lockwire inter-
ference with
static seal.
Cause
Uneven load
distribution and
excessive hard-
ness of metal.
Nonavailabilit y of
aluminum seal at
time of assembly.
Lo ckwire holes
drilled improper-
ly.
Effect
Pos sibility of loose
parts falling into
engine.
Aluminum /copper
incompatibility
resulting in
corrosion.
Leakage.
Remarks/Suggestions
Change drawings to callout for
different hardness specifications
and new bonding material.
Specify on drawings the type seal
material compatible with the tubing
used. Institute inspection to
comply with specification.
Ensure manufacturing specificatione
clearly define the locations for
drilling operations. For existing
applications, the replacement of
the seal with an O-ring should
preclude leakage.
%o
Nc Hardware
1 Purge Cover
2 Purge Cover
3 Shipping and
Protective
Materials
Ref
Code
B
B
A
Problem
Cut in material
along the zipper.
Water inside
purge cover.
Shipping and
protective
materials mis-
taken for flight
hardware.
C OVE RS
Cause
Cover too small.
Condensation of
air trapped in-
side cover.
Poor human
engineering.
Effect
Inability to hold
purge pressure.
Explosive atmos-
phere if purge func-
tion was lost
during LH 2 filling
operations.
Ranges from test
delays to possible
loss of stage.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Modify purge cover to allow for
shrinkage.
Implement procedures to require
draining of the cover prior to LH2
purge and fill operations.
Utilize materials which either will
not permit installation of the pro-
tected item or will be highly
visible after installation.
HOSES AND TUBES
Nf
1
Hardware
Augmented
Spark Ignite r
Fuel Injector
Hose Assembly
2! Flex Hose
A s s embly
3 Flex Hose
Assemblies
4 Fuel Return
Line Hose
Ref
Code
F
C
B
5 Hose Assembly B
Problem
Flex hose
Breakage.
Hydraulic fluid
leakage at the
B-nut joints.
Difficulty in
meeting speci-
fied require-
ments.
F Teflon cracks.
L eaka ge.
Cause
Resonant flow-
induc ed vibrations,
Scored flare.
Vendor welding
specifications not
compatible with
the current
state -of-the -art.
Overaged
material.
Personnel damage
due to hose
routing and
twisting during
installation.
Effect
Hose failure and
subsequent leakage.
Depletion of hy-
draulic fluid suppl_ni
High rate of rejec-
tion.
Hose failure and
fuel leaks.
Fire hazard.
Remarks/Suggestions
ii i
Implement proper test environment
conditions to assure adequacy of
part operation.
Institute additional inspection
points prior to final assembly.
Ensure personnel are properly
trained and certified for work in
hydraulic systems installation.
Strict adherence to MSFC welding
specifications should he maintained, i
however, utilize vendor welding
specifications if proven to be
superior.
Purge stock ofoveraged Teflonhose.
Inspect in use xtems and replace as
necessary. Initiate periodic
inspection of this type hose.
Redesign hose assembly to provide
wrench flats to prevent twisting
during installation. Route hose
assembly to preclude damage due
to work traffic. Institute use of
protective coverings for hose
as s emblies.
_j2
No
6
Hardware
Hydraulic Line
(Tube
A s s embly)
Pres sure
Trans duc er
Sensing Lines
(Tube
A ssembly)
Tube
As sembly
Tube
Assembly
Ref
Code
C
B
B
C
Problem Cause
HOSES AND TUBES (Continued
Inadequate han-
dling procedures ;
wo rkmanship.
Effect
Worn seals and
flares.
System
pressurization
Hydraulic fluid
leakage.
Lack of redun- Explosion due to
dancy. over pressuriza-
Remarks/Sugge stions
Establish and enforce adequate
handling and installation proce-
dures. Ensure personnel are
trained and certified for work on
hydraulic systems installations.
Install redundant set of pressure
transducers with mandatory re-
with transducer
sensing lines
disconnected.
Cracked sleeve
(303 stainless
steel).
Radial scratches
in flared
surface,
Sulfur in the
sleeves causing
the formation of
a brittle non-
metallic com-
pound in the form
of slivers and
spheres,
Rotation of tube
as sembly during
ins tallation,
tion.
Leakage.
Leakage.
quirements that both sets be
operational prior to pressurizing.
Replace 303 stainless steel sleeves
with 304 stainless steel sleeves.
Ensure personnel are trained and
certified for work on pneumatic
systems installations. Utilize
proper tools to ensure that tube
will not rotate during torquing
operations.
Nc
Z
u. 3
4
Hardware
FEP Teflon
Wire Insula-
lation
LH 2 Tank
Ins ulation
LH 2 Tank
Sidewall
Insulation
Tank Insula-
tion Tile and
Simulator s
Ref
Code
F
B
B
C
Problem
Shrinkage of
insulation.
Loss of helium
purge
capabi lity.
D ebonding of
insulation.
Tensile test
failure at
cryogenic
temperature.
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS
Cause
Variations in
manufacturer s'
process control.
Effect
Shorts due to
exposed wire.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Review existing specifications,
incorporate shrinkage tests, and
ensure that adequate manufacturer
Torn honeycomb
insulation.
Increased insula-
tion heat transfer
and LH2 boiloff.
material controls exist.
Utilize a spray foam type insula-
tion which does not require a
helium purge. Require insulation
Scorched adhesive
and a previously
burned area
which had been
improperly
repaired.
Test specimen
process controls
different from
production pro-
cess controls.
Helium purge
pressure drop;
increased heat
transfer and ex-
ces sire boiloff.
Loss of insulation
effe clive ne ss.
technicians to be certified after
attending a 20-hour course in
insulation bonding techniques.
Refresher courses should be
scheduled every 12 months.
Establish a training program and
ensure personnel are certified on
insulation bonding and repair
techniques. Delete use of honey-
comb insulation and use a spray
foam type insulation which does
not require a helium purge.
Require simulators to be processed
using the same controls as pro-
duction items.
4•' C
--4
Nc Hardware
5 Spray Foam
Insulation
Stafoam;
Foam Potting
Material
Ref
God_
B
A
INSULATION AND POTTING COMPOUNDS (Continued)
Problem
Gouges to bulk-
head during
milling and
trimming
operations.
Growth of foam
potting
mate rial.
,Cause
Use of inadequate
milling and
trimming tools.
Instability of foam
due to its sensi-
tivity to moisture
and temperature.
Effect
Rework and/0r
scrapping of
panels / sections.
Interference with
electrical and
mechanical compo-
nent operation.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Avoid use of metallic tools for
trimming or milling of foam in-
sulation. Institute personnel
training.
Ensure proper heat curing process
is accomplished by vendor.
Institute adequate ins pection
monitoring points.
LINES AND DUCTS
Nc
i
Hardware
Duct Assem-
bly
2 Fuel Feed
Duct
3 Fuel Pressure
Duct
4 LH 2 Feedline
_= LH 2 Feedline
Ref
Code
B
C
A
B
B
Problem
Loose rivets.
Loss of vacuum.
Vendor proof
pres sure test
conduct ed at
too high a
pressure.
Incomplete
weld penetra-
tion.
Longitudinal
weld cracks in
the inner
bellows.
Cause
Human error; use
of wrong rivets.
Fatigue cracks on
inner bellows
assembly.
Contractor failed
to notify vendor
of revised proof
pres sure require
ments.
Poor workman-
ship and improp-
er weld X-ray
interpretation.
Improper manu-
factu ring
processes.
Effect
Leakage.
Excessive heat
transfer; exces sire
boiloff.
Possible rupture
of duct.
Cracked welds ;
line rupture.
Los s of vacuum ;
structural failure.
Remarks/Sug_e stions
Ensure drawings clearly specify
the correct rivets to be used.
Implement additional ins pection
points to ensure installations are
according to drawings.
Fatigue cracks can be prevented by
adding an inner liner to the duct to
ab'sorb the effect of fast flowing
cryogens.
Ensure vendor is notified of all re-
visions to proof pressure require-
ments and implement inspection
points to ensure vendor testing is
conducted to the latest drawing
revision.
Institute usage of the latest welding
equipment and techniques. Utilize
magnification for review and
examination of weld X-rays.
Initiate a separate 100% revalua-
tion of all weld X-rays.
Anneal and roll bend hellows
material during forming to reduce
stress and cut bellows material
such that only one longitudinal
weld is required.
LINES AND DUCTS (Continued)
Nc
10
Hardware
LH 2 Feedline
LH 2 Recircula-
tion By-Pass
Line
LH 2 Recircula-
tion Duct
LH 2 Recircula-
tion Line
LH 2 Recircula-
tion Line
Ref
Code
B
B
C
B
B
Problem
Cracked glass
ins err in
the rrn o couple
gage.
Loss of vacuum.
Loss of vacuum.
Outgas sing of
contamination.
Outgas sing of
contamination;
loss of vacuum.
Cause
Improper handling.
Improper installa-
tion of thermo-
couple gage.
Roll seam leakage
due to handling
damage.
Contamination
i from the aluminum
j rupture disc.
Contamination in-
Effect
Loss of vacuum.
Exces sire boiloff.
Excessive heat
transfer; exces sire
boiloff.
Loss of vacuum.
Excessive hoiloff.
Remarks/.Sugge stions
Ensure personnel are properly
trained for thermocouple gage
installation. Institute use of
protective coverings for gage.
Ensure that installation procedures
provide detailed maintenance in-
structions for replaceable parts
on vacuum jacketed lines. Ensure
personnel are trained and certified
for work on vacuum jacketed lines.
Ensure post installation/rework
tests are adequate to identify a
faulty installation.
IEnsure personnel are trained and
certified and institute use of pro-
tective cove rings.
Utilize corrosion resistant steel
(CRES) rupture discs in cryogenic
recirculation line s.
Ensure that procedures provide de-
itroduced during
replacement of
thermocouple
gage.
tailed maintenance instructions for
replaceable parts on vacuum
jacketed lines. Ensure personnel
are trained and certified for work
on vacuum jacketed lines.
LINES AND DUCTS (Continued)
Z
O
Nc
11
12
Hardware
LH 2 Recircula
tion Return
Line
LH 2 Recircu-
lation Return
Line
13 LH 2 Vent Line
14 LOX Auxiliary
Pressurization
System Line
A s s emhly
1_= LOX Feedline
Ref
Code Problem
B Loss of vacuum.
B Outgassing of
contamination.
B Loss of vacuum.
Cause
B High frequency
fati gu e.
B Loss of vacuum.
Cracked glass
bead sealin
thermocouple
gage.
Improper
cleaning and
purging.
Insufficient torque
on thermocouple
gage.
Excessive
pres sure levels
applied by the
LOX auxiliary
pres surization
system.
Defective circum -!
ferential bellows
to outer duct
welds.
Effect
Exces sire boiloff.
Loss of vacuum.
Exc e ssire hoiloff.
LOX leakage; fire
hazard.
Excessive heat
transfer; excess-
ive boiloff.
Remarks/Suggestions
Institute use of protective covering. =
on thermocouple gages. Ensure
personnel are trained and certified
for work on vacuum jacketed lines.
Ensure that cleaning and purging
procedures reflect adequate con_
trois to prevent the inclusion of
contamination. Lines suspected
of outgassing due to contamination
should be pumped down for longer
periods of time than normal
requirements.
Increase thermocouple gage torque
from 60 inch pounds to 90 inch
pounds maximum.
Change line orifice size to limit
the pressure applied to the stage
pressurization system.
Change manufacturing procedures
to include a mass spectrometer
leakage check under elevated
temperatures.
tO
Nc Hardware
16 LOX Feedline
17 LOX Fill and
Drain Line
18 LOX Fill and
Drain Line
19 LOX Vent
Line Ass embly_l
201 Stainless Steel
Ducting
Ref
Code
LINES AND DUCTS (Continued)
Prqhlem.. Cause
B Loss of vacuum.
B Cracked mount
weld; Hne
flattened at ad-
3acent bend.
B Fracture of line
bellows.
B Weld deficiencies
C Corrosion of
welds.
Improper vacuum
pumping proce-
dures.
Mishandling and
work traffic.
Metal fatigue
caused by high
frequency
cycling.
Poor workman-
ship and inade-
quate inspection.
Inadequate fabri-
cation, cleaning,
and packaging
procedure s.
Effect
Excessive LOX
boiloff.
Line leakage;
fire hazard.
Leakage; fire
hazard; possible
line collapse.
Leakage; fire
hazard; possible
line collapse.
Leakage.
Remarks/Sug_e stions
Ensure that procedures clearly de-
fine proper pumping procedures and
techniques, including when to be-
gin pumping operations and the
frequency of pumping operations.
Institute use of protective coverings
for lines susceptible to damage
from work traffic.
Strengthen line by adding lines
within the bellows sections and re-
place the single ply bellows with a
three ply bellows.
Incorporate a onepiece vent line
to eliminate multiple welds.
Ensure welders are trained and
certified. Improve inspection
through use of magnification of
weld X-rays.
Avoid use of carbon steel wire
brushes during fabrication and
ensure passivation of weld areas.
Maintain cleanliness during cleaning
and packaging operations.
Nc Hardware
21 Turbopump
Fuel Duct
22 Vacuum
Jacket ed
Feedline
Ref
Code
D
B
Problem
Cracks in weld
joints.
Shrinkage of the
Kel-F seal on the
evacuation valve.
LINES AND DUCTS
Cause
Inadequate inspec-
tion planning and
control of process
flow.
Seal material
inadequate for
application.
'Continued)
Effect
Leakage.
Loss of vacuum.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure vendor inspection require-
ments clearly define inspection
operations.
Institute use of an all metal spring
seal in place of the Kel-F seal.
LUBRICANTS AND CHEMICAL ADDITIVES
ro
Nc
1
4
Hardware
Ele ctroplating
Copper
Additive s
Epoxy/
Trichloroethy-
lene
Lubricant
Lubricating
Agents
Reproduction
Machine Toner
Transparent
Chemical Film
(Alodine
15oo)
Ref
Code
F
F
F
D
F
C
Problem
Debon4ing of
solder, to copper
laminate.
Loosening of
epoxy.
Variation in
sens itivity to
contact with
LOX.
Use of
inadequate,
excessive, or
wrong type
lubricant.
As sociated
hardware
contamination.
Confusion in
determining film
thickness,
uniformity, and
presence.
Cause
Additives
(organics) in the
copper plating
solution.
Epoxy incompati-
ble with
trichloroethylene.
Lubricant incom-
patibility.
Inadequate lubri-
cation procedures.
Toner transferred
by hand from
drawing to
hardware.
Transparency of
films.
Effect
Electrical separa-
tion between solder
and copper pad.
Debonding of
epoxide items.
Possible loss of
lubrication and
accelerated wear
out rate.
System contamina-
tion.
Possible hazard
condition in LOX
environment.
Inadequate protec-
tion of metallic
surfaces.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Implement change in copper plating
process to eliminate bright acid
copper additives in the solution.
Initiate and dis seminate information
to prevent using trichloroethylene
with epoxies.
Ascertain usage environment and
conduct compatibility tests.
Tighten inspection controls at
vendor and establish formula guide-
lines in order to produce lubricant
with consistent chemical qualities.
Maintain tight controls on availabil-
ity and accessibility of lubricants.
Ensure proper application through
per sonnel training.
Ensure that controls exist to pre-
clude toner contamination.
Use colored films where
permissible.
Nc
1
2
3
Z
4
Hardware
Auxiliary
Hydraulic
Pump
Auxiliary
Hydraulic
Pump
LH 2 Recircu-
lation Pump
LOX Turbo-
pump
5 Turbopump
6 Turbopump
Ref
Code
C
C
Problem.
Pump output
below specifi-
cation.
Pump output be-
low specifica-
tion.
B Bearing failure.
D
D
D
Crack in first
stage turbine
wheel.
Broken O-ring.
Gross contami-
nation.
PUMPS
Cause
Broken compen-
sator spring
guide.
Improper adjust-
ment of the
pres sure
compensator.
Dry spinning of
pumps during
leak checks.
Cracks caused by
poor design.
Wrong installa-
tion sequence
used.
Use of loose pump
flange cover as a
seal during tran-
sit.
Effect
Output out of
tolerance; low
pressure.
Out of tolerance
output; low
pressure.
Failure of the
pumps to ade-
quately perform
propellant recir-
culation.
Possible engine
explosion due to
turbine breakup.
Fuel leakage at fuel
balance cavity
supply line adapter.
Pos sible turbopump
and engine damage.
Remarks/Sug_e stions
Increase spring guide material
strength and dimensions.
Implement step-by-step procedures
for adjusting and locking pump
compensator.
Utilize bearings which are either
self lubricating or do not require
lubrication during dry spinning
operations.
Initiate a redesign of turbopump and
verify proper operation by testing
under operational parameters.
Revise modification manual to in-
clude proper installation sequence
and warnings to use extreme care
during installation.
Caution personnel to use more care
when installing covers and seals,
and institute tighter inspection
controls. Redesign covers to
afford adequate protection during
shipping ope ration s.
QUICK DISCONNECTS
Ln
Nc Hardware
1 Fluid Quick
Dis connect
2 LH2
Dis connect
3 LOX Discon-
nect Assembly
4 Quick
Dis co nne ct
5 Quick Discon-
nect Assembly
Ref
Code
C
B
Problem
Mismatched
connector
halves.
Excessive gap
between the
ground and
vehicle fill
disconnect
halve s.
B Sheared bolts.
B
A
Scratch on
sealing surface
of Q.D. bellows
probe.
O-rings in the
Q.D. take a
permanent set.
Cause
Deterioration of
ground half due
to repetitive
USe.
Improper adjust-
ment during in-
stallation;
human error.
Poor visibility
resulting in im-
proper position-
ing of GSE half
of disconnect
during mating.
Scratched during
manufacture and
was approved for
use Itas is 11.
O-ring lubrication
washed away by
HzO/Methanol
media.
Effect
Excessive Q. D.
leakage.
Leakage with po-
tential fire hazard.
LOX leakage; fire
hazard.
Leakage of Q. D.
with potential fire
hazard.
Quick disconnect
leakage.
Remarks/Suggestions
Implement a preventive maintenance
program to replace continuously
used items at periodic intervals.
Develop tighter quality control
surveillance during installation.
Modify attaching latch bars to pro-
vide better visibility when mating
GSE and airborne disconnect
assemblies.
Initiate a manufacturing change to
require the use of a Teflon pro-
tective cover during handling
operation.
Initiate a preventive maintenance
schedule for periodic O-ring change-
out. Revise Q.D. specifications
for the use of a more compatible
O-ring material on subs equent
quick disconnect assemblies.
O_
3
4
7
Hardware
Dome Loaded
Pressure
Regulator
Dome Loaded
Pressure
Regulator
Dome Loaded
Pressure
Regulator
Dome Loaded
Pressure
Regulator
Dome Loaded
Pres sure
Regulator
Dome Loaded
Pressure
Regulator
LOX Bubbling
Regulator
Ref
Code Problem.
B Internal leakage
A Seat leakage.
F Internal leakage
Fails to main-
tain a set
pres sure.
C
REGULATORS
Cause
Inadequate de sign;
poppet and guide
slightly galled
from contamina-
tion.
Erosion marks
and metal
particles due to
contamination.
Torn diaphragm.
Normal
in-servlce
wear-out.
Heat generated
in stopping flow
of gas.
Seat damaged
during as sembly.
Fractured spring
due to alloy
flaw.
A Seat damaged.
B Pressure creep.
A Leakage.
Effect
Overpressuri.
zation.
Out-of-tolerance
operation.
Loss of pressure
regulation.
Leakage; out of
tolerance opera-
tion.
Leakage; improper
regulation.
Inability to main-
tain a stable
pressure.
Out-of-tolerance
operation.
Remarks/Surge stions
Redesign regulator for new guide
and spring and eliminate external
sensing ports. Install filters to
prevent contamination.
Redesign diaphragm using materials
that are less susceptible to
tearing.
Establish a preventive maintenance
program requiring replacement of
time sensitive parts on a regularly
scheduled basis.
Redesign regulator seat to be more
compatible and reliable under
operating conditions.
Implement tighter inspection con-
trols during regulator assembly.
Institute 100% inspection during
and subsequent to spring manu-
facture.
Initiate a preventive maintenance
program and provide for seat re-
placement at regular intervals.
N( Hardware
8 LOX Dome
Purge
Regulator
9 Nitrogen Flow
Regulator
10 Pressure
"_ Regulator
11 Pressure
Regulator
12 Pressure
Regulator
13[ Pressure
Regulator
Ref
Code
A
A
A
E
B
B
REGULAT ORS (Continued)
Problem,
Erratic relief
poppet
operation.
Diaphragm
leakage,
Cause
Main inlet and
Effect
Contaminated
poppet assem-
.bly.
Leakage.
Chattering and
pressure
creep.
Pressure
cree_ng.
relief poppets
bent due to im-
proper regulator
adjustment.
C onsi stent cycling
due to low flow
regulation re-
sulting in
diaphragm rup-
ture.
Contamination
from leak detec-
tor soap
solution.
Improper installa_
tion techniques
and tests.
In-service wear.
Bent poppet sten,
causing galling
of stem in guide;
human error.
Fails to open;
improper regula-
tion.
Out -of-tolerance
operation.
Excessive regula-
tor output
pressure.
Poor regulation.
Inability to main-
tain a stable
pressure.
Overpr es suriz a -
tion.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Caution operating personnel not to
adjust the regulator without inlet
pressure applied.
Redesign regulator to contain a
rubber-backed diaphragm backer
plate to prevent rupture. Install
a parallel regulator to prevent
continuous cycling at low flow.
Revise test procedures to require
leak check by submerging the
regulator in deionized water with
subsequent vacuum drying.
Initiate personnel training in
proper installation methods. Re-
quire leak and pressure tests for
regulators prior to installation.
Institute a preventive maintenance
program to provide that parts
subjected to wear be replaced at
regular intervals.
Incorporate tighter manufacturing
inspection controls during assem-
bly. Ensure that post assembly
functional tests will identify
faulty hardware.
7_
OO
Nc Hardware
14 Pressure
Regulator
15 Pressure
Regulator
.,. ,,,..
Ref
Code
B
B
Prpblem
Leakage past
s eat.
Erratic
regulation.
REGULATORS (Continued)
Cause
Seat deteriora-
tion.
Inadequate de sign
for application.
Effect
Inability to main-
tain a stable
pressure.
Inability to main-
tain a stable
pressure.
Remar,ks/,Sugge stions
Incorporate design changes to in-
stall a glass impregnated teflon
seat which is less susceptible to
deterioration.
Research design thoroughly and
ensure that qualification test pro-
gram will provide a suitable
product.
CO
_D
N¢ Hardware
1 Conos eal
2 Cryogenic
Seal
3 Hydraulic
Accumulator
and Large
Piston Seals
4 Naflex Seal
Ins tallation
5 Seal
Ref
Code
C
B
C
A
A
Problem
Scratched seal.
Leakage.
O-ring
spirailing.
Leakage.
Gouged seal.
Cause
Workmanship and
handling.
Unfavorable
tolerance
LS
Effect
Leakage at
connection.
SEA
buildup.
Inadequate de-
sign.
Handling and
wo r kma nship.
Improper installa-
tion.
Fire hazard.
Leakage.
System degrada-
tion.
Fluid leakage.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Provide for adequate seal protec-
tion and caution personnel in the
handling and installation of delicate
parts.
Redesign seal to allow for un-
favorable tolerance buildup.
Use quadrangular shaped seals
(QUAD-BON) instead of conven-
tional O-rings.
Special handling and polishing re-
quirements, in addition to strict
adherence to fit-up procedures and
torque values, should preclude
leakage problem s.
Incorporate procedural changes and
personnel training to preclude
installation errors.
i . "
SUPPORT HARDWARE
Nc
2
o0 3
O
Hardware
A lure inure
Alloy Coupling
Nut
Aluminum Raw
Stock
Bracket
4 Clamps (In-
Tank)
5 Coupling Nut
6 Flange Bolt
Ref
Code Problem
F Cracked nuts.
B C racking of
material during
forming
operations.
B Corrosion.
B Loose, un-
fastened and/or
damaged
clamps.
E Improper tem-
per of B-nut.
F Sheared Bolt.
Cause
Manufacture r
deviation from
temper
specification.
Inadequate re-
search into form-
ing methods com-
patible with the
physical proper-
ties of the
material.
Chemical finish
inadequate for
envi ro nm ent.
Poor workman-
ship.
Manufacturer
deviation from
s pe cification.
Corrosive en-
viro nrnent and
stress corrosion.
Effect
Stress corrosion
failure ; leakage.
Cost and schedule
impact.
Structural degrada.
lion.
Provide a source
of material for
injection into
turbopurnp s •
Stress corrosion.
Structural degrada
lion.
R emarks/Sugge stions
Ensure existence of proper vendor
processing controls and inspect
100% for correct hardness of
alloy.
Thorough studies and analyses should
be conducted on test articles prior
to procuring large quantities of new
material and starting manufacturing
of production hardware.
Institute use of corrosion resistant
paint.
Issue bulletins as a remainder of
the need for extreme caution and
attention to detail when performing
in-tank operations.
Tighten vendor quality control to
ensure proper alloy hardness.
Initiate eddy current tests at re-
ceiving inspection to verify pro-
per B-nut temper.
Ensure bolt selection is resistant
to a corrosive environment. Se-
lect bolt size and strength to
eliminate effects of stress
corrosion.
SUPPORT HARDWARE (Continued)
Nc Hardware
7 Flared Tube
Fitting Sleeve
8 Flared Tube
Installation
9 Flared Tube
Plugs
i0 Flexloc Nut
1 1 High Carbon
Steel Bolts
12 MF Tube Fit-
tings with
Ratchet and
Spring Locking
Devices
Ref
Code
F
A
B
F
A
A
Problem
C racked
sleeves.
Leakage.
Dislocated
O-rings.
Loose nut.
Hydrogen
embritt lem ent.
Washer spring
failure.
Cause
Sulfur additive to
stainless steel
material.
Inadequate
flaring, fit-up,
and torquing
procedures.
Marginal plug
design and sub-
sequent over
torquing of plug.
Retaining bolt too
short.
Improper heat
treating and pro-
cessing.
Inadequate pro-
curement re-
quirements.
Effect
Tube leakage.
System degrada-
tion.
Leakage past
O-rings.
Improper holding
action.
Bolt fracture.
Leakage.
Remarks/Suggestions
Initiate drawing change to use
different class sleeves. Verify
change by torque check prior to
each cryogenic tanking. Use
sulfur additive sleeves only in
noncritical applications.
Strict adherence to flaring proce-
dures, fit-up procedures, and
torque values should preclude
leakage problem s.
Train assembly personnel in
torquing procedures. Call-out for
an ins pection point during O-ring
ins tallation.
Change drawing to specify longer
bolt. Initiate inspection control
of this specific problem.
Institute rigid requirements for
heat treating and subsequent
proces sing of bolts.
Replace spring with lockwire on
existing fittings. Establish new
requirements for future procure-
ment, or establish Class I drawings
for this requirement after
pro cur em ent.
['0
Nc Hardware
13 Mounting
Ins ert s
Anchored in
Honeycomb
Material
14 Self-Locking
Nut
15 Self-Locking
Nut
16 Socket Head
Cap Screw
17 Socket Head
Screw
Ref
Code
B
F
B
Problem
SUPPORT HARDWARE (Continued)
Bonding breaking
loose when
electrical com-
ponents are
mounted.
Cracked nuts.
Unattached bolt,
washer, and nut
found in tank.
F Sheared screw.
F Cracked heads
and rounding of
the internal
wrenching flats.
Cause
Bonding insert in
cavity with potting
compound not pro-
viding sufficient
strength.
Improper vendor
alloy process.
An uncrimped nut
(crimping is re-
quired to ensure
a self-locking
action).
Excessive depth
of pilot hole;
human error.
Inadequate manu-
facture and heat
treating.
Effect
Loss of electrical
functions.
Loss of bolt
iholding action.
Unattached hard-
ware can migrate
into LOX and LH 2
pumps.
Loss of screw
holding capability.
Failure of bolting
action and/or mis-
application of
correct torque
values.
Remarks/Suggestions
Future specifications should include
a requirement for metallic filler to
be added to potting compound and
use of X-ray inspection methods
should be instituted.
Ensure manufacturer inspection
process and controls are adequate
to screen defective items.
Issue bulletins and set up displays
in shop areas to emphasize the im-
portance of the proper installation
of lock fasteners. Institute 100%
inspection of all baffle installation
attaching hardware after all in-tank
operations.
Establish tighter quality inspection
controls during manufacturing pro-
cess. Check receiving inspection
procedures for adequacy in
determining properties of socket
head cap screws.
Inspect and perform hardness tests
on existing stock. Purchase
screws directly from conforming
manufacturers.
%0
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Nc Hardware
18 Support
Bracket
19 Titanium
Metals used in
LOX Systems
2G Weld Sleeve
2] Welded Support
Hardware
(Ladders)
Ref
Code
B
F
D
B
SUPPORT HARDWARE (Continued)
Problem
Cracked welds
on gas distri-
butor brackets.
Explosive reac-
tion of titanium
in contact with
oxygen.
Foreign
material
trapped in weld.
Defective
welds. Lack
of fusion in
welds.
Cause
Excessive heat
build-up during
start and stop
portions of weld.
High s ensitivity
to impact in LOX
environment.
Effect
Structural failure.
Loss of titanium
containers and
damage to
Inadequate
cleaning.
Proof load re-
quirements not
maintained.
surrounding
structure.
Pin hole leak.
Weld separation;
equipment damage.
Remar,ks/Sugge stions
Institute additional inspection points
with the aid of magnification and
change welding requirements to
have support weld ends chamfered
to remove possible cracks.
Titanium is not recommended for
construction of LOX tanks for space
vehicles.
Change drawings to include
additional cleaning requirements
and fabrication restrictions.
Establish requirements for peri-
odic proof load tests. Perform
X-ray inspection on all welds.
TANKS
q_
N( Hardware
1 APS Bladder
Expulsion Tank
2 Bulkhead
As sembly
3 Cylinder
As sembly
4 Fuel Tank
5 Helium Storage
Tanks
Ref
Cod_
C
B
Problem
Sustained
differ entia 1
pres sure.
Indentations in
aft LOX foil
seal.
B Corrosion.
A
C
Hi-Lock rivet
found in fuel
tank.
Incorrect weld
wire.
Cause
Test personnel
error combined
with GSE valve
leakage.
Faulty workman-
ship.
Inadequate manu-
facturing controls
resulting in the
use of a defective
adhesive primer.
Hi-Lock rivet
failure due to
stress corrosion
resulting from
improper
manufacture.
Inadequate con-
trols on acquisi-
tion, storage, and
use of weld wire.
Inadequate
inspection after
weld.
Effect
Bladder rupture.
LOX leakage.
Degradation of
structural integrity.
Contamination;
structural failure
with tank damage.
Weak seams
caused by em-
brittled weld
structure.
Remarks/Suggestions
Provide check points to ensure that
fill valves are open prior to system
venting. Instruct personnel on
proper venting operations.
Machine counterbore surfaces to a
closer tolerance and replace
aluminum foil seals with lead
coated seals.
Initiate use of a new primer,
Koropom 515-70, under spray and
pour foam insulations.
Implement more stringent quality
control measures at the rivet
vendor and contractor facilities.
iMaintain tighter controls on weld
procedures and manufacturing pro-
cesses. Also, institute eddy
current tests at receiving
inspection.
UI
7
Hardware
LH 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Quarter Panel
Oxidiz er
Tank A ssembly
Oxidizer
Tank Assembly
Ref
Code Problem
B Cracks in
stringers.
B Hard spots.
A Contamination
of tank.
A Torn ring
baffle web.
TANKS
Cause
Improper
'Continued)
Effect
Structural collapse.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Polish stringer ends and edges, and
machining of
stringer ends ;
improper handling
techniques ; and,
misalignment
between stringers
and cylinders.
Inadequate
techniques used in
forming opera-
tions.
Improper proce-
dure during
Cracks in the
panels.
Potential flow
restrictions and
replace Hi-Shear impact driven
rivets with Hi-Lock fasteners.
Specify the maximum allowable mis-
alignment between stringers
of adjacent cylinders and incor-
porate changes to tooling and
handling fixture s.
Use thoroughly tested and developed
material characteristics and
forming techniques.
Institute adequate personnel
training on cleanliness levels and
cleaning opera-
tions.
LOX impact
during fast fill
operation.
system contamina-
tion.
Po ssible baffle
failure with subse-
quent system
contamination.
strict adherence to contamination
control procedures. Ensure 100%
inspection subsequent to all tank
entries.
Ensure that LOX fillprocedures
specify a "slow fill" rate only.
Incorporate redesign changes to
strengthen the baffle in the fill
inlet area.
//
N( Hardware
1 All Hardware
3
2 Contract End
Items
Contract End
Items
4 Contract End
Items
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
,,,.,..,,,.,
Ref
Code Problem
A
B
D
D
System invali-
dation due to
unplanned
events and/or
modifications.
Hardware end
items not con-
forming to
contract speci-
fication.
System inade-
quate to verify
the conformance
of articles to
drawing re-
quirements
during
as sembly.
Numerous and
frequent acci-
dents resulting
in damage to
stage and
as sociated
equipment.
Cause
Adequate retest
requirements not
specified.
Systems and
ins tallation
drawings not
conforming to
specifications
and/or other
contract
requirements.
Improper methods
of releasing
drawings.
Lack of personnel
training and/or
supervision, in-
adequate operatin_
procedure s and
safety controls,
and noncompliance
with established
procedures.
Effect
Inadequate retest
of the disturbed
system can result
in mission loss.
Cost and schedule
impact.
Unscheduled re-
work.
Added cost and
schedule impact.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute "Positive Statement _'re-
test requirements and provide 100%
quality inspection coverage during
retest.
Complete a First Article Configura-
tion Inspection (FACI) on the
hardware as early as possible in
the production phase to find and
correct any existing nonconfor-
mance with contract requirements.
Ensure that engineering planning is
established to release drawings in
accordance with MIL-D-70327 and.
at tier levels compatible with
manufacturing effo ft.
Survey contractor to ensure that an
adequate system is established for
training and ce rtification of per-
sonnel, control of facilities equip-
ment, and a strong safety program.
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS (Continued)
--d
Nc Hardware
5 Exposed
Hardware
6 Pneumatic
Components
7 Qualification
and
Engineering
Test Hardware
8 Qualification
Test Hard-
ware
91 Tungsten Inert
(TIG) Welded
Hardware and
Structures
Ref
Code Problem.
E
B
B
D
B
Sus c eptibilit y
to damage
(dings, dents,
scratches, etc.).
Contamination
and erosion.
Identification
and control to
prevent use as
flight hardware.
Test environ-
ments not
compatible
with mission
environments.
Numerous
welding defects.
Cause
Protective covers
not used.
Inadequate clean-
liness and fabri-
cation control
requirements.
Items not marked
to identify them
as test hardware.
Inadequate re-
Effect
Costly re pairs,
unscheduled
maintenance, and
schedule slippage.
System contamina-
tion and leakage.
Unqualified and
nonflight worthy
hardware used as
flight hardware.
Failure to meet
search of
probable en-
vironm ental
conditions.
Insufficient
rigidity of
welding fixture.
de signed
requirements.
Need for costly re
work or failure of
structure and
hardware.
Remarks/Surge stions
Install protective devices on hard-
ware susceptible to damage.
Emphasize the importance of
obs erring precautions.
Refine cleanlines s requirements and
improve fabrication control
dis ciplines.
Po sitive marking ide ntification of
all test hardware should be con-
ducted as soon as an item is se-
lected for test. Establish a
serial number control system to
prevent unautho riz ed ins tallation.
Establish bonded areas for storage
purposes.
Test all hardware in the environ-
mental ranges to which it will be
expos ed.
Where proximity requirements are
very critical, movement of the
work rather than the welding head
should be the basic tool design
approach for TIG welding.
Oo
N¢ Hardware
10 Various
Components
11 Various
Functional and
Structural
Components
TEST HARDWARE, END ITEMS, AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS (Continued)
Ref
Code Problem
D
D
Improper
installation of
component s.
Sires s
Corrosion.
Cause
Human error.
Use of materials
susceptible to
stress corrosion.
Effect
Possible loss of
mission.
Failure of the
affected component,
with effects
ranging from test
delay to mission
loss.
Remarks/Surge stions
Future designs should be such that
there will be no question as to the
proper method of installation.
Where problems exist, implement
color Coding requirements and
instructions for installation.
Minimize use of corrosion
susceptible materials. Require
Class I drawings defining the
sensitive components, inspection
criteria, and inspection frequency.
7.
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4
Hardware
Carrier Re-
tract Reconnect
A ss embly
Stage
Umbilicals
Umbilical
Carrier
Reconnect
A s s embly
Umbilical
Locking
Mechanism
Ref
Code
A
B
A
A
UMBILICALS
Problem
Carrier retain-
ing latch disen-
gages
prematurely
allowing carrier
locking pawl to
hit the vehicle.
Misali_nrn ent of
quick
disconnects.
Slow and incom-
plete travel of
carrier retract.
Locking pawls
of interface
connecting
mechanism
drop from the
retracted
position.
Cause
Weak spring in
the latching
mechanism.
Improper align-
ment tools for
ground and
vehicle halves of
umbilical plates.
Improper spring
rate requirements
causing a need for
:more retract
force than
available.
Damaged pins
which had been
subjected to
dire ctional loads
not experienced
under normal
conditions.
Effect
Structural damage.
Damage to discon-
nects and loss of
ground-to -vehicle
services.
Failure to operate
within specifica-
tions.
Inability to keep
the umbilical
connection mated.
Remarks/Suggestions
Redesign latching mechanism with a
modified pin release flange and add
a stop to limit travel of the flange.
Caution personnel on the use of
proper alignment tools. Add
inspection points when disconnects
are installed subsequent to static
firing. Perform alignment checks
whenever disconnects are remated.
Modify qualification and acceptance
test procedures to require the
measured forces for line retraction
and extention to be accurate within
specified limits. Institute inspec-
tion points during carrier spring
a ssembly.
Initiate modification to the pin
release flange and add a stop' to
limit travel of the flange to
alleviate excessive directional
loads.
VALVES AND MODULES
O
Nc Hardware
I Ball Valve
2 Ball Valve
3 Check Valve
4 Check Valve
5 Check Valve
6 Check Valve
Ref
Code Problem,
A
A
C
A
Leakage between
body and flange.
Leakage during
pressurization.
External helium
leakage.
Internal lock
pin sheared,
A Sticking valve.
A Reverse seat
leakage.
Cause
Creased O-rings
occurring during
assembly.
Seat wearout due
to continuous use.
Insufficient metal
to metal
bottoming between
valve body and
retainer during
a ssembly,
Undersized lock
pin; inadequate
design.
Improper assem-
bly after
cleaning.
System contami-
nation.
Effect
Out of tolerance
operation.
Out of tolerance
operation.
Depletion of helium
supply.
Inlet port blocked
by poppet.
Failure to perform
function.
Improper valve
ope ration.
Remarks/Sug_e stions
Initiate tighter inspection controls
during vendor assembly. Provide
for acceptance testing of compo-
nents prior to installation.
Establish a preventive maintenance
schedule to replace seats at
regular intervals,
Ensure that assembly instructions
are adequate and specify that
bottoming of valve body to retainer
must be accomplished. Institute
inspection at this point.
Ensure that system is designed to
prevent the use of unnecessary
hardware installations.
Initiate tighter surveillande during
rework operation.
Incorporate use of valve seats with
harder materials that are less
susceptible to contamination
impregnation. Utilize metal-to-
metal seats where possible. Ensure
that procedures and specifications
are adequate to prevent system
contain ination.
Nc Hardware
7 Chilldown
Shutoff Valve
8 Cold Helium
Dump Module
9 Cryogenic
Butterfly
Valve
10 Fuel Prevalve
11 Fuel Tank
Pres surization
Control Module
As s embly
Ref
Code
C
C
C
A
C
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Problem
External leakage
between actuator
and microswitch
housing.
Main poppet
valve fails to
return to the
closed position.
Incorrect
valve position
indications.
Lubricant used
instead of
LOC -TITE
locking
compound.
Torn seat and
worn poppet
guide,
Cause
Fatigue cracks
and bellows
failure due to
metallic con-
tamination on the
poppet guide bore.
Friction between
seal and poppet
guide.
Not built for or
tested at
operation en-
vironment.
Human error.
Use of improper
tooling during
outlet orifice
calibration,
Effect
iDegraded valve
[performance,
Failure to hold
pressure.
Test delay to
determine actual
position,
Remarks/Suggestions
Use a Teflon guide to prevent
metallic particle contamination.
Select stronger body materials or
"beef-up" existing material to
prevent fatigu'e cracking.
Ensure that poppet guide and seat
material tolerances are adequate
to prevent frictional forces.
Ensure that hardware is built for
and tested to the environment in
which it will be used.
Internal gate seal
nut torque relaxa-
tion with subs e-
!quent back-off of
nut.
Excessive leakage
past the inlet
!check valve,
Institute tighter vendor inspection
controls and implement personnel
training in the assembly of fluid
corn ponents,
Ensure calibration procedures
identify the specific tool to be used
for each operation and that correct
test order will verify proper
operation.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
P robl em Cause EffectNc
12
13
14
Hardware
Gas Generator
Ball Valve
Gas Generator
Fuel Purge
Check Valve
Gas Generator
Oxidiz er Valve
GH z Pneuma-
tic Valve
16 Hand Valve
17 Helium Flow
Control Valve
18 Helium
Solenoid Valve
(3-way)
Ref
Code
D
D
D
C
A
A
D
Stripped threads
on Q.D.
coupling.
Test plate in-
stalled incor-
rectly.
Restricted gas
generator flow.
Bent valve
body.
Incomplete
closure.
Fails to indi-
cate closed
position.
Metallic
co ntamination
in connector.
Inadequate thread
length.
Personnel error.
Poppet retaining
ring not made to
drawing speci-
fications.
Improper
handling.
Facility contam-
inants adhering
to the seat.
Fuel leakage at
ball valve inlet
drain.
Valve will not meet
minimum specified
flow requirements.
Insufficient hot gas
for fuel and
oxidizer turbine
operation.
Poppet will not
mate against valve
s eat.
Leakage; out of
tolerance
ope ration.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Change drawings to specify use of
longer ball valves.
Caution technicians and inspectors
to adhere strictly to test plate
installation procedures.
Implement 100% inspection at
vendor facility to ensure parts are
manufactured according to
drawings.
Instruct personnel on the proper
handling and care of parts.
Initiate preventive maintenance to
ensure system cleanliness level is
maintained. Periodic inspections
should be included. System and
component design should be primary
means of obtaining equipment
capable of proper operation.
Moisture corro-
sion on the
indicator switch.
Misalignment
while mating plug
to solenoid
connector.
Po ssible launch
scrub.
Solenoid fails to
actuate.
Institute procedures for moisture-
proofing of flow control valves.
Revise field manual to include
special instructions for mating
plug to solenoid connector.
%,0
Nc Hardware
1c Helium Vent
and Shutoff
Valve.
2( Ignition Moni-
tor Valve (IMV)
2 1 Ignition Moni-
tor Valve (IMV)
22 LH 2 Continu-
ous Vent
Module
23 LH2 Vent and
Relief Valve
24 LH 2 Vent
Valve
Ref
Code
A
Problem
Failure to
transmit open
indication
signal.
D Internal leakage.
D
C
C
B
Deformation of
bolt plunger tip.
Excessive leak-
ageat the bypass
shutoff valve
actuator and
valve body.
Excessive leak-
age past piston
rod threads.
Slow actuation
time.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Cause
Valve micro-
switch corrosion.
Incorrect poppet
adjustment;
human error.
Inadequate proce-
Effect
Incorrect output
leading to launch
delay or scrub.
Premature opening
of main fuel valve.
Probable engine
Remarks/Su_e stions
Replace fill and shutoff valve with
_a check valve to enhance proper
operation.
Ensure poppet adjustment is correct
at initial setting and perform tests
to verify that initial adjustment is
not disturbed.
Revise ignition monitor valve test
dures resulting in
overpres suriza-
tion of the IMV
control port.
shutdown. procedures and implement modifi-
cations to ignition monitor valve
test tools presently being used.
Inadequate purge
causing freeze-up
of the valve and
damage to the
seal.
Inadequate staking
and retention
methods.
Contaminated.
helium supply.
Inability to main-
tain proper flow
rate.
Possible locking of
the main valve in
the closed
position.
Degraded valve
performance.
Ensure purge flow rate is compat-
ible with the requirements of the
module.
Change retention methods from
staking to locking with a castle
nut and cotter pin.
Install filters at the helium supply
outlet and perform periodic
scheduled sampling inspections of
the helium. Cycle and purge valves
prior to functional testing to remove
trapped contamination.
|, , I
Nc Hardware
25 LOX Fill and
Drain Valve
26 LOX Prevalve
127 LOX Prevalve/]
Fuel Prevalve
28 LOX Shutdown
Valve
Ref
Code
A
A
A
C
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Problem,
Maj o r inte rnal
leakage in the
closed position.
Main seal re-
tainer locknut s
loose.
Prevalves
close at the
same time the
main valve s
close.
Valve hang up
in the open
position.
Cause
Cracked main
seal.
Improper design.
Faulty delay
timers.
Leakage past
both open and
close seals re-
suiting in no
delta pressure
for dis engaging
the valve locking
device.
Effect
Explosive environ-
ment; fire
hazard.
Provides a source
of contamination
and possible in-
gestion into the
LOX pump.
Loss of required
closing delay after
main valve closure
can result in
pos sible turhopump
cavitation and
subsequent
explosion.
Failure to operate.
Remarks/Suggestions
Redesign main seal. Previous re-
design incorporated a triple seal
arrangement consisting of an ex-
ternal static seal, an internal
dynamic seal, and a pressure
backup seal.
Implement design change to provide
for positive locking of the seal re-
traction mechanism (lockwire
retainer nuts). Incorporate test
procedures to ensure proper
ope ration.
Delete usage of electrical delay
timers and incorporate an orifice
in the prevaive pneumatic actuation
line to provide delayed closure.
Modify valve configuration by
adding a vent between the open and
close port seals to allow a delta
pressure to be attained.
O'I
Nc Hardware
29 LOX Shutdown
Valve
30 LOX Tank
Pre ssurization
Control
Module.
3 1 LOX Tank Re-
lief Valve
32 LOX Tank
Shutoff Valve
33! LOX Tank Vent
and Relief
Valve
34 LOX Vent and
Relief Valve
Ref
Code Problem
C C racked poppet.
C
A
C
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued.)
A
A
Excessive inter-
nal leakage past
the shutoff
valve.
Valve indicator
fails to show
proper position
during
functional test.
External leak-
age at flange
joint.
Valve actuator
gear clutch
spring lodged
between two
gears.
Exces sire vent
line leakage.
Cause
Use of non-
annealed poppet
material.
A chipped main
poppet seat (Mylar
material).
Improper assem-
bly of switch
resulting in a
worn switch shaft.
Scratch on sealingi
surface and high
porosity of
casting.
Unnecessary
spring redun-
dancy for proper
valve operation.
Seals damaged due!
to contamination
introduced into the
system by the GSE
gaseous supply.
Effect
Failure to operate
within specifica-
tion.
Out of tolerance
operation.
Test delay to deter-
mine actual posi-
tion of valve.
Failure to function
properly.
Leakage through
valve.
Loss of control
pressure.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Incorporate use of annealed poppet
material to prevent cracking and
warping.
Use of a poppet seat composed, of
Polyimide material has proven to
he effective.
Implement personnel training and
more stringent quality controls
during switch assembly. Ensure
that as sembly procedures and
drawings clearly define proper
assembly installations and
techniques.
Expand source inspection require-
ments to include a 100% inspection
of all Marman flanges.
Ensure vendor design is adequate
to accomplish function without
incorporating unnecessary
components.
Incorporate valve seats that are
less susceptible to contaminants.
Ensure GSE contamination proce-
dures and/ controls are adequate to
preclude stage contamination.
I
O',
NC
35
36
37
38
Hardware
LOX Vent
Valve
LOX Vent
Valve
LOX Vent
Valve
LOX Vent
Valve
!Ref
Code
B
B
B
B
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Problem Cause Effect Remarks/Suggestions
Open indication
switch fails to
operate.
Valve fluctua-
tion between
open and closed
positions.
C RES diaphragm
leakage.
Main poppet
leakage.
Moisture in the
switch actuator
causing freezing
during chilldown.
Pneumatic pres-
sure variations
caused by the
length of the vent
line.
Gold plating
flaking or
corrosion caused
by entrapped
plating solution
residues.
Contamination
lodged on flat
surface of poppet
seal during valve
installation.
Inability to deter-
mine actual posi-
tion of vent valve.
LOX tank pressure
fluctuation resul-
ting in excessive
LOX boiloff. Vent
valve reseats at
lower than speci-
fied pressure.
High aneroid bel-
lows pressure;
vent valve operating
pressure out of
specification.
Major vent valve
leakage;loss of
tank pressure.
Redesign the switch by relocating
the bellows to seal off all moving
parts to prevent moisture entrap-
ment.
Modify vent valve by adding a surge
chamber and a dash pot (double
plenum and orifice) to dampen
pres sure fluctuations.
Ensure that manufacturing proce-
dures are adequate to prevent the
entrapment of plating solution
residues through cleaning and
purging methods and subsequent
inspections. Institute periodic
inspections of valve to ensure
proper aneroid bellows operation.
Ensure bellows material is com-
patible with CRES diaphragm and
plating solutions.
Utilize protective enclosures (tents)
during installation or removal of
valves from system. Revise pro-
cedures and specifications to
require "Flow Cycling" of the valve
to remove suspected contamination.
-d
NC
39
40
41
42
43
Hardware
LOX Vent
Valve
LOX Vent
Valve
Main Fuel
Valve
Main Oxidiz er
Valve
Main Oxidiz er
Valve
,, ,,,,,
Ref
Code
B
Problem,
Solenoid connec-
tor shorted.
B Seat leakage.
D
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
D
D
Cause
Moisture entering
through a cracked
solder joint on
the electrical
connector.
Metal particle
contamination on
valve seat.
Fuel in position O-ring damaged
indicator
housing.
D etonation of
LOX and hydro-
carbon
contamination.
Moisture in
valve.
during as sembly.
Inadequate docu-
mentation to
control and
ensure part
cleanliness and
identification.
Engine drying not
performed after
static firing;
inadequate
procedures.
Effect
Solenoid fails to
ope rate; inability
to operate vent
valve.
Inability of valve
to cycle to a com-
pletely closed
position.
Fuel leakage;
erroneous valve
position indications
Po s sible engine
explosion.
Rusty gate shaft
end s.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute use of welded joints rather
than soldered joints. Caution per-
sonnel on the proper handling of
solenoid valve connector
a s s emblie s.
Revise test procedures associated
with leak-checking the vent valves
to require "Flow Cycling" to
eliminate contamination prior to
valve removal. Include a require-
ment for a tent-type enclosure
during valve installation or
removal.
Initiate tighter vendor inspection
controls during O-ring installation.
Change cleaning, packaging, and
assembly documentation to ensure
parts are LOX clean and verify
through inspection.
Ensure that a vacuum drying opera-
tion is performed subsequent to
fill valve operation.
00
N¢ Hardware
44
45
46
Maimstage
Control
Solenoid
Valve
Modulating
Flow Control
Valve
Override
Solenoid Valve
47 Pneumatic
Actuation
Control Module
48 Pneumatic
Power
Control
Module
[49 Pneumatic
Power Con-
trol Module
Ref
Code
D
E
C
C
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Pr0hlem
No response
upon command.
D ere ctive
modulating flow
control valve.
Fails to actuate
in cryogenic
envir ohm ent s.
Leakage in open
and/or closed
positio n •
C Lockup pressur4
Cause
Corrosion between
pins and case.
Improper adjust-
ment of the GSE
cooling unit.
Pin hole leak in
hermetic seal.
Inadequate seal
design.
C o nt am inatio n
Effect
Short; solenoid will
not energize.
Failure to control
flow.
Freezing; loss of
sol enoid function.
Failure to function
properly.
Improper pressure
Remarks/Su_e stions
Megger check all solenoid valves
in the field on a periodic preventive
maintenance schedule.
Instruct operating personnel in the
proper adjustment of unit.
Ensure process controls are ade-
quate to prevent pin hole leaks.
Institute inspection using a mass
spectrometer.
Ensure that qualification testing
will prove design requirements of
the component. Qualify by test
only.
Use inlet filters that will preclude
above
specification.
C Helium leakage
in closed
position.
combined with a
small movement
of the regulator
lookup device.
output.
Inadequate s eat Failure to function
the entrance of contamination. Use
anodized poppets and seats to
minimize high flow/high velocity
damage,
Ensure that qualification testing
design. properly. will prove design requirements of
component. Qualify by test only.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
,.O
Nc Hardware
50 Propellant
Control
Module (APS)
51 Relief Valve
52 Relief Valve
53 Relief Valve
54 Relief Valve
5=. Relief Valve
5_ Relief Valve
Ref
Code
C
C
A
B
B
A
Problem
Contamination.
Leakage past
valve outlet.
Audible leakage
past seat.
Leakage past
seat.
Low relief
pressure.
Damaged pilot
poppet and loose
balls on main
poppet assem-
bly.
C Split diaphragm.
Cause
Reaction of APS
fuel with
cleaning agent
(Freon-MF).
Valve flange made
of inadequate
metal.
Use of excessive
LOC-TITE thread
compound.
Seat pitted by
contamination.
Worn sealing
O-ring.
Normal vibration.
Inadequate
material and de-
sign of the
diaphragm.
Effect
Slow engine valve
actuation.
Failure to function
properly.
Loss of GNz
supply.
Premature opera-
tion of vent valve.
Inability to main-
tain required
pressure level.
Fails to relieve and
reset at specified
pressures.
Internal leakage.
Remarks/Suggestions
Ensure that cleaning procedures
are adequate, and utilize a com-
patible cleaning agent such as
unsymmetrical isopropyl alcohol.
Select proper material and prove
the integrity by test prior to
production.
Institute tighter manufacturer
assembly and inspection controls.
Ensure personnel are trained in
proper use of thread compounds.
Implement tighter inspection con-
trols for cleanliness levels of
pneumatic systems.
Institute a preventive maintenance
program to provide for O-ring
changeout at regular intervals.
Ensure valves are qualified using
vibration specifications simulating
in- s ervic e condition.
Ensure component environmental
operation through extensive quali-
fication testing.
Nc Hardware
57 Relief Valve
on
o _60
58 Relief Valve
59 Relief Valve
Shutdown
Valve
61 Solenoid Ball
Valve
62 Solenoid
Operated
Valve (3-way)
63 Solenoid Valve
Ref
Code Problem
A Defective ball
bearing.
A Broken O-ring.
C Valve wearout
under cryogenic
applications.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
C C racked poppet.
A
Cause
Improper assem-
bly.
Back pressure,
Effect
Inability to adjust
relief setting.
Leakage at all
Remarks/Sugge stions
Establish training to ensure person-
nel are aware of proper ball
bearing insertion procedure.
Ensure procedural steps are corn-
D
popping the valve
off seat.
Unacceptable,
qualified valve
design for
cryogenic en-
vironment.
un-
pressures.
Gas leakage.
patihle with proper operation of
equipment.
Ensure valve design is compatible
with desired usage environment and
prove integrity of valve through
qualification te sting.
A
Failure of
electric
actuator.
Contam inatio n
in valve.
Leakage past
the main seats.
Use of non-
annealed poppet
material.
Inadequate design;
actuator shaft
binding due to
split washers.
Inadequate
venting proce-
dures for purging
contamination.
Seat deterioration
due to heat build-
up during long
periods of valve
energization.
Failure to operate
within specifica-
tion.
Ball valve will not
completely open
or close.
Leakage through
valve.
Out of tolerance
operation.
Institute use of an annealed poppet
to prevent cracking and warping.
Replace electric actuator with a
single ported flange connected to
the outlet of a 3-way 2- position
solenoid valve.
Add note to field manual to change
venting procedure and specify a
leak check to preclude contamina-
tion and leakage in flight.
Replace seats with high temperature
(Ve spel) material.
!.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
7.
N¢ Hardware
64 Solenoid Valve
65 Solenoid Valve
66 Solenoid Valve
67 Solenoid Valve
68 Solenoid Valve
64 Solenoid Valve
7( Solenoid Valve
Ref
Codc Problem Cause Effect Remarks/Suggestions
F Rust deposits.
A Failure to close,
B Failure to close,
C Failure to open.
Inadequate O- ring
seal.
Previous rework
causing increased
armature gap.
Poppet spring out
of adjustment.
B Pull-in voltage
out of
specification.
B Leakage past
seat.
Lock washer
improperly placed
under jam nut
during servicing.
Improper modi-
fication adjust-
ment.
Seat installed
backwards.
Inoperative valve.
Inability to shutoff
flow.
Inability to termi-
nate flow at
desired time.
Incorporate adequate manufacturer
designs, processes, and inspec-
tions. Replace O-rings on regular
preventive maintenance schedules.
Reinspect reworked parts to ensure
that all tolerances are to
s pe cificatio n.
Perform a functional checkout
prior to installation, and monitor
for conformance to specifications.
Continuous
venting.
O-ring nicked
and nylon seat
cracked and
Inability to
operate upon
command.
Provide for personnel training and
inspection points to preclude
improper servicing.
B
worn.
Valve would not
open flow port.
Inability to control
flow.
Inability to supply
required down-
stream pressure.
Establish a training program for
personnel and follow-up with a
technical manual to provide proce-
dures for proper valve servicing.
Revise assembly procedure to
provide for visual inspection of
seat with a lOx scope.
Institute a preventive maintenance
program to provide for O-ring and
seat replacement at specified
intervals.
k_n
Nc Hardware
7 1 Solenoid Valve
72 Solenoid valve
73 Start Tank
Discharge
Valve
74 Start Tank
Dis char g e
Valve
7_= Start Tank
Fill Valve
Ref
Code
B
Problem,
Cracked solder
joint at elec-
trical
connector.
B Water in valve.
D Cracked
bellows.
D Aluminum oxide
contamination.
D Moisture in
valve.
VALVES AND MODULES (Continued)
Cause
Improper
handling.
Humidity in valve
actuation lines ;
inadequate
purging
procedures.
Inadequate thick-
ness of bellows
seal and de-
bonding of plastic
bellows seal due
to rust contami-
nation.
Chemical
corrosion.
Vacuum drying
not performed
after static
firing; inadequate
procedures.
Effect
Short circuit.
Freezing of valve
in a cryogenic
environment.
Leakage through
valve.
Reverse leakage
through valve.
Leakage through
valve.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute use of welded joints rather
than soldered joints. Maintain
strict adherence to handling
procedures.
Purge system until an acceptable
dew point level is attained.
Change drawings to increase
thickness of seal and to add inner
and outer seal retaining rings.
Initiate use of an organic sealant
for valve body and hard chrome
plate wear surfaces.
Revise leak test method and specify
usage of an organic sealant to
prevent corrosion effects.
Ensure that a vacuum drying
operation is performed subsequent
to fillvalve operation.
_o
Nc
76
77
78
79
Hardware
Tank
Pre s surization
Control
Module
Vent and
Relief Valve
Vent and
Relief Valve
Vent and
Relief Valve
Ref
Code
C
C
C
A
VALVE AND MODULES (Continued)
Problem
Solenoid valve
fails to return
to closed
position under
normal force.
Leakage.
Leakage past
the s eat.
Valve fails to
relieve the
fuel tank
pressure.
Cause
Excessive
pressure on the
poppet dynamic
seals.
C o ntaminatio n
due to inadequate
cleaning proce-
dure after rework
and prior to
installation.
Contamination.
Servopoppet
co ntamination
during as sembly.
Effect
Excessive
closing force re-
quired for valve
operation. Un-
controllable
output pres sure.
Failure to function
properly;
continuous
venting.
Failure to function
properly;
continuous
venting.
Valve malfunction
with possible
fuel tank damage.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Friction can be reduced by using a
single seal made of material with
a lower friction coefficient.
Impose strict requirements to pre-
vent contamination from entering
the valve during rework, installa-
tion, and testing.
Refine cleanliness requirements
and improve fabrication control
di s cipline s.
Institute additional inspection
points during manufacture. Ensure
personnel are properly trained
and certified for pneumatic system.=
a s s embly.
N(
3
4 _
5_
Hardware
Auxiliary
Propulsion
System (APS)
Environmental
Control
System (ECS)
Environmental
Control
System (ECS)
Filter
Fuel High
Pressure Duct
Flange
,, ,,,.. ,.,.,
Ref
Code
C
E
E
A
D
MISCELLANEOUS
Problem Cause Effect
Fuel bladder
leakage.
Loose B-nut on
coolant line.
Num erous pro-
blems when
converting
from HzO/
Methanol to
Oronite coolant.
C rack in filter
housing.
Flange made of
wrong type
alum inure.
Torn bladder due
to weld burrs and
inadequate
inspection.
Human error.
Inadequate
enginee ring being
performed on "In
Process" changes _
Stress corrosion.
Receiving Inspec-
tion not adequate
to verify proper
material
properties.
Depletion of APS
fuel.
Coolant pump inlet
and outlet
pressures below
allowable limit s;
leakage.
Flight end items
used as a "Test
Bed" for perfor-
ming the engineer-
ing, rather than a
test bed to verify
the change.
Filter leakage.
Flange breakage
during
straightening
op e ration s.
Remarks/Suggestions
Institute 100% inspection of all
diffuser welds after fabrication.
Initiate training of personnel in the
proper torquing of B-nuts.
Changes of any magnitude should be
preengineered to preclude the use
of flight hardware as an
engineering model.
Revise heat treating procedures for
filter housings. Ensure through
inspection that housing is at proper
temper during manufacturing,
making it less susceptible to stress
corrosion.
Revise receiving inspection proce-
dures and implement 100% non-
destructive testing verification of
material.
Ln
Nc Hardware
6 GN z Supply
Pressure
(Test Supply)
7 Impeller Fan
8 Inaccessible
Areas
9 Latch Shaft
/
10 Latching
Springs
I 1 LOX Dome
Ref
Code
D
F
B
B
F
D
Problem.
Oil
contamination.
Cracks in fan
blade.
Entrapment of
foreign objects
(bolts, nuts,
washers, etc.).
Galled locking
shaft.
Broken spring.
Metallic
contamination.
MISCELLANE OUS
Cause
Piston failure in
compressor.
Flutter condition
existing at blade
leading edge.
Lack of adequate
inspection.
Nonlubrication of
shaft; inadequate
procedural
requirements.
Marginal spring
design.
Inadequate inspec-
tion during fabri-
cation, as sembly,
and installation.
(Continued)
Effect
Teardown and
cleaning of test
console and
engine systems.
Blade breakage.
Costly repairs,
unscheduled
maintenance,
schedule slippage.
Inability to remove
LH 2 disconnect.
Inoperative spring
a ssembly.
Possible engine
damage.
Remarks/Suggestions
Sample test fluid before and after
engine checkout. Redesign system
to delete use of piston compressor
and add filters.
Initiate investigation into possible
usage of different material for
blades. Implement inspection of
blades on a regular preventive
maintenance schedule.
X-ray inaccessible areas after
assembly operations. Rotate stage
with an amplified sound detecting
system installed.
Revise drawings to provide for
specific callout on parts requiring
lubrication.
Initiate spring and/or spring
assembly redesign. Ensure proper
operation prior to production.
Revise inplant inspection
procedures to include an additional
inspection operation after fabrica-
tion and prior to installation.
Ensure cleaning procedures are
adequate.
Nc Hardware
14
Ou
12 LOX Sump
Baffle s
13 Manufacturing
Operations
15
16
Material
Control
O2/H 2 Burner
A s s embly
Pneumatic
Checkout
Rack
Ref
Code
B
D
D
C
A
Problem
Bent and
broken baffles.
Drilling opera-
tions in welded
systems.
Items being
made of wrong
material.
A burned hole
in the spool of
the combustion
chamber:
Reversed
outlet lines.
MISCELLANEOUS (Continued)
Cause
Shock and
fatigue resulting
from fast LOX
loading.
Inadequate manu-
facturing
planning.
Inadequate vendor i
controls, re-
ceiving inspection,
and material
identification.
Improper match
of the orifices
on the injector
plate due to
improper
calibration.
Design drawing
error.
Effect
Inability to pre-
vent sloshing and
swirling of LOX.
Provides source of
contamination for
pump ingestion.
Contamination.
Ranges from test
delay to mission
loss.
Complete destruc-
tion of burner
a s s embly.
Remarks/Sugge stions
Institute use of stronger baffles.
Ensure that LOX fill procedures
specify a "slow fill" rate.
Perform all drilling operations
prior to welding. Where this is
not possible, purge system and
X-ray when integrity might he
questionable.
Upgrade packaging requirements,
and institute 100% inspection by
methods such as eddy current.
Revise controls, receiving inspec-
tion, and warehousing requirements.
Ensure that injector plates have
properly calibrated orifices and
are tested prior to release.
Incorrect system
pressurization.
Caution design personnel to check
and recheck drawings. Institute
use of design checkers.
/
MISCEL LANE OUS (Continued)
Nc Hardware
17 Retrorocket
Motor
18 Vibration
Isolato rs
--3
Ref
Code
A
C
Problem
Wall thick-
ness too thin
and cases
creased.
Debonding of
isolators from
aluminum.
Cause
Improper
manu_cture.
Marginal proces s
steps during
initial bonding.
Effect
Rupture of water
case.
Failure to isolate;
loss of structural
integrity.
Remarks/Su_e stions
Institute tighter manufacturing
ins pection controls.
Use of improved process methods,
stricter quality controls, primers
with greater bonding
characteristics, and rigid inspec-
tion controls, should preclude
debonding problems. Also, pull
tests should be performed to ensure
proper bonding.
,,, , , I
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TECHNIQUES
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TECHNIQUEINDEX
I.
2
3.
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0.
11.
IZ.
13.
14.
15.
16
17
18
19
20
Zl
ZZ
23
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Z9°
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
TECHNIQUE
Acoustical Emission Technique
Assessment, Reporting, and Monitoring of Failures
Automation of Flowmeter Calibration
Calibration Interval Adjustment Program
Control of Tube Flaring Fabrication
Corrective Action Control
Data Reduction by Computer
Dent Measuring Technique
Development of Engineering Language Computer
Test Programs
Eddy Current Technique
Ele ctrical Conductivity Technique
Electrolytic Leak Detection
Electromagnetic Technique
Equipment Quality Analysis/Quality Maintenance
T esring
Fitting Optical Target Fixture
Four Axis Measuring Machine
Freon Injection System for Leak Detection
Infrared Theory and Analysis
In Motion X-Ray Machine
Inspection of Inaccessible Areas
Inspection of Small Diameter Line Assemblies
Leak Detector for Use in Space Environment i
Mandatory NASA Inspection Requirements
Mass Drop-Off Measurements Based Upon Precise
Pressure and Temperature Measurements
Mass Spectrometer Leak Detector Techniques
Milling of Spray Foam Insulation
New Methods for Stage Propetlant Tank Proof Testingil
Nondestructive Test Device for Evatuation of 3/4:Inch_
Thick Polyurethane Spray-On Foam Insulation
Piece Part Sampling/Analysis for Subtier Suppliers
Precision Measuring Room
Quality Assurance Rotary Inspection Table
Quality Data Reporting System
Radiographic Threshold Detection Level of Subsurface
Crack-Like• Defects in Aluminum Welds
Remote Visual Inspection System
Solenoid Testing by Analyzing Electrical Transients
Solid State Radiographic Image Amplifiers
Special Bore Scope Technique
Spectrophotom etric Analysis
Page No.
161
161
16Z
162
163
163
164
164
165
166
167
167
168
169
170
170
171
172
172
173
173
174
175
176
177
179
179
180
181
181
182
183
184
185
187
189
190
191
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39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
TECHNIQUE
Standards Describing and Estimating Leaks in
Aerospace Hardware
Test Assessment Program
Thrust Chamber Leak Checks
Topographical Recorder
Torque Wrench Calibrator
Ultrasonic Delta Technique for Aluminum Welds and
Materials
Ultrasonic In-Place Tube Weld Inspection System
Ultrasonic Technique
Ultrasonic Tube Analyzer System
Uniform Reference Standards
Uson Leak Detector
Vacuum Plate Inspection Technique for Cork Debonds
Volumetric Gas Flow Measuring Technique
Welding Program
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191
193
193
194
194
195
196
196
197
197
198
199
!99
200
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
Ref. Code
A*ACOUSTICAL EMISSION TECHNIQUE
PURPOSE: Detection of crack propagation in metal.
A new technique for the detection of the propagation of
cracks in metals has been developed. This technique,
referred to as Acoustical Emission, operates on the
principle that each metal will generate a resonant
frequency wave length when the parent metal is vibrated.
Any vibration from the resonant wave length indicates the
presence of a disrupting factor, e.g. , crack propagation.
It should be noted that this technique has not been
thoroughly developed; however, the basic concept is
feasible and only little further development would be
necessary for applicability to this and other programs.
*For reference code identification, refer to
Introduction, page 2.
ASSESSMENT, REPORTING, AND
Z MONITORING OF FAILURES
Ref Code
A
PURPOSE: Provides corrective action support for
defective hardware.
The basic philosophy of this system is to analyze each
'failure to determine cause and initiate necessary changes
to preclude recurrence.
Failure information is collected during manufacturing and
testing of stages and. associated ground support equipment.
These failures are documented on the Unplanned. Event
Record (UER). The UER is part of the Launch Vehicle
Branch integrated record system and provides the means
for formal failure analysis and. resolution.
Each UER is tracked as an unresolved problem until the
required nonrecurrence action is implemented.
Additionally, the failures are classified by criticality code
with respect to impact on the next scheduled launch. If
program nonrecurrence action cannot be implemented prior
to a specific launch, each unresolved failure is assessed by
a Management Assessment Board. The "board" provides
the initial rationale for risk assumption and. work around
procedures.
The continuous monitoring and assessment of unresolved
failures provide the necessary controls to effect a design
mature stage. The formulation of a unique "board" to
assess unresolved failures, that cannot be corrected prior
to launch, in a routine and timely manner, is considered
a program innovation that should be established for all
future program s/contractors.
O_
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SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
AUTOMATION OF FLOWMETER
CALIBRATION ....
Ref. Code
D
PURPOSE: Use of Saturn computer program and
calibration curves.
The calibration of flowrneters was completely automated.
Initial calibration data is reduced by data processing
using a special FORTRAN program, and converted into
calibration curves. Subsequently, calibration data is
taken for three points on each curve and reduced on a
programmed electronic calculator giving the percent
difference of the original curve data from the current
test data. If this percent is within acceptable limits the
curves are validated for another calibration interval.
This concept replaced a previous program of performing
a manual calculation of each data point and a physical
plotting of the data into a curve. Time for flowmeter
calibration has been reduced from 8 hours to 0.75 hour
per curve.
CALIBRATION INTERVAL Ref. Code
4 ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM D
PURPOSE: Test equipment calibration.
A calibration interval adjustment program was developed
and implemented. The program adjusts the calibratien
interval of each item of test equipment based on its "as
found" tolerance and/or condition at each calibration. The
program is easy to administer because of the simplified
decision making output ,planned into the interval adjustment
charts. The charts are based on technically sound
statistical principles eliminating a previous system of
applying personal judgment only. The program was needed
to eliminate inadequate decision making ability and during
the past three years, the average calibration interval has
doubled while the "as found" in-tolerance frequency has
improved from 79 percent up to 90 percent.
V.
L_
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
CONTROL OF TUBE Ref. Code
5 FLARE FABRICATION A
PU RP OSE : Controlling machine performance.
An engineering analysis of the tube flaring problem (high
rejection rate on finished hardware) indicated that
inspection and control measures should be established as
far upstream in the fabrication process as possible.
Analysis indicated that a highly reliable method of
controlling the machine performance was the answer to
the problem.
An engineering evaluation of the Leonard Machine design
disclosed a deficiency in the design of the spindle bearing
and seal application. It was necessary to remove the
bearings, clean, repack, and adjust them before each
certification period. Repeated sampling of the machine
performance proved that the machine satisfied the re-
peatability requirements for the duration of the certifi-
cation period. By implementing a system based on
certified machines and certified operators, the leakage
rate on tube flares has been reduced to approximately Z
percent of the installed hardware. Rejection of finished
hardware due to flares before installation was reduced
to less than 3 percent.
Ref. Code
6 CORRECTIVE ACTION CONTROL B
PURPOSE: Provide data for recurrence control action.
The Corrective Action Control Center, generally referred
to as the "Action Center, " was established to provide a
central control point to display and monitor all significant
problems.
These problems are displayed on a "Significant Problem
Constraint Board" which identifies the problem relative to
the stage, GSE, milestones constrained, and current status
of corrective/recurrence control action. A Contractor
Quality Control representative is assigned each problem
and charged with the responsibility for tracking corrective
action progress through a satisfactory conclusion. Repeti-
tive conditions can be readily detected and appropriate
action initiated in a timely manner. Such a system is an
effective management tool in that current information
relative to problems and corrective action proceedings are
available through a single point of contact.
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
DATA REDUCTION Ref. Code
7 BY COMPUTER D
PURPOSE: Permit rapid and accurate data reduction of
calibration data.
In excess of 30 data processing programs have been
written and implemented to permit rapid and accurate
data reduction of calibration data. Data reduction elimi-
nated previous manual calculations, permitting a sub-
stantial reduction in calibration time. These concepts
are constantly being applied to more equipment.
Industry-v_de savings can be obtained through these
principle s.
8 DENT MEASURING TECHNIQUE
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Determination of depth of dents in spherical
surfaces.
A special technique for exact determination of the depth of
dents in spherical surface on hard-to-reach surfaces was
necessary for evaluation of their severity.
A technique has been developed by using a molding material
to fill the dent, removing material after curing and finally,
accurately measuring the molded material by means of a
comparator to determine the exact contour and depth of
the dent.
o'-
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DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING Ref. Code
9] LANGUAGE COMPUTER TEST PROGRAMS H
PURPOSE: Development of an engineering language
computer test program.
An engineering language computer test program known as
ATOLL (Acceptance, Test, or Launch Language) was
developed to eliminate the necessity for manual conver-
sion of engineering data to machine language.
The ATOLL program provided a language for use in
automatic checkout and launch testing of the stage or
vehicle completely independent of local consideration
(i.e. , checkout or launch equipment and location), and
utilized the knowledge of the launch vehicle test engineer
for automatic checkout and launch testing.
It also established criteria for development of a single
document which satisfied the following needs:
a. A detailed test procedure in automatic checkout
and launch testing.
b, A test program for input into the automatic
checkout and launch test system.
C. A test review and evaluation document for plant
representatives and project offices.
d. A checklist for government inspection teams for
verification of contractor automatic test
performance.
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING LANGUAGE
COMPUTER TEST PROGRAMS (Continued)
ATOLL programs provided advantages such as reduced
programming costs, increased test effectiveness, higher
operational efficiency, and automatic checkout and launch
test systems, which resulted in schedule and manpower
savings, and reduced the number of errors.
O_
O_
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Ref. Code
EDDY CURRENT TECHNIQUE A
PURPOSE: Refinement of various nondestructive testing
methods.
Throughout the program, problems concerning unique
hardware conditions have arisen that required the develop-
ment or refinement of various nondestructive testing
methods.
For eddy-current testing, the word "flaw" has a much
wider meaning than it does for the other forms of nonde-
structive testing. Not only can cracks, voids, and
fissures be detected, but also differences in alloy,
conductivity, hardness, grain size, inclusion content,
thickness of plating, etc. The information concerning a
flaw is obtained from the change in impedance of a test
coil supplied with an alternating current of suitable
frequency. The coil induces a varying field in a part underi
test which in turn generates eddy currents in the part. The
eddy currents react on the exciting coil and affect its
impedance. These impedance variations can be analyzed;
itheir magnitude and phase yield information concerning the
type and severity of the flaw.
Two general types of coils are in common use. One is a
cylindrical coil, called a feed-through coil, through which
the test part passes. The other type is a small coil which
can be placed on the surface of the part and is called a
probe coil. Feed-through coils are particularly suited to
the testing of cylindrical objects such as barstock tubing.
Probe-type instruments are usually used for the detection
of defects such as seams and cracks, which cause changes
in conductivity.
i0 EDDY CURRENT TECHNIQUE (Continued)
Eddy current inspection techniques have been refined or
developed to provide for rapid, accurate inspection of the
followi ng:
a.
b°
C.
d.
Characteristics of titanium weld wire
Thickness measurements of stainless steel
tubing
Detection of surface cracks in steel spherical
bearings and housings
Detection of surface cracks in nonmetallic
ablative coatings.
-.3
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ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY
TECHNIQUE
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SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
Ref. Code ELECTROLYTIC
A 121 LEAK DETECTION
PURPOSE: Test to determine specified heat treat of
metal.
Due to the possibility of error in the area of heat treat,
there arose a need for a method of testing to determine
the specified heat treat. Existing test equipment has been
adapted for rapid verification of heat treat conversion of
aluminum from 7075-T6 to 7075-T73. The technique has
further been refined to provide for a rapid determination
of the electrical conductivity in small and odd shaped
7075-T73 aluminum fittings.
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Leak detection process for large diameter
tanks.
The tremendous size of the Saturn propellant tanks
dictated that the use of standard techniques for leak
detection was impractical. Each standard system was
analyzed for its adaptability to meet the requirements
imposed by Saturn tanks. However, in each instance, the
standard techniques proved" to be unsuitable.
To overcome the limiting factors imposed by the standard
leak detection systems_ a unique system, devoid of
personnel inspection operations, was developed. The
Electrolytic Leak Detection System is extremely simple in
components and operations. The system consists of
adhesive-backed aluminum foil tape which is insulated from
the tank by water soluble paper. A switching circuit
connected between the foil and the tank indicates via a
display panel when a deionized water leak occurs under the
taped area. The relative size requirement of the S-IC
tank (approximately 2,000 feet of weld seams) necessitates
that the tape be broken into short individual strips to
precisely locate a leak, but the system still maintains the
capability of permitting the leak detection elements to be
placed over all the desired areas prior to installation of
the tank into the hydrostatic test position.
The Electrolytic Leak Detection System circumvents the
prohibitive factors as sociated with existing standard
techniques. The system, however, is highly reliable and
economical notwithstanding its simplicity.
o-.
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12 ELECTROLYTIC LEAK DETECTION (Continued)
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
The system components and operating techniques indicate
that it could be readily adapted for inspection of any
liquid pressure vessel system.
13 ELECTROMAGNETIC TECHN[ QUE
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Short range radar type measuring device.
Microwave equipment has been refined and developed to
determine the thickness of the major assembly portions of
the propellant tanks during chemical milling and subsequent
operations. The microwave principle is essentially a
short radar type of measuring device.
In order to maintain structural integrity and uniformity of
these parts, assurance of proper thickness was required.
Because of the large size of these parts, conventional
means of measuring were not appropriate and no other
known method was available.
0"-
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EQUIPMENT QUALITY ANALYSIS / Ref. Code
14 QUALITY MAINTENANCE TESTING A
PURPOSE: Continuation beyond the "problem" hardware
concept.
An Equipment Quality Analysis (EQA) Program has.been
designed to continue beyond the "problem" hardware
concept. Although suspected or known hardware problems
are thoroughly investigated, the EQA program is intended
to reach beyond the "reason" for a particular problem's
existence and to seek the latent "reasons" as to cause.
This program has not limited itself solely to the confines
of problem analysis. This program periodically investi-
gates selected production hardware by random sampling
of parts or components (procured or manufactured) which
were originally scheduled for flight or ground support
equipment. The sampled hardware is subjected to inten-
sive laboratory analysis which range from a complete
software package audit through hardware disassembly
which may or may not be destructive in nature.
The primary purpose of this concept is to provide
additional assurance of product integrity and reliability
by serving as an adjunct to the reliability and failure
analysis programs.
A natural outgrowth of this concept was Quality Mainte-
nance Testing (QMT) as a part of the Quality Maintenance
Program, This latter program extends the increased
product assurance concept to reliability critical hardware
(that hardware where failure could cause loss of crew
EQUIPMENT QUALITY ANALYSIS/
14 QUALITY MAINTENANCE TESTING (Continued)
or vehicle). Primary emphasis is placed on the critical
hardware which has not demonstrated any problems which
would have subjected the hardware to scrutiny under any
of the preceding programs.,.
The total concept of EQA as it presently exists has served
to increase confidence that Saturn hardware will perform
as designed with a high degree of reliability through
elimination of latent defect§. The combined EQA/QMT
program correlated with in depth team reviews of
suppliers' facilities, processes, and standards can
be adapted with onIyminor modifications to increase
confidence in hardware reliability on future
programs.
OSPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND P ROCEDURES
FITTING OPTICAL Ref. Code
!51 TARGET FIXTURE A
PURPOSE: Location of fittings on a spherical surface.
The Fitting Optical Target was developed in the Saturn
program specifically for use in checking the location of
the tank head assembly fittings. A family of Fitting
Optical Targets (FOT) has been developed for the varying
fitting configurations. The FOT provides a means by
which the center point of an optical target can be quickly
and accurately placed at the center of the fitting opening.
The optical target can be rotated about its center provi-
ding sighting flexibility for the varying angular positions
of the fittings. The displacement between the center of
the _:arget and the face of the fitting flange is established
for each FOT according to engineering drawings. An
adapter plate can he mounted on the FOT such that its
plane is parallel to the surface plane of the fitting plane,
thus, providing a surface from which the incident angle
of the fitting to the gravity plane can be determined by
means of a microptic clinometer.
The FOT was developed to replace the previous time
consuming use of scales and necessary calculations, and
to increase accuracy of the system.
FOUR AXIS Ref.
16 MEASURING MACHINE D
Code
PURPOSE: Dimensional inspection of injectors.
A four-axis measuring machine was purchased primarily
for use in the dimensional inspection of injectors and
hardware which was fabricated on numerical controlled
machines. Due to the weight and size of such items, the
four-axis measuring machine reduced the number of setups
required to perform dimensional inspection.
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
FREON INJECTION
17 SYSTEM FOR LEAK DETECTION
Ref. Code
G
PU RP OSE : Use of preselected freon mixtures for
operating in systems varying from a few
pounds to 2500 psig.
Problems associated with in-system leaks necessitated
action for the development of a freon injector. The two
main features required of the system consisted of the
pre selecting of freon mixtures prior to pressurizing a
system by the operator and the versatility of operating
with systems varying from a few pounds to 2500 psig and
flow rates of Z5 to 800 cfm. "
The freon injector has an air driven liquid boost pump
which raises the freon from inlet pressure to 7.500 psig.
This high pressure freon is fed through an annin flow
control valve to a mixing chamber in the system
pressurizing line, utilizing the heat in the air to
vaporize the freon.
A sample of the mixture is taken immediately downstream
of the mixing chamber and is fed to an infrared freon
analyzer instrument. The analyzer produces a signal
proportional to the percent of freon in the sample. This
signal is amplified and fed to an analog comparator. A
second reference signal is c0n_rolled by the freon
injector operator at the control panel. This controlled
signal is fed to the analog comparator.
17
FRE ON INSECTION
SYSTEM FOR LEAK DETECTION (Continued)
The signal from the analyzer and the signal from the freon
injector panel are compared, and a new signal is generated
which is proportional to the difference between these
signals and causes the annin flow control valve to release
more or less freonas required. The freoninjector
produces a mixture between 1 percent and 3 percent Freon
22 to the pressurizing media. The injector has provided
for remote operation and has pneumatic provisions for both
a "zero" sample gas and a "span" gas for calibrating the
analyz or.
The operator controls are power switches, infrared
analyzer flow control valves and regulators, and a pressure
regulator for the air supply serving the annin flow control
valve.
m
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INFRARED THEORY
18 AND ANALYSIS
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
Ref. Code IN MOTION
A 19 X-RAY MACHINE
PURPOSE: Evaluation of hardware for defects.
Electrical current flowing through an electronic compo-
nent generates heat. This heat increases the temperature
of the component and the variation in temperature is
correlated to the power dissipation and to the current
flow.
The heat radiated by the component is related to the
temperature of the component. Hence, by measuring
the infrared radiation emitted by the components in a
circuit, the temperature profile of the circuit is obtained
without interfering with the electrical or thermal
characteristics of the circuit. To measure this infrared
radiation, the infrared test station was used.
The infrared analysis technique described was needed to
evaluate hardware for defects which could not be detected
othe rwis e.
In future programs, "IR" could be used to investigate
failures of electronic equipment, for evaluation of
incoming items on a receival basis, and for process
ins pection.
Ref. Code
D
PURPOSE: X-ray of lines and ducts.
A capability was developed for a combined manual, semi-
automatic and automatic "in motion" radiographic system
for the inspection of circumferential welds. The "in
motion" equipment permits X-raying a weld with one setup
land one continuous exposure rather than rotating the part
manually, thus, minimizing hardware handling problems,
material handling damage, and personnel hazards.
The old method involved X-raying a small arc of the weld,
rotating, and resetup of the part in a step-by-step procedure
until the circumference of the weld had been X-rayed.
-4
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INSPECTION OF Ref. Code
20 INACCESSIBLE AREAS B
PU RP OSE : Use of closed circuit TV with miniature
camera to gain access to areas beyond
reach of the human eye.
Closed circuit television equipment comprised of a
miniature camera with magnifying lens was the technique
employed to examine the drop through side of the "J"
weld in the LH 2 tank. An automated miniature TV
camera equipped with a 10 power magnification lens is
mounted on a track at the nearest point possible above
the "J" weld. The camera travels on the track around
the entire circumference of the "J" weld area, viewing
and recording the weldment on video tape. Any defects
or indications are easily detected by the magnification
and a permanent record of the inspection is provided by
the video tape.
Previous inspection was performed by an individual using
a borescope, a very inaccurate and time consuming
method of performing the inspection, due to the
proximity of the LOX tank dome to the LHZ tank sidewall
at the "J" weld. This technique, therefore, provided a
much higher degree of confidence to ensure that the
"J" weld was free of defects.
Similar techniques can be developed for unlimited use in
the inspection of articles where physical access is
limited or impossible for direct visual examination.
An addition of an ultraviolet light to the TV camera
could make it possible to perform Fluorescent Penetrant
Inspection of welded surfaces in a similar manner.
INSPECTION OF SMALL
IZ 1 DIAMETER LINE ASSEMBLIES
Ref. Code
B
PURPOSE: Used for inspection of weld seams on the inside
diameter of small lines.
An Inspection Test Fixture, comprised of a field indicator,
calibration tool for calibrating fixture probe linear pot, low
pressure (4-i0 psi) bladder on fixture head, TVmonitor,
X-Y recorder and voltohmmeter, is used in the inspection
of weld beads on the inside.diameter of small pressure or
fluid carrying lines ranging from 3 to 7 inches of diameter.
The exact position of the Inspection Check Fixture, after
insertion into the line assembly, is located by the field
indicator. The small low pressure bladder is used to pre-
vent inadvertent movement of the head after the fixture is
in approximate position. A permanent magnet is mounted
on the head of the check fixture. Thus, by moving the field
indicator about the approximate position of the fixture and
obtaining a peak meter reading, the weld seam undergoing
inspection may be plotted by using a coordinate system.
Through the closed circuit TV monitor a trace is made on
the X-Y recorder showing the profile of the peaking and
offset.
Before this technique and equipment were developed, it was
impossible to inspect offset and peaking of weld beads in-
side small diameter lines.
This technique can be applied to great advantage in many
areas where access is limited for direct visual examina-
tion of weldments and other critical surfaces.
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
LEAK DETECTOR FOR Ref. Code
22 USE IN SPACE ENVIRONMENT G
PURPOSE: To support orbital inspection and checkout
operations.
With the advent of orbital workshops and future extended
space missions, a need for a suitable leak detector to
support orbital inspection and checkout operations or
large space stations and interplanetary vehicles became
evident.
A prototype leak detector was designed, built, and tested.
The instrument is basically a hand-held, self-powered,
ion pressure gauge designed to operate in ambient
pressures below 10 -4 torr. Linear pressure measure-
ments by the pressure detector (General Electric trigger
gauge) are transformed into logarithmic electrical
signals by the instrument electronics which are displayed
as a deflection on the readout meter. Leaks are detected
by noting changes in pressure when the trigger gauge is
placed in close proximity of a leak. Since these changes
inpressure are apt to be quite small, the meter pointer
movement is more likely to be discernible when operating
the instrument at low ambient pressures. Therefore,
when searching for leaks, the instrument, upon actuating
the huckout switch, simulates a low pressure indication
by automatically subtracting an induced electrical signal
from the signal which represents the ambient pressure.
Electrically, this simulation is accomplished by using
current (approximately one ampere per torr) to actuate the
trigger gauge during operation. There are two sources of
LEAK DETECTOR FOR
2Z USE IN SPACE ENVIRONMENT (Continued)
this •current; (1) from the logarithmic amplifier which
drives the readout meter, and (Z) the buckout circuit. As
more current is delivered from the huckout circuit, less
current is delivered by the logarithmic amplifier and thus
the readout meter moves down scale. Buckout is applied
in three discrete steps each time the buckout switch is
depressed. Therefore, at an ambient pressure slightly
larger than 10 -7 torr, application of the middle level of
buckout would also leave the meter sensitive to a small
leak signal. However, at 5x 10 -7torr, _thelargestbuckout
level would drive the meter off-scale and the 10 -7 lewel
would reduce the reading to 4 x 10 -7 torr, a reading at
which a 10 -8 deflection would barely be noticeable. Thus,
when Small leaks are to be measured in higher pressur_es,
more buckout levels are needed, e. g. ; small discrete steps
or a continuous buckout adjustment.
• . . _ . .
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MANDATORY NASA Ref. Code
23 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS A
PURPOSE: Hardware inspection techniques.
In the beginning of the Saturn program, hardware inspec-
tion was conducted on a surveillance system, the extent
of inspection being determined mainly by the discrepancy
rate in a particular area. However, it soon became
apparent that a determination should be made of those
critical characteristics whose failure comld cause mission
failures and that a heavy concentration of inspection
should be focused thereon. Mandatory NASA Inspection
Requirements were conceived for this purpose. To begin
with' heavy coverage was instituted in most areas until
such time as critical manufacturing and inspection proce-
dures and processes were verified. Gradually, as these
procedures and processes were proved, mandatory
government inspection was deCreased until, at the present
time, an absolute minimum set of requirements has been
established. The Mandatory Inspection Requirements fall
mainly into three categories:
(I) Inspection of critical structural operations and
all gnrn cuts.
(Z) Inspections to ensure maintenance of contamination
control requirements.
(3) Witnessing of testing operations on items whose
failure could cause loss of life and/or mission
failure.
Mandatory Inspection Requirements for the latter cate-
gory are determined mainly by the analysis of failure
mode and effects documents and test procedure s in s elec,
ring those test facets that are Critical to mission success.
MANDATORY NASA
23 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
Requirements for the first two categories are determined
by the application of engineering judgment in selecting
those characteristics during assembly and alignment
operations thought to be critical to mission success.
It is felt that these concepts of mandatory inspection are
directly relatable to any aerospace program that naay arise
in the future. In order to be even more effective, howeveri
it is recommended that the critical characteristics be
identified during the very early stages of the program,
i. e. , during the initial drawing review. Having been
designated on the drawings, these characteristics could
then be incorporated into manufacturing and inspection
planning from the outset.
r
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MASS DROP-OFF B_EASUREMENTS BASED
UPON PRECISE PRESSURE AND Ref. Code
TEMPERATURE MEASU REMENTS G 24 !
PURPOSE: For detection of leaks in complex gas systems
on space vehicles.
An analytical study was performed to determine if Mass
Drop-Off measurements, based upon precise temperature
and pressure measurements, could be used successfully
for the detection of leaks in complex gas systems on
space vehicles.
The study showed that this technique could be used to
detect leak rates to an accuracy of 1 scim on systems
less than 5 cubic feet in capacity, but only if the
temperature in the system is uniform and constant
throughout the entire volume during the checkout period.
This is based upon a minimum detectable pressure decay
of 0. 1 psi/hr. The magnitude of the detectable leak
rates become proportionally larger in larger system
volumes.
This leak detection technique becomes very ineffective
if the temperature environment is not controlled and free
of temperature fluctuations and gradients. Under these
circumstances, this method could still be used for the
detection of very large leak rates or to obtain a general
check of the overall status of a closed complex gas
system.
MASS DROP-OFF MEASUREMENTS BASED
UPON PRECISE PRESSURE AND
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS (Continued ,)"
Dry air was used as the test media throughout this study,
but the same limitations described herein would apply to
any compressible fluid.
In the course of this study, it was determined analytically
that the technique of detecting leaks with the MD technique
is very effective, provided that temperature requirements
can be accurately maintained but very limited in scope if
the temperature requirements cannot be maintained.
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUESAND PROCEDURES
MASS SPECTROMETER LEAK Ref. Code
Z5 DETECTOR TECHNIQUES G
PURPOSE: For external testing of tankage, including
weld seams, bosses, etc.
Although helium mass spectrometer leak detectors have
been in use a long time, little is known about their
application to aerospace hardware problems. Therefore,
an investigation was undertaken to develop and evaluate
techniques suitable for testing aerospace hardware for
external leakage.
Four basic fixture approaches were developed and proven.
These were: One-piece rigid, two-piece rigid, non-
reusable (tape), and reusable soft.
A. RIGID FIXTURES
I. One-Piece Rigid Fixtures .. It is useful "for spot
checking areas on flat or spherical surfaces and can be
used to test bosses, covers, etc., if there is no extension
such as an electrical lead or pressure tubing leading
away from the area under test.
The basic fixture design is that of a hat section with a
connection for the mass spectrometer suction line and
a flange for'sealing. 'Two seal techniques proved useful.
On flat surfaces, the best method is a large flat rubber
gasket laid on top of the hat section. This rubber should
be about I/8-inch thick, soft, nonporous, and lightly
greased with a vacuum grease compatible with the
MASS SPECTROMETER LEAK
Z5 DETECTOR TECHNIQUES (Continued)
hardware under test. This approach is preferred to a
gasket between specimen and fixture, as it will accommo-
date fairly severe surface anomalies such as welds, etc.,
as long as the discontinuity is not too sharp for the rubber
to conform to. The gasket is pulled down and held in place
by the vacuum. The fixture should have radial grooves on
the bottom of the flange to permit rapid evacuation under
the gasket to initiate the seal.
This sytem cannot be used when there is an appreciable
curvature in the surface mating with the fixture, so an
alternate system was developed. In this case, the soft
rubber gasket is placed between the fixture and the test
articles. This system allows the same fixture to be used
with a wide variety of curvatures; however, the tolerance
for discontinuities is limited to what the rubber itself can
accommodate in compression.
In both cases, an investigation was made to determine if
more sophisticated seals would be more useful. Bonded
seals, molded lip seals, and O-rings were investigated
and all were found workable in some situations. However,
each was more limited in _ application, and for general
application, the two techniques described above had a wider
application and will meet almost all needs. In addition,
the soft rubber gaskets are inexpensive, easily cut on site,
and therefore do not require a large complex inventory of
many parts in many sizes.
GO
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MASS SPECTROMETER
LEAK DETECTOR TECHNIQUES (Continued)Z5
2. Two-Piece Rigid Fixtures. A problem not solved
by the fixtures described above is the case where a tube
must emerge through the fixture. This is the case where
a pressure line emerges from a boss, or where a fitting
in a line, such as a tee or union, must be checked. A
two-piece fixture was developed to perform this task.
The seal is accomplished by designing the fixture to mate
well, with dowel pins to maintain alignment, and the
actual seal is accomplished with a vacuum putty, such
as Apiezon sealing compound Q.
Attempts were made to build reusable seals so that putty
would not be needed; however, this was not accomplished.
Investigation and consultation revealed that a vacuum
seal of this type had not been built, and probably could
not be built. The basic problem, (as had been discovered
earlier) was the "Y" intersection of the mating surfaces
where the split in the fixture meets the tube emerging
through it.
The putty-sealed fixture works well and can be applied
quickly, with test data obtained in 5 minutes or less,
achieving full machine sensitivity. However, it is recog-
nized that the techniques are messy and at best adds a
cleaning problem and would be unacceptable in certain
clean room conditions.
The first method developed
B. SOFT FIXTURES
I. Tape Techniques.
is a tape technique. The basic approach is to cover the
MASS SPECT ROMETER
251 LEAK DETECTOR TECHNIQUES (Continued)
area to be tested with a flexible spacer to provide a
passageway for leakage and then seal with a pressure-
sensitive, adhesive-coated, plastic tape. A small plenum
chamber is placed in the middle of the run and the mass
spectrometer connected via suction cup and hose.
This method was successfully demonstrated with tape
lengths up to 20 feet. However, it was found to have
several drawbacks: (i) _if a leak is indicated, then its
location must be determined by a series of bracketing
maneuvers, halving the area each time until the leak is
localized to where the size area to be repaired is
reasonable; (2) all tapes act as a semipermeable
membrane and extract helium from the air in significant
quantities. This ranges from no problem to a serious
problem, depending on the length of the taped section and
the sensitivity desired. A 20-foot strip of Mylar tape
selectively extracted enough helium to indicate a leak of
5 x 10 -9 sccs. TherefOre, if full machine sensitivity is
desired, a dummy strip must be made up and placed near
the actual [ocation to use as a reference zero. By this
means, a 1 x I0 -I0 leak can be routinelydetected.
Z. Reusable Soft Fixtures. This fixture is in
essence an elongated suction cup which easily conforms
to curved surfaces and can accommodate reasonable
discontinuities such as intersecting welds, etc. This
fixture works very well and routiflely delivers full
machine capability in the I0-12 range.
,.O
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MILLING OF SPRAY
?.6 FOAM INSULATION
Ref. Code.
B
PURPOSE: To provide a standard thickness of
protective coating.
After .spray application of the foam material over metal
surfaces, the foam surface is very irregular, thus
requiring extensive machining to reduce the insulation
to the specified thickness and contour. Since the foam is
a relatively soft material, it can be cut or trimmed with
nonmetallic tooling which will les sen the possibility of
damage to the metal surface in the event the cutter
should penetrate the foam. Therefore, nonmetallic
tooling was-developed from high density laminated
material such as "hercu-Lam" to accomplish the
milling operation.
Tooling of this type was needed to reduce or eliminate
the damage caused by metal cutting tools. Several such
incidents occured whereby severe damage was inflicted
to the metal surface by the metal cutter penetrating the
foam.
Z7
NEW METHODS FOR STAGE PROPELLANT
TANK PROOF TESTING REF. Code G
PURPOSE: Use of high-density slurries as pressure-
transmitting media in hydrostatic tests.
The objective of this research program was to develop
high-density slurries suitable for use as pressure-
transmitting media in hydrostatic testing of stage pro-
pellant tanks. This included a determination of the
range of densities that could be obtained, determination of
compatibility with stage and stage component materials,
and the definition of pumping, storage, and other handling
te chniqu e s.
Water-based slurries were formulated from a large number
of materials and it was conclusively shown that specific
gravities from two to six could be achieved with readily
available materials and conventional chemical processing
equ_.pment. Lead oxide (litharge) was shown to be the
most suitable materialforproducing stable slurries over
a wide range of specific g.ravities. Laboratory data
indicated that these slurries also act as pressure trans-
mitting media. Additional studies are desirable in order
to evaluate more fully and to improve the corrosion
characteristics of the slurries when in contact with
aluminum alloys. _
A preliminary economic analysis favors the construction
of an on-site plant for producing slurries in quantities of
up to one million gallons. Additional prototype and pilot-
plant studies are recommended, however, before construc-
tion of a plant is undertaken for large-scale production.
Co
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Z8
NONDESTRUCTIVE TEST DEVICE FOR EVALUATION
OF 3/4-INCH THICK POLYURETHANE Ref. Code
SPRAY-ON FOAM INSULATION (SOFI) G
PURPOSE: Application of the sonic impedance method.
Described is the technical survey, research, development,
and applications engineering effort performed to develop
a nondestructive test (NDT) for the evaluation of the
cryogenic insulation used on the Saturn. This insulation
is of the low-density polyurethane foam type and is applied
by a spray-on technique to the exterior of the liquid hydro-
gen tanks of the Saturn V vehicle.
The insulation is designed to preclude excessive heat
transfer between the atmosphere and cryogenic liquid
fuel. Hence, the SOFlmust be free of voids in accor-
dance with limits defined by specification requirements
and must bond to the aluminum tank skin in a manner
adequate to prevent loosening and spalling during stage
ground tests or actual flight conditions. In addition,
existing unbonds must not be extensive enough to cause
spaUing as a result of "cryopumping" during the thermal
extremes of tanking and detahking operations.
The first step in the selection of a NDT technique was an
evaluation of the pertinent SOFI properties and the
existing quality requirements. From this information a
sound basis for consideration or rejection of a test method
was formed. A detailed technical survey of various NDT
techniques was then performed. Based on strong
theoretical evidence, a vibrational impedance method was
selected and a prototype impedance head was fabricated,
improved, and evaluated.
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NONDESTRUCTIVE TEST DEVICE FOR EVALUATION
OF 3/4-INCH THICK P OLYURETHANE
SPRAY-ON FOAM INSULATION (SOFI) (Continued)
The evaluation was performed on coated and uncoated test
panels containing preplaced voids and unbonds at 3/4 inch
depths, coated test panels with preplaced unbonds at 2.0
inch depths, uncoated test panels with preplaced voids at
2.0 inch depths, and uncoated 5/4 inch test panels with no
known defects.
The sonic impedance method was capable of detecting
unbonds and voids with minimum dimension of i.0 inch in
3/4 inch SOFI. The minimum gap or defect thickness
dimension of detectable defects was established to he 0. 003
inch on test panels containing natural occurring unbonds.
The sonic impedance method demonstrated an ability to
locate defects smaller than specification limits and is
recommended for NDT evaluation of cryogenic SOFI for
the following reasons :
l°
2.
It can be operated manually or in an automated
system.
The readout or flaw discrimination is made by
an electrical system (meter and recorder),
instead of complete dependence upon the
the operator's ability.
. It can detect unbonds and voids in 3/4 inch insu-
lated structures after the polyurethane protective
coating has been applied.
OO
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PIECE PART SAMPLING/ANALYSIS Ref. Code PRECISION
FOR SUBTIER SUPPLIERS A 30 MEASURING ROOM
, ,,, ,,
PURPOSE: Hardware quality analysis.
The intent of this inspection program is to allow the
major contractor to reach beyond the first level of
suppliers and randomly sample those suppliers' procured
components and hardware. Detailed attention is given to
those "piece parts" (individual components or small
assemblies procured by the supplier) which could adverse.
ly affect the quality level and/or operation of the
supplier s' hardware.
The prime si_.ficance of this method is that it provides,
via randomly selected parts from existing stores, an
analysis of the quality level of the subtier suppliers'
hardware. This concept further provides an evaluation
of the affected first-level suppliers' documentation and
control systems for procured hardware.
The costs of operation for this technique are nominal but
when viewed in perspective of the results which can be
attained, the operation becomes even more economical.
The concept of source control can be extended to selected
subtler suppliers at a small fraction of the cost for
comparable results which could be anticipated from such
programs as those encompassing personal visits by
quality field representatives.
Ref. Code
D
PURPOSE: Provides environmentally controlled conditions
for precision measurement.
An environmentally controlled precision measuring room
with the latest precision measuring equipment was fabri-
cated and put into use to support development and
production of hardware which included dimensions which
must be machined to a critically close tolerance.
_o
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i QUALITY ASSURANCE ROTARY Ref. Code
3 1 INSPECTION TABLE ..... A
,,, ,,
PURPOSE: Provides a 34-foot diameter rotating inspec-
tion table.
The 34-foot diameter rotating inspection table, in
conjunction with stationary optical measuring equipment,
serves as a uniform reference standard for dimensional
measurements, and provides a single, central,
established (permanently set up), means for performing
complete dimensional analysis (angular and linear) and
critical dimensional inspections of large complex
assemblies for the Saturn V booster stages. The rotary
table, in itself, provides a uniform reference standard
or optical comparator for each major section af the
booster.
The size of the rotary table (34 feet in diameter) was
required to accommodate the large sections of the Saturn
booster (33 feet in diameter) such as the thrust
structure, intertank, forward skirt, tank skin rings,
Y-rings, tank head assemblies, etc. These sections
and/or smaller structures can be inspected on the
rotary inspection table under optimum conditions for
inspection purposes. The utilization of a single reference
plane eliminates the inherent variations of the multiple
table system. Such variations are not always predictable
and could appreciably reduce the accuracy of the
mathematical computations required for vertical
assembly of these major sections.
QUALITY ASSURANCE ROTARY
3 1 INSPECTION TABLE (Continued)
The rotary table, aside from being a single reliable
reference plane, also provides a degree of accuracy
unattainable when movable optical equipment is used. The
fixed position of the optical equipment in relation to the
rotation of the inspected item further provides another
uniform reference plane by eliminating or at a minimum,
greatly reducing the error factor induced by changing the
plane of reference of the inspection equipment.
It is highly probable that an inspection system such as the
one used in the Saturn program can be significantly
improved further in accuracy, time, and ease in making
dipaensional measurements and analysis, for application
to future programs by utilizing laser measuring equipment
i'n place of, or in addition to, optical equipment in
conjunction with the rotary inspection table.
L " . i ¸ _
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QUALITY DATA Ref. Code
32 REPORTING SYSTEM A
PU RP OSE: Comprehensive evaluation and reporting of
trend data.
The Quality Data Reporting System is a means for the
systematic and comprehensive evaluation and reporting
of quality trend data and determining those areas that
required special inspection emphasis.
The system functions as follows:
1. C.ontractors[ Q.C_ S_rstem Evaluations are
performed primarily by elements of NASA Quality
Engineering and Reliability to ensure that the contractor
has established, implemented, and is maintaing a quality
control system which satisfies all contractual require,..
QUALIT-Y DATA •
32 REPORTING SYSTEM (Continued) • .
This system replaced a prior method which did not provide
for a counting of items inspected that were satisfactory.
The prior method was capable of counting only deficiencies
against contractors. The new method counts good and bad
inspections, thus, a percent discrepant rate is established,
i.e., one out of I0 bad or I0 percent bad. The system can
thus give a good measure of quality (even when volume
of work is a variable). _ " "
The system was needed to place priorities on a limited-
amount of NASA inspector's and engineer's time andto
begin working on the most important problems first.
This system can be valuable on any program._since it is an
effective and efficient management tool. .. -
ments. Formal surveys are conducted on a scheduled
frequency based on nature of function.
2. Production Verifications are inspections
performed on hardware to applicable drawings and
specifications established by design. In the verification
effort, documents were designed and implemented into
a system for reporting, in specifics, all activity. The
reports used provided data on shakedown discrepancies
and area survey checksheets, All of this information
is identified as to area inthe factory, and trend charts
are maintained to determine areas that have a large
number of problems.
" r
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RADIOGRAPHIC THRESHOLD D'ETECTION LEVEL OF
SUBSURFACE CRACK-LIKE DEFECTS Ref. Code
IN ALUMINUM WELDS G
PU RP OSE : Defines the detection capabilities in quantita-
tive terms with respect to crack length,
width, and depth.
Several penetrameter designs are used throughout the
industry as technique indicators to measure the radio-
graphic quality level or evaluate those parameters
influencing the ability to measure radiographic sensi-
tivity in quantitative terms. The designs are presently
based upon the ability of an experienced film interpreter
to resolve radiographic images produced by drilled holes,
wires, tapered and parallel slits, and spheres.
Of prime interest in this program is the ability of a given
radiographic technique to resolve small weld cracks andre
define the detection capabilities in quantitative terms
with respect to crack length, width, and depth. The
closest approximation to the configuration of a naturally
occurring weld crack which has been achieved to date is
the taper or parallel slit technique used by several
investigations to study the limitations of radiography in
detecting crack-like defects. In the slit technique,
cracks are simulated by placing two identical machined
shims next to each other, and by varying the arrange-
ment and thickness of the shims, various slit dimensions
(simulating width and depth of cracks) can he obtained
and the minimum detectable slit size can be determined
for any given radiographic technique. The limitations of
simulating the configuration of a crack with machined
rectangular shims are obvious, and one important
variable which cannot be reproduced by this method is
33
RADIOGRAPHIC THRESHOLD DETECTION LEVEL OF
SUBSURFACE CRACK-LIKE DEFECTS
IN ALUMINUM WELDS (Continued)
the irregular shape of the edges of the crack. Another
serious limitation which is peculiar to this test program
lis the ability to satisfactorily machine flat, square, and
parallel edges on extremely thin sheet or foil.
Because of the above-mentioned limitations on employing
slit-type penetrameters, it was proposed that a closer
approximation of a natural crack might be possihlyachieved
by initiating and propagating a fatigue crack in a SEN-type
specimen (single-edge notched) similar to the configura-
tion used in fracture mechanics studies. A fatigue crack
prepared in the SEN specimen, although not representative
of a natural weld crack, would be a much closer
approximation of a natural crack because of the irregular
fractured edges and irregular crack pattern produced
during propagation. This method of simulating a natural
crack, therefore, was proposed as the principal technique
with the tapered slit technique to be used as a backup or
alternate method. In both techniques, it was felt that the
simulated crack dimensions (width, depth, and length)
could be readily controlled or measured to obtain reliable
and reproducible data regarding the minimum threshold
detection level for any given radiographic technique and
material thickness.
To satisfy the requirement of determining the detection
capabilities of internal or subsurface weld cracks for a
specific radiographic technique, a penetrameter with pre-
determined crack or slit dimensions (width, depth, and
length) can be sandwiched between the welds of two test
plates previously machined from the test material under
OO
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RADIOGRAPHIC THRESHOLD DETECTION LEVEL OF
SUBSURFACE CRACK-LIKE DEFECTS
!33 IN ALUMINUM WELDS (Continued)
study. Finally, by employing several of these plaque-
type penetrameters, whose crack or slit dimensions are
graduated and fixed in terms of width, depth, and length
and sandwiching them between matched sets of welded
test plates, the vanishing point of the slit or crack for
each penetrameter can be determined by experienced
film interpreters. Thus, with a specific set of penetra-
meters as described above and applied to a given materia]
34
REMOTE VISUAL
INSPECTION SYSTEM
Ref. Code
G
PURPOSE For inspecting areas not accessible for direct
viewing.
The purpose of this project was to develop'a visual
inspection system and techniques for inspecting areas not
accessible for direct viewing, such as the inside of valves
and lines installed on a flight vehicle. The parameters
within the system developed included:
material thickness, and radiographic technique, crack
_v-idth(w) and crack depth (d) can be plotted to establish
the minimum crack dimensions which are discernible
under a given set of test conditions. These test data
then provide a reliable and reproducible reference for
either establishing or maintaining a satisfactory radio-
graphic quality level for detecting internal crack-like
weld defects. It is important to note that these special
penetrameters were not to be designed to judge the type
or size of weld cracks or to establish limits of
acceptability.
.
Z.
.
.
Portability - System was to be compact and
flexible enough to permit easy transportation by
one or two people in a common vehicle such as
a pickup truck or large car.
High image resolution - System was to be equal
to the present inspection devices or about 40
paired lines per milliameter.
Permanent image retention - Permanent image
retention was to be either photographic film or
video tape.
Operator ease of operation- System was to be
capable of entering close places on space
vehicles and still be efficiently operated for long
periods of time without undue physical strain on
the operator.
The different phases of the investigation included mirror
systems, rigid borescopes, the newer flexible fiberscopes,
closed circuit television, and light supplies.
A review of the preceeding systems led to the development
of a system mating the flexible fiberscope with the closed
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
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34 INSPECTION SYSTEM (Continued)
circuit television system. This was done by using the
standard eye piece or ocular lens assembly to project the
image of the item under inspection. It is a general prac-
tice to add an adapter lens between the fiberscope or
borescope and the film or television cameras. The
addition of this lens cuts down the available light at the
film plane or on the vidicon tube of a television camera.
The adapter lens also cuts down on the total system
resolution. As a means of overcoming these two
problems, the ocular lens of the fiberscope was modi-
fied so it projected a 5/8 inch diameter image at a
distance of 4 inches from the eye piece of the fiberscope.
The lens modification Was accomplished by spacing the
final lens as sembly approximately 5/ 16 inch beyond its
original position On the fiberscope. _ This can be easily
done by loosening a set screw and relocating the eye
piece or replacing the eye piece •with an adaptor lens.
Utilizing the ocular lens or eye piece of the fibersCope
as a projecting lens required an adjustable extension
tube to keep external light from reaching the face of the
television camera vidicon tube. Also, a mounting fixture
was designed to hold the television camera: firmly and
correctly align the eye piece of the fiberscope with the
vidicon tube. It was necessary to keep this unit as small
as possible, soit could be carried into physically
restricted areas of space vehicles. Instead of mounting
the television camera onthe fiberscope support, the
vidicon tube and its electronic yoke control as sembly were
removed from the main camera body and mounted directly
on the fiberscope Ocular end support bracket. The
34
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INSPECTION SYSTEM (Continued)
assembly was electrically connected by an adapter cable
to the main camera body and its controls. The camera was
in turn connected totwo other units. The first unit was a
Model RCV 17 Conrac TV monitor with an inherent resolu-
tion of 500 lines. The second unit was a video distribution
amplifier whichcould feed the video signal to another
communications building where the image and audio could
be permanently recorded or sent out over a television
distribution system. This system can be used in many
areas of inspection, design, and failure analysis. The
technology used to design this system could be applied to
improving existing units in the medical profession for use
in space medicine, i.e., measurement of organ movement
during launch conditions.
The project produced an operational television-fiberscope
inspection system which is available with an operator for
"on call" service.
The system consists of: •
o A Sylvania 800 series camera with 800 line
resolution.
o • A Conrac Model 14 TiV monitor with about 500
line resolution. _
o An American Cystoscope Maker's Light Supply
Model 1000 containing a 150-watt lamp and a
1000-watt mercury vapor lamp.
o A fiberoptic light supply with a 150-watt lamp;
o Two American Cystoscope Maker's Model BFO-
3864-DD fibersc0pes; one has a i/8 to 1 square
go
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REMOTE VISUAL SOLENOID TESTING BY ANALYZING Ref. Code
•INSPECTION SYSTEM (Continued) 35 ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS _ - G
- inch field size and I/4 to:_l I/2 inch focus capa-
bility and the other has a 2 square inch to over
i0 square foot field with'a focus capability from
i to over I0 inches.-Both fiberscopes are 72
inches -long, have remote focus of the objective
lens, and have remote position control of the
final 6_inches of the tip. :
The system is mounted in rnodular sections on a standard
laboratory cart, weighs 220 pounds, requires 20 amperes
at ii0 volts, and can be loaded into a car or light truck
by one or two people..: .-
The remote visualinspection system needs further re-
search and development in the areas of illumination,
use of ultraviolet light with the fibers cope, and color-
rendition and transmission through fiberoptic s.
• • : • • -_ • • • -. •
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PURPOSE: Plotting of a current rise versus time curve.
When an electrical solenoid magnet is energized with a
direct current voltage, a.characteristic rise of electrical
current is generated in the windings of the solenoid. This
current change may be plotted as a current rise versus
time curve. The electrical and mechanical characteristics
of the solenoid coil and the motion of the solenoid plunger
determine the characteristics of the derived curve.
4 "
Previous studies of the current •curves of solenoid-i •
operated mechanical devices indicated that the characteris-
tics of _the curve could be related to mechanical charac-
teristics of the solenoid and the operated device. It:was
believed that the curve could be used as an operational •
signature for the device; therefore, an analysis of the
curve parameters might provide an improved tool for
determining the operational quality of the device. Further-
more, not only Iexisting quality but gradual degradation
might be detected which would make it possible to use this
technique for failure prediction_
From the tests performed,• the accuracy of the time ,
measurements was limited by a small variation in the
Visicorder timing lines and by the large time interval of
0.01 second. No two intervals were exactly-.the same due
to motor speed variations. .The timing over _a number of
intervals was obtained by averaging the interval and-using
a rule with equal intervals as determined by the average.
Also, the intervals of O. Ol second were spaced almost an
inch apart and required a proportional method to determine
a time ending between the intervals. Another problem was
00
00
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
SOLENOID TESTING BY ANALYZING
35 ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS (Continued)
that the timing line did not synchronize with the application
of voltage to the solenoid. This synchronization is
required to start the interval being proportioned.
The preceding problems can be eliminated by the use of
a marker that is controlled by a stable oscillator. The
oscillator is divided down to obtain the desired intervals
of time and applied to another recording channel on the
Vi s ico rde r.
Two recording channels could be used to provide markers
on each side of the recording paper to give a means of
drawing in a timing line. These intervals of time could
also provide the delay times and turn on signals required
for automatic control. These signals would synchronize
the energizing of the solenoid with the markers on the
recording paper. This marker system would be highly
flexible and would cover the range of any solenoid.
A stable oscillator with the divider network was designed
and fabricated. This system provided an accuracy of
less than i millisecond over a room temperature change
of 30°F. The divider network provided markers at l-
and 10-millisecond intervals. The designed marker
system was used for tests after the tests were performed
in the first test report. The time measurements using
this system were more convenient than the previous
averaging and proportional system. A general test
system is proposed using basically the measurement used
in these tests and the marker system to provide the
SOLENOID TESTING BY ANALYZING
35J ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS (Continued)
instrument control signals. A range of current measure-
ment would be provided by switching in different current
shunts. Any calibration range could be obtained by using
plug-in modules for the DC amplifier. Several plug-in
sections with a selection switch could be used for
convenience. The plug-in modules could be fixed gain to
reduce calibration requirements or variable gain to
provide flexibility in testing. The only difficulty expected
in this system is the DC drift which can be reduced by the
use of appropriate DC circuitry. A system that is more
automated, requiring less technical knowledge, could be
developed by using digital techniques. The Visicorder and
current measurement circuits may be replaced by a
counter. The counter would count time from solenoid turn
on to the minimum current point draw (Tz)° There is no
difficulty anticipated in developing this test system. The
TZ point can be easily detected because of the steep wave
front that has consister_ly preceded the T 2 point. The
detection of the TZ point will require the development of
a stable triggering circuit that would be independent of
solenoid type.
The implementation of subject technique would provide an
improved tool for checkout, adjustment, and failure pre-
diction of solenoid-operated mechanical devices. Checkout
of the device may be accomplished by comparison of
variations of curve parameters with defined acceptable
Halts for the variations. Adjustment of the solenoid may
be accomplished to reduce the curve parameter variations
to a minimum possible value from defined nominal values.
CO
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3__ ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS (Continued)
I Failure prediction may be accomplished by comparison
of parameter variations with known initial parameters.
5"allure analysis requires an extensive analysis of
combinations of parameter variations in order to
pinpoint the exact cause of present or incipient failure s.
In some cases, it may not be practical to identify the
exact cause or causes of present or incipient failures.
Any complete failure, excepting a leakage failure, can be
detected by this technique. The test technique is sensitive
enough to detect degradation of all types of failures that
may be expected in a solenoid before complete failure.
In some cases, the test results predict the cause of
failure, but cannot predict when the failure will occur.
This technique shows improvements of accuracy,
increased failure information, and test speed over the
present test techniques.
361
SOLID-STATE RADIOGRAPHIC
IMAGE AMPLIFIERS
i|J
Ref. Code
G
PU RP OSE: Replacement for fluoroscopic screens and
X- ray film.
The developed radiographic amplifiers are intended as
equivalent or improved replacements for fluoroscopic
screens and X-ray film used in radiographic evaluations
of space vehicle components and structures. Light
sensitive storage amplifiers were developed as potential
replacements for "X-Y" type area scan-recorders, when
used with a light intensity point light source input.
Radiographic storage amplifier screens (8 x 10 inch size)
were fabricated both on glass substrates and on plastic
substrates. They were built in a simple photoconductor-
electroluminescent (PC-EL) sandwich type construction
with ZnO as the sensing material. The minimum exposure
for obtaining an acceptable image on these screens was
about 1 roentgen. The resolution was 300 to 500 lines/inch
(6 to 10 line pairs/ram). The storage time was (to 1/3
brightness) between 5 minutes to 1 hour, depending on the
preparation of the ZnO and on other construction para-
meters. The erasure of the image was achieved by heating
the panel in a furnace or by electrical heating of a panel
electrode. It needed 1 to 10 minutes depending on the
storage time of the panel.
The nonstorage higher sensitivity panels similar to
fluorescent screens, were constructed in a PC-EL
sandwich structure also, but the PC layer was sintered
CdS-CdSe powder. Threshold sensitivities were lower
than 60 mR/Minute (I rnR/sec. ),
OSPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
SOLID-STATE RADIOGRAPHIC
36i IMAGE AMPLIFIERS (Continued)
The contrast sensitivity of both types of radiographic
amplifiers closely approached the 2 percent thickness
definition per MIL-STD-453, for 0.25 inch thick
aluminum plate (2 percent penetrameter outline visible).
Light sensitive storage panels were successfully
developed. The two different approaches which evolved
were: (1) using a nonstorage PC-EL image intensifier
(CdS-CdSe) in combination with a Thorn image retaining
panel; (2) using a light sensitive ZnO photoconductor in
a simple PC-EL sandwiching construction.
Promising experiments were made by sandwiching a non-
storage radiographic amplifier panel with a light sensitive
storage panel of the ZnO type. Also, experiments with
photographic film exposure in contact with a solid-stage
radiographic amplifier improved the contrast sensitivity.
One approach to meet reasonably high requirements
would be by integrating in one unit two cascaded image
amplifiers.
SPECIAL BORE Ref. Code
37 SCOPE TECHNIQUE , A
PURPOSE: Provides 360 ° fish,eye view of
of lines.
the interior
Special bore scopes for inspection of the interior of
installed propellant supply lines have been developed.
The.borescope provides a 360 ° fish-eye view of the ,
interior of the lines.
This scope was developed to inspect for contamination in
offset areas within propellant supply lines similar to
shelf-like offsets caused by the larger diameter of bellows
within •
_'_e line. . . :
• :" "i • • " • •
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SPECTROPHOT OME TRIC Ref. Code
_8 ANALYSIS A
PURPOSE: Chemical analysis of cleaning solution
concentration.
The concentration of cleaning solutions for LOX and fuel
tanks is being determined by comparison to standard
solutions. This determination is done by spectrophoto-
metric analysis of the test solution versus the calibrated
standard solutions.
Because the previous method, chemical analysis, was
relatively slow and tedious, the spectrophotometric
system was developed which appreciably reduced the time
factor and increased the overall accuracy.
The previous chemical analysis required the evaporation
of the chemicals being tested to a given volume which was
time consuming. In the spectrophotometric method, the
chemicals can be used in their normal state, therefore,
eliminating the time required for evaporation and the loss
of chemical value.
STANDARDS DESCRIBING AND ESTI- Ref. Code
39 MATING LEAKS IN AEROSPACE HARDWARE G
PURPOSE: Standardization of leakage rate determination
using the bubble technique.
Bubble size is primarily a function of two parameters,
of air passage and air velocity; other factors such as
temperature, etc. , have very little, effect.
size
Each size leakage passage has a characteristic minimum
bubble size which prevails from the smallest observable
flow, up to the flow rate at which air velocity becomes the
governing factor. When air velocity becomes the govern-
ing factor, bubble size gets progressively larger and less
uniform, until the air velocity becomes so high that no
bubbles can form.
The minimum leak that can be reliably detected is approxi-
mately 0. 001 scim (standard cubic inches per minute).
This is approximately three bubbles per minute on threaded
AN flare fittings and the formation of a patch of milky-
white foam about the size of a match head on a flanged
fitting in I minute.
Highly skilled observers can detect lower leak rates under
ideal conditions but the limit of O. 001 scim is used as the
lower limit as it can be detected routinely by properly
trained personnel under usual field conditions.
Air passage size, as discussed above, is the basic para-
meter governing bubble size from minimum leak, up to
the point at which air velocity governs. Most threaded
flare fittings have the same order of magnitude thread
clearance and, at low flow, all leakage past the flare
xO
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STANDARDS DESCRIBING AND ESTIMATING LEAKS
39 IN AEROSPACE HARDWARE (Continued)
escapes by this route, unless blocked by excessive thread
lubricant.
This commonality of thread clearance passages explains
the characteristic small uniform (approximately 1/64 to
5/64 inch diameter) bubbles that occur and persist on
threaded flare fittings. As the flow rate increases, a
definite point is found where air velocity causes larger
bubbles of random size to form and persist, although
for a shorter time. A second distinct change occurs at
some higher flow where very large bubbles form that are
short lived.
Flanged fittings exhibit an entirely different behavior at
low flow rates. The characteristic leak through a flanged
fitting is a number of very fine hair-like leak paths and
results in very small bubbles which, through a detraction
phenomenon, often appear as a milky-white foam within
the liquid detection agent and may build up like a deposit
of shaving cream lather.
At higher rates where air velocity is the governing
parameter, larger bubbles of random sizes occur as in
the threaded fitting.
Fifty-five samples (ii each 0f 1/4, 3/8, i/2, 3/4, and
1 inch) of flared tubing connectors were tested to obtain
quantitative values for transition flow rates. It was
found that the spread on all sizes was very similar for
each transition and that a meaningful pattern emerged.
STANDARDS DESCRIBING AND ESTIMATING LEAKS
39 IN AEROSPACE HARDWARE (Continued)
It is concluded that fitting leaks can be divided into types
and classes as described, and the approximate flow rates
can be estimated as follows:
Threaded Type
Class I
Class II
Class III
0. 001 to 0.4 scim
0.4 to 2.8 scim
2.8 to 47.0 scim
Flange Type
0.001 to 1.3 scim
i.3 to 4.0 scim
4.0 to 50.0 scim
For flange Class I leaks, the volume of accumulated foam
after 1 minute can be estimated for approximate flow
rates.
For threaded fittings, each Class I bubble is usually i. 3
x 10 -4 cubic inches. Therefore, a bubble count for 1
minute multiplied by i.3 x 10 -4 will give an approximation
in scim.
With experience, an observer can further refine the esti-
mate within Class I of both types, especially at the low end,
by observing buildup per unit time.
,.0
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Ref. Code
40_ TEST ASSESSMENT PROGRAM A
PURPOSE: Validation/revalidation of system functions.
The cessation of testing of a system or the removal of
any member of that system, whether during or after
completion of a test, has always initiated some degree of
suspicien regarding the integrity of that system. The
Test Assessment Program, designed to meet the needs of
the Saturn test program, addresses the validation/revali-
dation effort to he "real-time" and continuous in nature.
An assessment of a tested system is performed immedia-
tely before and after testing. The pretest assessment is
designed to determine if any constraints exist which might
adversely affect the tested system. The immediate post-
test assessment designates whether any unplanned events
which occurred during the specific system test have
caused invalidation of that system or of previously tested
system s.
This program has proven the feasibility of performing a
continuous audit function as an adjunct to major test
activities. Details of operation would require revision
to conform to specific program requirements, but the
basic concept can be realistically applied for major test
activities of any future programs. Ft%rthermore
economy of operation can be realized since the amount of
research work required to ascertain the integrity of a
tested system can be reduced considerably.
THRUST CHAMBER
4 1 LEAK CHECKS
Ref. Code
D
PURPOSE: Provides a sealed cavity inspection area for
inspection of thrust chambers.
In order to perform leak checks of tube-to-tube braze
joints for thrust chambers, a special leak test pit was
designed. This pit provided a means to support a thrust
chamber in an inverted position with a sealed cavity
surrounding the external portion of the thrust chamber.
This cavity could then be pressurized and a leak check
made internally of tube-to-tube braze joints.
TOPOGRAPHICAL
42 RECORDER
SPECIAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Measurement of irregular surfaces.
When the necessity exists to provide continuous recordings
of measurements to define the extent of alignment and/or
mismatch, the time factor reaches such a magnitude
that serious schedule delays can be anticipated and an
automated system is mandatory.
The topographical recorder system provides an accurate,
efficient, and cost optimized technique for the inspection
of welded seams. The recorder, by means of a
comparator stylus, is capable of providing an alignment
determination and comparison, and a visual display of
these measurements as a one step operation. The
visual display is in the form of deviations from a
reference line ona strip chart recorder. The strip chart
provides a permanent record of the inspection and the
actual values of the measurements. As the name implies,
the recorder is also capable of providing an exact
determination of the topography of concave or convex
"cans" which might occur on a bulkhead surface of the
propellant tanks _
This technique appears to be readily adaptable for any
pressure vessels which would require inspection of
welded seams.
TORQUE WRENCH
I CALIBRATOR43
Ref. Code
D
PURPOSE: Precision to _+0.5 percent of reading.
A torque wrench calibrator was designed, built, and placed
into service. This equipment is a unique advancement in
the state-of-the-art in that it is accurate to +0. 5 percent
of reading in a usable range of 5 to 4,000-foot pounds.
This is five times more accurate than commercially
available equipment. This equipment was necessary on the
Saturn program because of the necessity to provide torque
wrenches within required accuracies.
OU
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ULTRASONIC DELTA TECHNIQUE FOR Ref. Code
ALUMINUM WELDS AND MATERIALS G
PURPOSE: Rapid scanning weld inspection for penetra-
tion and fusion.
The Delta Technique is a unique, multicrystal inspection
method that is relatively insensitive to defect orientation.
Internal weld defects including lack of penetration and lack
of fusion were readily detected when using this technique.
This technique is capable of rapid scanning rates while
providing a simultaneous and permanent record of the
test results.
Test demonstrated that the Delta Technique successfully
detected the weld defect of primary concern in Z014 and
Z219 aluminum alloy weldments at inspection rates of
50 feet per hour. Lack of penetration of a 0. 030 inch
x 0. 060 inch size and lack of fusion as narrow as 0. 025
inch were reliably detected by the Delta Technique.
Microfissuring, a laminar shrinkage type defect found in
3/16 inch and i/4 inch weld sections was detected by the
Delta Technique where radiographic techniques failed
because of unfavorable defect orientation.
Correlation of the nondestructive tests was made by
destructively analyzing 18 feet of weld for_total defect
content. Findings of this study show that for a quantity
of weldments containing tight lack of penetration up to
80 percent of the total defects were detected by the Delta
Technique while only 36 percent of the total defects were
detected with radiography.
44
ULTRASONIC DELTA TECHNIQUE FOR
ALUMINUM WELDS AND MATERIALS (Continued)
A manual Delta probe and a Delta wheel assembly were
fabricated in Phase II of this program. An evaluation of
these Delta configurations was made by inspecting 168
inches of aluminum butt weld, sectioning the welds, and
comparing the correlation percentages with those obtained
in the development of a Delta weld inspection i_oraluminum
welds (Phase I). Both the Delta wheel and the manual
Delta probe provided the same quality of weld inspection
obtained in Phase I.
<O
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ULTRASONIC IN-PLACE TUBE WELD Ref. Code ULTRASONIC
INSPECTION SYSTEM D 46 TECHNIQUE
PURPOSE: Inspection of tube welds.
This system was designed for inspecting critical in-place
tube closeout welds on hydraulic lines. It is capable of
PURPOSE: Detection of metal faults.
Ref. Code
A
Ultrasonic inspection techniques have been refined or
developed to provide for:
inspecting closeout welds ranging from 0. 250 to One inch
in diameter and weld cross sections of 0. 020 to one inch.
Some unique features of the system are the split lucite
rings which serve as the transducer positioner and also
act as a couplant darn. A vernier assembly provides pre-
cise indexing of the transducer during the manaal scanning
of the weld. The miniaturized components permit ultra-
sonic inspections to be performed with limited access to
welds or space adjacent lines.
ao
b.
C.
d.
Detection of surface cracks due to stress
corrosion
Detection of cracks in thin (0. 090 inch)
aluminum sheets
Inspection of installed electrical feed-through
connectors for detection of O-ring grooves.
Determination of actual fusion diameter of spot
welds.
--4
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ULTRASONIC TUBE Ref. Code
47 ANALYZER SYSTEM D
, n,,, , ,,,,
PURPOSE: Inspect and measure thickness of tubes.
The ultrasonic tube analyzer system that was developed
was the first such system in the country which had the
capability of ultrasonic inspecting and performing thick-
ness measurements on both straight and tapered tubing
ranging from 0. 125 to one inch in diameter and resolving
material discrepancies as small as 0. 002 inch in depth.
This inspection can be performed at inspection speeds of
40 feet per minute. The rotating head is equipped with
two transducers, one to detect circumferential defects
and one to detect longitudinal defects. The information
from the transducers is transferred through a capaci-
tance coupler to a receiver and the results recorded on a
strip chart recorder.
48
UNIFORM REFERENCE
STANDARDS
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Clarification and definition of Class I
docum entation.
Due to the nature of the various processes associated with
the fabrication and installation of electrical components,
assemblies, cable routing and tubing, ducting, and piping
installations, difficulties arise in achieving uniform
interpretation of acceptance criteria.
A system of Uniform Reference Standards was therefore
established. The Uniform Reference Standards provided
reference standards to clarify and further define existing
Class I documentation and specifications. For example,
wire or cable routing is seldom spelled out in Class I
documentation as to length, configuration of bends,
method and spacing of supports, and other aspects only
derived after mock-up fit, etc.
This effort resulted in the production of the following
documents :
ae Uniform Reference Standards for Inspection of
Electrical Assemblies and Components
be Uniform Reference Standards for Inspection of
Electrical Installations
C. Uniform Reference Standards for Inspection of
Tubing, Ducts, or Piping Installations.
By being collected into book form, the reference standard
can be made available to all personnel within manufacturing
,.O
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UNIFORM REFERENCE
STANDARDS (C ontinued!...
or assembly areas. Since the book format makes
graphical and/or descriptive narratives immediately
available at the point of need, i. e. , the solderer's bench,
the inspection station, etc. , it is not necessary for
individuals to attempt to maintain a "memory picture"
of a correct assembly. Since visual images tend to
become more and more a matter of individual interpreta-
tion with the passage of time, the uniform reference
technique further provides a constant refresher course
for the correct procedures which were learned during
the formal schooling phase of the training cycle.
Ref. Code
49 USON LEAK DETECTOR D
PURPOSE: Detector for use on all helium supported
systems.
The Uson leak detector which was developed as a result
of the overall Saturn program proved very useful. The
use of this device allows use of helium as the pressurizing
medium without a tracer gas and a Halogen leak detector.
Since helium is the control, medium for most pneumatic
systems and the use of helium provides a more sensitive
leak detection method than gaseous nitrogen, reliability
was enhanced by utilization of the Uson leak detector.
,.O
,.O
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VACUUM PLATE INSPECTION Ref. Code
TECHNIQUE FOR CORK DEBONDS B
PURPOSE: Verifythe structural integrity of sheet cork
insulation.
A nondestructive inspection technique has been developed
to Verify the structural integrity of sheet cork insulation
in the vicinity of the LH2 feedlines on the Saturn vehicle.
The capability is required primarily to detect any cork/
foam debonds that may }lave occurred as a result of
static firing of the stages. The objective is to provide
assurance that the cork insulation is structurally sound
prior to CDDT at KSC, and descrlbes the inspection
device and provides operating procedures for inspection
personnel. .....
The inspection technique consists of the application of a
tensile load, by vacuum, to the cork/foam composite
while measuring the amount of induced deflection of the
cork. Cork debonds, as small as two inches in diameter,
will display a_marked increase in deflection compared to
structurally sound areas.
VOLUMETRIC GAS FLOW
51 MEASURING TECHNIQUE
Ref. Code
A
PURPOSE: Use of alignment optics and a closed T. V.
system.
Volumetric gas flow reading s are being taken by using
alignment optics and a closed T.V. system. This technique
Jis 25 percent faster and more accurate than the previous
!technique, which used two men, allows direct reading, and
requires only one man for operation.
OO
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Ref. Code
52 _ WELDING PROGRAM A
PURPOSE: Precertificationfor the welder and process.
Assurance was required that the Saturn welding program
would, in fact, prwduce reliable weld joints on all weld-
ments. This problem was approached in several stages
which are listed below:
I. Weld Certification
a. Process certification
b. Operator certification
(I) Manual welder
(2) Machine operator
c. Certification status of weldment
d. Equipment calibration and control
2. Welding Evaluation Program
3. Weld Motivation Program
4. In-Process Control of Weld Variables
The program was designed to establish a means of
implementing the applicable specifications to a program
that would ensure ultimate reliability.
52 WELDING PROGRAM (Continued.)
The system involved precertification requirements for the
welder and the process. A training program was
established for welders and also a weld development
program for weld processes. Criteria were established
to evaluate results and a system of records reflected
the progress.
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